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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2010
INTRODUCTION
In Metaphysics Η.6 Aristotle famously remarks:
What then is the cause of what is potentially F being actually F in the case of things that come to be over and above the efficient cause? For, nothing other is the cause of what is potentially a sphere being actually a sphere; rather this [i.e. the cause] is what it is to be for each of them singly.
(1045a30–3)This passage and its immediate context can be interpreted in several ways. One interpretation, which I have defended elsewhere, runs as follows.
‘If we consider the issue of the unity of a composite in terms of
matter: form
potentiality: actuality
there is no longer a difficulty. What makes it the case that
potentiality: actuality
are paired in such a way as to form a composite unity is that they share a cause: what it is for each of them to be what they are (a formal cause).'
Consider an example: in the case of man the actuality, according to this view, is being alive in a given reason-involving way. This is what it is to be a man: the relevant formal cause. The matter in question is made what it is by this formal cause: it is what is capable of being alive in this way. When what is capable of being alive in this way is actually alive, there is a unified composite.
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