Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Causes and Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis
- 2 Capital Flows and Crises
- 3 The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis: Korea and Thailand Compared
- 4 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, Taiwan and the Asian Financial Crisis
- 5 Indonesia: Reforming the Institutions of Financial Governance?
- 6 Political Impediments to Far-reaching Banking Reforms in Japan: Implications for Asia
- 7 Dangers and Opportunities: The Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis for China
- 8 The International Monetary Fund in the Wake of the Asian Crisis
- 9 Taming the Phoenix? Monetary Governance after the Crisis
- 10 The Vagaries of Debt: Indonesia and Korea
- 11 The New International Financial Architecture and its Limits
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Taming the Phoenix? Monetary Governance after the Crisis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Causes and Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis
- 2 Capital Flows and Crises
- 3 The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis: Korea and Thailand Compared
- 4 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, Taiwan and the Asian Financial Crisis
- 5 Indonesia: Reforming the Institutions of Financial Governance?
- 6 Political Impediments to Far-reaching Banking Reforms in Japan: Implications for Asia
- 7 Dangers and Opportunities: The Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis for China
- 8 The International Monetary Fund in the Wake of the Asian Crisis
- 9 Taming the Phoenix? Monetary Governance after the Crisis
- 10 The Vagaries of Debt: Indonesia and Korea
- 11 The New International Financial Architecture and its Limits
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel – these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national.
–John Maynard KeynesFew observers doubt that the financial crisis that struck Asia in 1997–98 was a watershed event for the global monetary system. For years the tide had been running one way – toward ever closer integration of national financial and currency markets. Politically, governments were increasingly thrown on the defensive by the rapid growth of international capital mobility. As I wrote a few years ago: ‘Like a phoenix risen from the ashes, global finance [has taken] flight and soared to new heights of power and influence in the affairs of nations’ (Cohen 1996: 268). The only question, it seemed, was how much the traditional monetary authority of sovereign states had, as a result, been compromised. ‘The phoenix has risen. Does it also rule the roost?’ (Cohen 1996: 270).
Then came the fall of the Thai baht and all the contagion – the ‘bahtulism’ – that followed. For many, these events served to affirm the new power of markets to constrain policy. The phoenix did indeed rule the roost. Governments had no choice but to live with new limits on their authority. But for others, choice was precisely the issue.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000
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