Spinoza’s moral theory, or, as it is sometimes dubbed, “the ethics of the Ethics,”1 is best characterized as a form of “virtue ethic,” since its fundamental category is virtue rather than duty or obligation, which are central to deontological theories such as Kant’s. It is contained in its fourth part, which has the daunting albeit somewhat misleading title, “Of Human Bondage, or the Powers of the Affects.” As one might expect, it is grounded in the naturalist program of the preceding three parts, which culminates in the psychological egoism embedded in the conatus doctrine. Spinoza characterizes the nature of his project in a scholium to E4p18. Having presented his account of human bondage, understood as slavery to the passions in the first eighteen propositions, which explains why the title is only somewhat misleading, Spinoza abruptly shifts gear and turns to a consideration of “what reason prescribes to us, which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and which … are contrary to these rules.