Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
- 2 The goal of human life (Nicomachean Ethics, book 1)
- 3 Character-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 and book 2)
- 4 Actions as signs of character (Nicomachean Ethics 3.1–5)
- 5 Some particular character-related virtues (Nicomachean Ethics 3.6–4.9)
- 6 Justice as a character-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, book 5)
- 7 Thinking-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, book 6)
- 8 Akrasia, or failure of self-control (Nicomachean Ethics 7.1–10)
- 9 Friendship (Nicomachean Ethics, books 8 and 9)
- 10 Pleasure (Nicomachean Ethics 7.11–14 and 10.1–5)
- 11 Happiness (Nicomachean Ethics 10.6–9)
- References
- Index
10 - Pleasure (Nicomachean Ethics 7.11–14 and 10.1–5)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
- 2 The goal of human life (Nicomachean Ethics, book 1)
- 3 Character-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 and book 2)
- 4 Actions as signs of character (Nicomachean Ethics 3.1–5)
- 5 Some particular character-related virtues (Nicomachean Ethics 3.6–4.9)
- 6 Justice as a character-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, book 5)
- 7 Thinking-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, book 6)
- 8 Akrasia, or failure of self-control (Nicomachean Ethics 7.1–10)
- 9 Friendship (Nicomachean Ethics, books 8 and 9)
- 10 Pleasure (Nicomachean Ethics 7.11–14 and 10.1–5)
- 11 Happiness (Nicomachean Ethics 10.6–9)
- References
- Index
Summary
UNPLEASANT DIFFICULTIES
What can be so common and so well known to us as pleasure? Do we not seek it throughout the day? Does it not frequently guide or even sway our actions? Many people apparently even live for pleasures of a certain sort.
And yet it seems almost impossible to say what pleasure is. Is it a sensation, like seeing a patch of blue sky? Or is it a feeling, like joy and delight? If it is feeling, can it be enduring, like a “mood,” or is pleasure something passing, more like an emotion? But perhaps pleasure is not a “thing” that we are related to at all, but rather our being related to something in a certain way, so that to be pleased simply is to “take pleasure” in something that is not itself a pleasure. Yet is it not also pleasant to take pleasure in something? (How could it not be?) But then, if it is pleasant to be pleased, a pleasure could serve as an object of pleasure.
Moreover, what is the relationship between pleasure and attraction? Might we be repelled by a pleasure, qua pleasure, or is that suggestion nonsense? But if we are necessarily attracted to a pleasure, must we not in some sense inevitably take it to be good? It would be, if a good is a goal. Or at least this much seems true: the fact that something is pleasant seems to be some kind of sign that it is good.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Aristotle's Nicomachean EthicsAn Introduction, pp. 286 - 315Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005