Thailand's on-going political crisis began with agitation against the Thaksin Shinawatra-led government, saw a military coup and a spate of street-based protest and violence. Drawing on Marx and Weber and using the categories of class, status and party, it is argued that Thailand has reached a political turning point. Subaltern challenges to the hierarchical institutions of military, monarchy and bureaucracy appear to have resulted in political patterns of the past being set on a new trajectory. The social forces that congregate around old ideas associated with status honour – hierarchy, social closure and inequality, ‘Thai-style democracy’ and privilege – are challenged by those championing equality, access, voting and populism. While the balance of forces would suggest that an historical turning point has been achieved, reaction and unexpected outcomes remain possible.

Recent revisionist approaches to early pre-1500 eastern Indian Ocean history draw from and cross-reference epigraphic, archaeological, art historical, literary, cultural, textual, shipwreck, and a variety of other primary and secondary sources as these document the evolution of Southeast Asia from roughly 300 to 1500, before significant European regional presence became a factor. This study's focus is the transitional importance of c. 1000–1500 Indian Ocean international maritime trade and transit from the South Asian shorelines of the Bay of Bengal to the South China and Java Seas, which is conceived to have temporarily produced an inclusive eastern Indian Ocean zone of contact. In this then ‘borderless’ region there were a variety of meaningful contacts and material, cultural, and knowledge transfers that resulted in synthesis of Indian, Chinese, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian cultures and populations made possible by enhanced international maritime trade connections before European presence became a factor, a period often dated from the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511.

This article assesses indigenous perceptions of water through a comparison of the water management strategies at three ancient sites located in different ecological zones of Myanmar. Two of our examples are in the high-rainfall regions of Lower Myanmar: Thagara in the Dawei River valley flanked by mountains on the east and west, and Kyaikkatha on delta lands at the egress of the Sittaung River. We contrast these adaptations with the micro-exploitation of the scarce water resources at Bagan (also spelled Pagan) in the arid zone of Upper Myanmar. In the southern wet regions, despite the different geographical setting of Thagara and Kyaikkatha, the focus was on drainage and control. Multiple ramparts and moats were used to conserve the scarce water in the dry months between December and April and control the heavy floods of the rainy months between May to November. At Bagan, sited directly on the broad Ayeyarwady River, water management of inland streams and seasonal lakes maximised the gentle slope of the plain while also coping with intermittent flash floods in the rainy months. The sites of Thagara, Kyaikkatha, and Bagan demanded specific adaptations but are alike in the absence of extensive transformation of the landscape. This balance of manmade and natural elements provides common ground despite their variable size and urbanised extent, ecological setting, and occupational sequence to highlight the shared significance of water management in their long-term urban success.

The maritime regions of Southeast Asia played an important but varying role in connecting South Asia and China prior to the sixteenth century. With regard to commercial exchanges, traders, ships, and polities in Southeast Asia facilitated and sometimes controlled the flow of goods. Additionally, merchant associations from South Asia and China established their bases in Southeast Asia to participate in trading activities in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea regions. At least three distinct networks emerged as a result of these maritime interactions: 1) networks of exchanges among the polities skirting the Bay of Bengal; 2) networks that connected the areas around the South China Sea; and 3) networks of direct exchanges between South Asia and China. Buddhist ideas also circulated through these networks, but seem to have made limited inroads in the maritime regions of Southeast Asia prior to the fifth century AD. By this time, Buddhism had already spread widely in China, with significant number of Buddhist missionaries arriving in the region through the maritime routes. Rather than playing a staging role in the transmission of Buddhism to China, the doctrine may have penetrated maritime Southeast Asia due to the vibrant Buddhist interactions and a significant increase in commercial activity along the networks linking South Asia and China during the fourth and fifth centuries. The use of Buddhism to legitimise new regimes in China and the diplomatic exchanges between Southeast Asian polities and these courts may have also facilitated the spread of Buddhism in the region.

The Sa'dan Toraja of upland Sulawesi, Indonesia have long been celebrated in the anthropological literature for their elaborate procession-filled mortuary rituals, which draw vast networks of kith and kin to mourn, memorialise, and reaffirm familial bonds and obligations. Whether residing in the homeland or abroad, most Torajans underscore funeral rites as the most vital expression of Toraja familial and cultural identity. Although some estimates suggest that more Torajans now reside off-island and overseas than remain in the homeland, extended familial funerals in the homeland continue to have a centripetal physical, economic and emotional pull. While various scholars have documented the ways in which remittances from Toraja migrants or the presence of international tourists have transformed Toraja funerals in recent decades, this article focusses on the role of social media in navigating global familial relationships and rituals. Indonesia has the largest number of Facebook subscribers in the world, and this study offers the first exploration of the ways in which Facebook interweaves far-flung familial relationships. This study also examines house-society orientations in the Toraja highlands and addresses the use of Facebook by Torajans in the homeland to cultivate continued allegiances to ancestral houses (around which extended Toraja families are oriented). Finally, this article also examines a large-scale 2012 Toraja funeral in order to spotlight the contours of the Toraja family in the current era of neoliberalism and cyber-technologies. The article offers insights into the ways in which various Torajans navigate social media and non-local corporations to image, reimagine and negotiate familial identities for various audiences (local, national and transnational).

