Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T15:44:42.410Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Syntax based approaches to belief revision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 September 2009

Peter Gärdenfors
Affiliation:
Lunds Universitet, Sweden
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Belief revision is the process of incorporating new information into a knowledge base while preserving consistency. Recently, belief revision has received a lot of attention in AI, which led to a number of different proposals for different applications (Ginsberg 1986; Ginsberg, Smith 1987; Dalal 1988; Gärdenfors, Makinson 1988; Winslett 1988; Myers, Smith 1988; Rao, Foo 1989; Nebel 1989; Winslett 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1991; Doyle 1990). Most of this research has been considerably influenced by approaches in philosophical logic, in particular by Gärdenfors and his colleagues (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, Makinson 1985; Gärdenfors 1988), who developed the logic of theory change, also called theory of epistemic change. This theory formalizes epistemic states as deductively closed theories and defines different change operations on such epistemic states.

Syntax-based approaches to belief revision to be introduced in Section 3 have been very popular because of their conceptual simplicity. However, there also has been criticisms since the outcome of a revision operation relies an arbitrary syntactic distinctions (see, e.g., (Dalal 1988; Winslett 1988; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1989))—and for this reason such operations cannot be analyzed on the knowledge level. In (Nebel 1989) we showed that syntax-based approaches can be interpreted as assigning higher relevance to explicitly represented sentences. Based on that view, one particular kind of syntax-based revision, called base revision, was shown to fit into the theory of epistemic change. In Section 4 we generalize this result to prioritized bases.

Type
Chapter
Information
Belief Revision , pp. 52 - 88
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×