Aristotle’s account of desire is extremely suggestive and worth considering in greater detail. There are a number of passages that warrant close consideration, and part of my goal here is to provide a detailed analysis of a key one: N.E. vii.6, 1149a25–b3. This passage is interesting in its own right, but when placed alongside some other key texts, it becomes significant for our understanding of non-rational desire in Aristotle’s moral psychology, in particular, concerning: (i) the ways in which non-rational desires can obey reason; (ii) the role various cognitive capacities have in the formation of non-rational desires; (iii) what it is that makes a desire count as “non-rational”; and (iv) the status of non-rational desires in virtue. My chapter has two parts. In the first, I consider the N.E. vii.6 passage in detail (sections 1–3); in the second, I address, in relation to it, the broader issues just mentioned (sections 4–7).

Before I begin, I should note that Aristotle divides desire, “orexis”, into three kinds: “epithumia” (variously translated “appetite,” “desire,” “bodily desire”), “thumos” (“spirit,” “anger,” “passion,” “temper”), and “boulêsis” (“wish,” “volition,” “rational desire”), and holds that epithumia and thumos are non-rational, whereas boulêsis is rational. To avoid potentially confusing translations, I shall leave these key terms (plus epithumia’s plural: epithumiai) untranslated (and unitalicized). I shall do the same with “akrasia” (“incontinence,” “lack of self-control”), “enkrateia” (“continence,” “self-control”) and “phantasia” (“imagination,” “appearance”) for the same reason.