Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Moral Hazard of Bureaucrats and Politicians
- 3 Political Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment
- 4 Political Moral Hazard and Bureaucratic Autonomy
- 5 “Above Politics”: The Separation of Powers and Bureaucratic Autonomy
- 6 The Control Paradox, Trust, and Leadership
- 7 Professionalism and Credible Commitment
- 8 The Politicization of Financial Regulation
- 9 The Financial Crisis and Reregulation
- 10 Conclusion: The Unraveling of Dodd-Frank
- Works Cited
- Index
- Other books in the series (Series List Continued from page ii)
3 - Political Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Moral Hazard of Bureaucrats and Politicians
- 3 Political Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment
- 4 Political Moral Hazard and Bureaucratic Autonomy
- 5 “Above Politics”: The Separation of Powers and Bureaucratic Autonomy
- 6 The Control Paradox, Trust, and Leadership
- 7 Professionalism and Credible Commitment
- 8 The Politicization of Financial Regulation
- 9 The Financial Crisis and Reregulation
- 10 Conclusion: The Unraveling of Dodd-Frank
- Works Cited
- Index
- Other books in the series (Series List Continued from page ii)
Summary
If control of my decision is in the hands of an agent whose preferences are different from my own, I may nevertheless prefer the results to those that would come about if I took my own decisions.
– Vickers (1985, 138)Bernanke, like Greenspan and Volcker before, subscribed to the view that the best way to protect a democratic society from undesirable rates of inflation was to keep control of interest rates and the supply of money away from elected politicians.
– Wessel (2009, 271)BUILDING IN AUTONOMY
Innovation in the creation of new organizations is often associated with FDR and his “alphabet soup” of New Deal agencies. But the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was an accomplishment of the previous Hoover administration, desperate to find a solution to the collapse of the housing bubble that accompanied the Great Depression.
Housing starts had boomed in the 1920s, increasing from around 100,000 new starts in 1918 to a high of more than 550,000 new starts in 1926 (Wheelock, 2008, 135). The upshot was a bubble to rival the recent housing crisis – complete with land and construction booms in Florida (Allen, 1931) and speculation that the bubble came from lax lending standards and the growing use of securitization of debt for new construction (Gordon, 1974).
In a 2009 article, economists Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith argued that this early housing bubble precipitated the Great Depression: “The standard explanation of the precipitating factor in the crash of 1929 has been excessive speculation on Wall Street. Speculation does appear to have been a factor, but then, as now, we believe that mortgage and consumer finance growth were also at the core of the problem” (Gjerstad & Smith, 2009, 287). And as Ernest M. Fisher pointed out in 1950, “The general economic expansion of that period found no more dramatic expression in any area than in that of mortgage lending. The expansion of mortgage lending was, in turn, a manifestation of a rapid expansion of our urban real estate inventory” (Fisher, 1950, 307). Construction surged, home ownership rapidly increased, indebtedness jumped by 174%, and mortgage bond issues rose from $300 million in 1920 to between $5 billion and $10 billion in 1935 (309).
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- Information
- Above PoliticsBureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment, pp. 53 - 76Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016