An increasing number of reports and studies on offenses against religious minorities has been published in Indonesia since the country's democratic transition in 1998. While the literature on intolerance unveils the young democracy's institutional problems which have undermined and eroded minority rights, such as direct elections and the lack of judicial independence, it leaves many critical questions to address. Although the number of victims of religious intolerance increased, in the same institutional settings, a large number of religious minorities has managed to prevent escalating violence and avoid being targeted by intolerant groups. Under what circumstances and how do minorities deter attacks in a time of heightened tension against them under a democratic system that has afforded them little protection? This article sheds light on the case of the Shi'a who suffered a series of attacks in Sampang, Madura in the East Java province, but have since gradually developed resilience. A series of attacks in Sampang in 2011–12 was one of the most destructive events against religious minorities in Indonesia. Examining the Sampang incidents, this article argues that if the religious minority can develop a cohesive network with elements of the majority capable of mobilising state power, it would build a safety net preventing attacks by intolerant groups. Thus, this article aims to develop our understanding of how religious minorities address violence caused by hostile socio-political forces and adapt to Indonesia's democracy.

Drawing on new archival evidence, this paper focuses on the origins of Vietnam's foreign economic policy of 1986, better known as doi moi (renovation). The existing scholarship contends that doi moi ideas emerged amid Vietnam's socio-economic crisis during the late 1970s through a bottom-up process of market-oriented activities by local authorities. I argue, however, that these scholars overlooked the early ideas of economically engaging the West to obtain advanced technology to raise the Vietnamese products’ quality, and therefore, their competitiveness in the socialist bloc. Following the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Vietnamese diplomats-turned reformists studied the role of western technology and capital investment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Politburo entrusted Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, a senior advisor to Hanoi's chief negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris, to conduct a series of clandestine studies on the role of western technology in economic relations between East and West. Thach's learning about the West's technological revolution led them to the shocking conclusion that the Soviet bloc was at least a decade behind the West in technological development. The fear of Vietnam being trapped in economic backwardness propelled these reformers to advocate bold ideas of economically engaging the West in the post-Vietnam War era to extract advanced technology to support post-war economic development and modernisation. However, it took an economic crisis (1977–78), followed by another costly two-front war against Cambodia and China between 1979 and 1985, for reformist Nguyen Co Thach's ideas to prevail over the conservative faction's military-first policy.

Existing analyses of the Islamic turn in regional Islamic politics in Indonesia have overlooked the possibility that these politics – often critiqued for their negative implications for minorities and vulnerable segments – are to some extent reflections of indigenous cultural dispositions. Drawing on the author's long-time ethnographic work in West Java, as well as recent anthropological theorising about public ethics in Islamic societies, the article identifies a significant correlation between, on the one hand, the practical forms and legislative outputs of the regional Islamic turn, and on the other, a characteristic notion of public decorum that is asserted in routines of embodied Islamic observance. The article notes that this extension of an embodied, practice-based public ethics into the political regimes of national life has created conflict with the disembodied civic order established in Indonesia's constitution and state ideology.

The article explores the process behind the construction of the Chao Phraya Dam, the first World Bank-funded water infrastructure project in Thailand, developed during the 1950s. Employing Andrew Pickering's ‘dance of agency’ concept in examining the process of turning financial and technical assistance into a workable project, I argue that development infrastructure, like the Chao Phraya Dam, provides a space to explore the dialectic operations – accommodation and resistance – of agency and the unstable associations among diverse actors, expertise, institutions, and materials, as well as practices. Recounting the history of the dam in the making, I explore a series of entanglements through different dances of agency, namely initiation, assessment, mobilisation, negotiation, adjustment, confrontation, and settlement. Such a multiplicity of dances inside and in the making of infrastructure reflects the techno-political entanglement encompassing the manifold negotiation and adjustment of conflicting goals, interests, recognition, and cooperation among different agencies. The dam, often portrayed as an engineering achievement of the state, is in fact the result of unanticipated relations and the responses to the temporal emerging forms of practices.

