Book contents
- Agency, Negligence and Responsibility
- Agency, Negligence and Responsibility
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Will and Blameworthiness
- Part II Agency, Reasons and Inadvertence
- Chapter 5 The Possibility of Pure Negligence
- Chapter 6 Agent-Relativity without Control
- Chapter 7 The Boundaries of Negligence
- Chapter 8 The Backward-Looking Puzzle of Responsibility in Negligence
- Chapter 9 Responsibility and Agency
- Part III The Significance of Action in Negligence
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - The Possibility of Pure Negligence
from Part II - Agency, Reasons and Inadvertence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 October 2021
- Agency, Negligence and Responsibility
- Agency, Negligence and Responsibility
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Will and Blameworthiness
- Part II Agency, Reasons and Inadvertence
- Chapter 5 The Possibility of Pure Negligence
- Chapter 6 Agent-Relativity without Control
- Chapter 7 The Boundaries of Negligence
- Chapter 8 The Backward-Looking Puzzle of Responsibility in Negligence
- Chapter 9 Responsibility and Agency
- Part III The Significance of Action in Negligence
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter defends the existence of negligence, understood here as a form of inadvertent moral wrongdoing for which the wrongdoer is presumptively and non-derivatively responsible and blameworthy. The wrong in question is failure of due care. This common-sensical claim needs defense in view of widespread skepticism about the possibility of non-derivative inadvertent wrongdoing. A major source of this skepticism is the conviction that all wrongdoing must ultimately derive from intentional or knowing violations.
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- Agency, Negligence and Responsibility , pp. 99 - 117Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021