Few of the conceptual distinctions in the study of human development are as fundamental, yet as fragile, as the dichotomy of prosocial and antisocial behavior. Both the ultimate strength and the inevitable weakness of this distinction arise from its direct focus on the complex relationship between the individual and his social world. A special preoccupation with the individual in relationship to society was evident in the earliest formulations of the emerging social sciences (James, 1890). However, the historical roots of the prosocial–antisocial distinction can be traced to earlier political and moral reflections on the nature of “good” and “evil” (Masters, 1983). In its simplest form, prosocial activity can be defined as that which is good or beneficial for the social group; by contrast, antisocial refers to that which is harmful to, or disruptive of, social life. That these two concepts are linked to abiding historical concerns about the nature of human conduct attests to their likely importance in any scientific study of human behavior. However, such historical antecedents also suggest important limits as well as potential misuses of these descriptive constructs in the study of human development.

The value of the prosocial–antisocial dichotomy in the description of human activity is most readily apparent when confronted with extreme behavioral contrasts. For example, lying, cheating, and stealing are generally less valued as social acts than giving, helping and sharing. Similarly, aggressive activities such as fighting and competing are usually less desirable than altruistic behaviors that involve caring and comforting.