Introduction

The Munir—Kiyani report held the opinion that if the government of Punjab had adopted an aggressive policy towards those inciting violence and hatred against the Ahmadis, the religious movements would not have reached critical mass. The adoption of noncoercive measures alone would have sufficed to keep tehrik-i-khatam-i-nabuwwat within limits. But due to the inadequacy of the administrative measures adopted – either deliberately for political expediency or out of negligence and incompetence – and the reluctance of the central government to officially reject the ulema's demands, by the end of February 1953 the government had to resort to violent, coercive methods to deal with the uprising.

This chapter chronicles the events which took place after the breakdown of negotiations between the ulema, the religio-political parties and the central government over direct action, ultimately resulting in violence. Although the disturbances were widespread in many districts of central Punjab, they were at their most intense in Lahore. The provincial bureaucracy did not foresee massive support for the movement, and this miscalculation on their part led to their failure to impose and enforce restrictions on public gatherings, providing protestors the opportunity to group together. By the time they realized the gravity of the situation, the legal, “noncoercive” modes of restriction on public agitation were largely ineffective.