Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process

doi:10.1017/9781108614856.004

3 - Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2019

Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt ,

Amalia Pulido ,

T. David Mason and

James Meernik

Edited by

James Meernik ,

Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt and

Mauricio Uribe-López

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James Meernik: Affiliation:
University of North Texas
Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt: Affiliation:
University of North Texas
Mauricio Uribe-López: Affiliation:
EAFIT University (Medelin, Coloumbia)

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Summary

On August 24, 2016, the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and leaders of the FARC rebel movement (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) signed a peace agreement designed to bring to an end the FARC insurgency that had lasted since 1964. One provision of the agreement was that it would be put to a vote in a plebiscite for Colombian citizens to ratify or reject. On October 2, 2016, the plebiscite was held and, surprisingly, 50.2 percent of voters rejected the agreement. Shortly thereafter, the Colombian government and FARC negotiated and signed a revised agreement and sent it directly to the Colombian legislature for ratification, bypassing a second referendum. Both houses of the Congress ratified the agreement, marking a formal end to the war between FARC and the government of Colombia.

Type: Chapter
Information: As War Ends
What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice
, pp. 68 - 90

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.004 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2019

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3 - Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process

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