Epistemic norms for practical reasoning usually concern the question which epistemic condition must be met for it to be rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I call this the classical question. In this chapter, I broaden the debate about epistemic norms, going beyond the classical question by focusing on ends. In section 2.1, I argue that we can approach the question of which ends one can rationally pursue by answering the question what one may hope for. In section 2.2, I argue that the standard condition on rational hope is too weak to properly constrain what one can rationally hope for. In section 2.3, I give my own account of what one may epistemically hope for, to which knowledge is central. In section 2.4, I point out that this suggests a novel angle on the knowledge-first program. In section 2.5, I relate my account of hope back to pursuing ends. Finally, in section 2.6, I argue that the wide variety of ends one can rationally pursue shows that many of the suggested epistemic norms that concern the classical question are overly demanding.