Since the opening of the Sino-Burmese border trade in 1988, the movement of goods and people from both sides has increased rapidly. In 2011, China became Burma's largest trading partner and over half the total volume of goods was accrued in cross-border trade via Yunnan. However, national figures on import-export volumes are derived solely from legal flows, while contraband is largely overlooked. To date, academic studies on contraband have remained insufficient, partly due to the difficulty accessing Burmese border areas, and partly due to the mere challenges in obtaining information about smuggling from those who engage in such activity. This paper, based on multiple fieldwork sites over several years, examines a particular contraband – the smuggling of Chinese motorcycles to Burma on the ‘new’ Burma Road. This shadow economy thrived between 2000 and 2014. While highlighting its economic rationality beyond state control, I attempt to make diachronic and synchronic comparisons by engaging with dialogues within the historical trading mechanism of the mule convoys in the region and also with theories of shadow economies generated from contemporary case studies in other parts of the world. I argue that the formation of this shadow economy is not haphazard but adheres to the ethos of the mule caravan trade, predicated on local knowledge and social networks.

Beginning in the early 1960s—and especially by the end of the decade—a large number of the ethnic Hmong people in Thailand aligned themselves with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). By the 1970s, most of the CPT's “liberated areas” were located in remote, mountainous areas populated by Hmong people. In this paper, I situate Hmong involvement in CPT through the literature related to the multi-ethnic connections being made through the organisation of armed groups and argue that Hmong involvement with the CPT was transnational, transcultural and gender-relations-transforming. The first Hmong Thai to join the CPT was recruited in neighbouring Laos. Other Hmong in Thailand heard about the CPT through radio broadcasts from Laos in Hmong language. Furthermore, many of the early CPT recruits travelled from their homes in Thailand for political and military instruction at a basic training centre called A-30, which was located somewhere in northern Laos near the border with China. There, most Hmong CPT recruits learned to speak, read and write central Thai language. Hmong CPT also started to meaningfully interact with other Thais, including those from northeastern and southern Thailand and Chinese Thais from Bangkok. Later, those deemed to have particular potential were sent to study in China or in Vietnam for specific military training. Some Hmong sent their children to study with the CPT; others went on their own. The Hmong also interacted with people from other communist movements in Southeast Asia.

There is a northern Thai story that tells how the naga—a mythical serpent—came and destroyed the town known as Yonok (c. thirteenth century) after its ruler became immoral. Despite this divine retribution, the people of the town chose to rebuild it. Many archaeological sites indicate resettlement during this early historical period. Although many temple sites were constructed in accordance with the Buddhist cosmology, the building patterns vary from location to location and illustrate what this paper calls ‘nonconventional patterns,’ distinct from Theravada Buddhist concepts. These nonconventional patterns of temples seem to have been widely practiced in many early historical settlements, e.g., Yonok (what is now Wiang Nong Lom). Many local written documents and practices today reflect the influence of the naga myth on building construction. This paper will demonstrate that local communities in the Chiang Saen basin not only believe in the naga myth but have also applied the myth as a tool to interact with the surrounding landscapes. The myth is seen as a crucial, communicated element used by the local people to modify and construct physical landscapes, meaning Theravada Buddhist cosmology alone cannot explain the nonconventional patterns. As such, comprehending the role of the naga myth enables us to understand how local people, past and present, have perceived the myth as a source of knowledge to convey their communal spaces within larger cosmological concepts in order to maintain local customs and legitimise their social space.

Admirers of ASEAN are impressed with the fact that it continues to exist and that an outright war has never broken out between its members. Also often praised is the value to the region of promoting cooperation through the consensual process known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. If ASEAN is a talk shop, these observers say, talking is at least better than fighting. ASEAN's increasingly numerous and vocal critics reply that by valuing process more than product, consensus over accomplishment, the organization is failing to respond to urgent real-world challenges in Asia. Not least among such challenges is Chinese expansion in the South China Sea (SCS) and the stated intention of incoming US president Donald Trump to pull his country out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Only four ASEAN members have claims in the SCS and only four are in the TPP, but the sea's and the treaty's futures matter for the rest of the region as well. The fact of Chinese advancement and the risk of American disengagement are endangering the autonomy and relevance of ASEAN, not to mention the repercussions of Sino-American escalation. Already weakened by internal dissensus, the group's ability to negotiate as a group with China on maritime security has been blocked by Beijing's insistence on bilateral talks. Chinese material largesse has coopted Cambodia into vetoing any ASEAN agreement to restrain, moderate, or even question China's designs on the heartwater of Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Way is being used against ASEAN itself. Heightened uncertainty as to America's future role in and commitment to the region further heightens security concern. In its 50th anniversary year, Southeast Asians would do well to think outside the increasingly marginalised, internally divided, and procedurally restricted box that ASEAN has become. Three ideas already in circulation illustrate the kind of creativity that ASEAN will need if it is to sustain its acknowledged historical success in fashioning an independent political and economic identity for Southeast Asia.

