Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART I HISTORY AND FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
- PART II STRUCTURING DECISION PROBLEMS
- PART III PROBABILITIES AND BAYES NETS
- PART IV UTILITIES
- PART V RISK ANALYSIS
- PART VI DECISION ANALYSIS IN A BEHAVIORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
- PART VII APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
- Index
- References
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART I HISTORY AND FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
- PART II STRUCTURING DECISION PROBLEMS
- PART III PROBABILITIES AND BAYES NETS
- PART IV UTILITIES
- PART V RISK ANALYSIS
- PART VI DECISION ANALYSIS IN A BEHAVIORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
- PART VII APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
- Index
- References
Summary
This first chapter of Advances in Decision Analysis presents definitions for decision analysis that will be used consistently throughout this volume and provides a list of references on the subject of decision analysis. As this is an edited volume on “advances” in decision analysis, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the subject to the level presented in one or more of the introductory decision analysis texts listed in the Preface.
This book attempts to maintain consistent distinctions among normative, prescriptive, and descriptive decision theories—distinctions that we find inconsistent in the literature. There is a rich and related literature on microeconomics, decision theory, behavioral psychology, and management science, which is only touched on in the following chapters.
Advances in Decision Analysis presents methodologies and applications of decision analysis as derived from prescriptive decision theory. Each of the first six parts of the book concentrates on different aspects of decision analysis. Part VII is devoted to applications of decision analysis.
The Rational Decision Maker
Many books in economics and decision analysis propose theories and methodologies that claim to be “rational.” Philosophers disagree on what is rational (Mele and Rawling 2004; Searle 2001). Many decision theories define the “rational decision maker” through mathematical principles or axioms, which, if combined, imply rational behavior (e.g., to maximize expected utility). But how compelling are these axioms? We would be remiss not to define what we mean by rationality.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Advances in Decision AnalysisFrom Foundations to Applications, pp. 1 - 12Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
References
- 1
- Cited by