In 2012–2013, the Chinese state was in a state of crisis. It had just experienced a political storm in relation to the abrupt downfall of political giant Bo Xilai, who had built a formidable power base and political movement in western China. Newly minted president Xi Jinping forced an aggressive anticorruption campaign that targeted incumbent state officials. There were widespread economic troubles, with shrinking exports, loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and industrial overcapacities. On top of all this, America’s diplomatic “encirclement” of China was succeeding – the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had signatures from twelve major economies in the Asia Pacific region, and China was being excluded. Facing these challenges, Chinese officials and state-affiliated researchers were concerned and gloomy. They had workable proposals to address these challenges; but none of them, in 2012–2013, gained enough traction to rally cross-agency support and societal approval.