Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
- 2 Career theories of monetary policy
- 3 Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies
- 4 Careers and the monetary policy process: Three mechanism tests
- 5 Careers and inflation in developing countries
- 6 How central bankers use their independence
- 7 Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
- 8 The politics of central banker appointment
- 9 The politics of central banker tenure
- 10 Conclusion: The dilemma of discretion
- References and Author index
- Subject index
- About the type, figures, and data
- Other Books in the Series
Other Books in the Series
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
- 2 Career theories of monetary policy
- 3 Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies
- 4 Careers and the monetary policy process: Three mechanism tests
- 5 Careers and inflation in developing countries
- 6 How central bankers use their independence
- 7 Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
- 8 The politics of central banker appointment
- 9 The politics of central banker tenure
- 10 Conclusion: The dilemma of discretion
- References and Author index
- Subject index
- About the type, figures, and data
- Other Books in the Series
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank PoliticsThe Myth of Neutrality, pp. 359 - 364Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013