Book contents
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- 17 The Economics of Horizontal Mergers
- 18 Horizontal Merger Policy
- 19 The Economic Theory of Vertical Integration
- 20 Vertical Merger Policy
- 21 Concluding Remarks
- Index
- References
20 - Vertical Merger Policy
from Part V - Mergers and Acquisitions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2022
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- 17 The Economics of Horizontal Mergers
- 18 Horizontal Merger Policy
- 19 The Economic Theory of Vertical Integration
- 20 Vertical Merger Policy
- 21 Concluding Remarks
- Index
- References
Summary
Neither vertical mergers nor mergers of complementary input suppliers alter the structure of either the upstream or downstream market. As a result, assessing their competitive significance is more complicated and more subtle than assessing the competitive significance of a horizontal merger. In this chapter, we will tease out the competitive concerns that have shaped vertical merger policy. We discuss vertical mergers in the biotechnology industry, in managed care, and between physician groups and hospitals to illustrate the difficult evaluation task assigned to the Agencies.
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- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 457 - 478Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022