The relationship of the bourgeoisie and democratisation has been inconsistent across the history of democracy. This work offers an alternative explanation taking the example of the Thai middle class, which had promoted democracy, turned against it. From the democratic transition of 1973 until the present day, the Thai middle class has played contradictory roles in the democratisation of the country. This work investigates the effects of democratic institution-building after regime change and the efforts to consolidate democracy in the middle class. This work proposes two major observations. The first is the failure of the middle class to establish themselves in democratic institutions and processes in either the legislature/executive, political parties, local government or structured interest groups. They have learned of the uncertainty of free elections and how the elected executives have benefitted other classes but not them. The second regards the missing prerequisite of democracy. Insufficient understanding of majority rules and two-turnover elections, caused the middle class who were disappointed with the outcome of democratic regimes and systems to easily turn away from democracy.

Higher education in East Asia is at an important historical juncture where its flagship universities are locked in a race to internationalise. In this restructuring, international students become a critical element in university and national strategies, as a key resource to strengthen university research and to augment the skilled labour force of a country. This article examines the issue of student migration at three scales. First, an idea of the regional magnitude of student movements is determined by examining inbound and outbound movements of students moving out of their home countries to study abroad within Pacific Asia (East and Southeast Asia). Second, by using Singapore as a case study, the paper examines the role of state policy in the internationalisation of higher education. We see how state and university policies shape the new work of flagship universities. And third, by drilling down further and using a survey sample of National University of Singapore international students, the main body of the paper examines the process of decision making, the elements which attract students to Singapore, their adjustment process, and their plans after graduation. This paper argues that the internationalisation of education brings about a powerful set of influences to the host society particularly when there are policies facilitating foreign students and their insertion into the host economy and society. Far from being a small temporary minority locked away in ivory towers, foreign students become the focus of policy, a talent that is sourced, a pillar supporting the economy, the hope of new marriage formation and the arrest the fertility decline, and an essential ingredient in the resultant multicultural society.

In past and present Vietnam, the dialectic of precarity and resilience shapes the everyday lives of mobile labourers. Vietnamese labour mobility is characterised by an interplay between precariousness ‘at home’ and the uncertainties of migration. The paper aims to highlight continuities and contingencies in the longue durée of Vietnamese work migration through a historical contextualisation of precarious labour relations. Both colonial ‘coolie’ workers and present-day labour migrants share similar experiences, for example socioeconomic marginalisation in the regions of origin, opportunity and risk, and emerging translocal identities.

This study probes the relationship between legal precarity and transborder citizenship through the case of the Karen from Myanmar in Thailand. Collected through ethnographic multi-sited fieldwork between 2012 and 2016, interconnected individual life stories evolving across the Myanmar-Thailand border allow the critical interrogation of the political and legal categories of ‘migrancy’, ‘refugeeness’, and ‘citizenship’, teasing out their blurry boundaries in migrants’ experience. Following the recent critical research in legal ethnography, this study demonstrates that legal precarity is not simply an antithesis to citizenship. The social and legal dimensions of citizenship may diverge, creating in-between areas of not-yet-full-citizenship with varying levels of heft (Macklin 2007). The article consists of three parts. First, it offers a theoretical framework to reconcile the Karen legal precarity (even de facto statelessness) and citizenship, even on both sides of the border (legally impossible). Second, it presents the three groups of Karen in Thailand, produced by the interaction of three major waves of Karen eastward migration and tightening Thai citizenship and migration regulations: Thai Karen, refugees, and migrant workers. All three face varying levels of legal precarity of temporary status without full citizenship. However, the last part demonstrates the intertwined nature of those groups. A grassroots transborder perspective reveals the resilience of the Karen networks when pooling together resources of the hubs established on Thai soil by the three waves. Even the most recent arrivals in Thailand use those resources to move from one precarious legal status to another and even to clandestinely obtain citizenship.

This article discusses the relationship between Sekolah Islam (Salafism-influenced Islamic schools) and urban middle-class Muslims. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in the City of Serang (Kota Serang), near Jakarta, this paper argues that these conservative and puritan Muslims demonstrate their Islamic identity politics through their engagement with Sekolah Islam. The analysis of in-depth interviews with and close observations of parents of students and school custodians (preachers or occasionally spiritual trainers) at several Sekolah Islam reveals that they have attempted to pursue ‘true’ Islamic identity and have claimed recognition of their identity as the most appropriate. The pursuit of a ‘true’ Islamic identity has infused Islamic identity politics, and there is an oppositional relationship between local Islamic traditions and Salafism, as seen in Sekolah Islam. The relationship between Islam and identity politics becomes intricate when it is transformed into public symbols, discourses, and practices at many Sekolah Islam. This paper shows that through their understanding and activities at Sekolah Islam, these Muslims are avid actors in the contemporary landscape of Islamic identity politics in Indonesia. By taking examples from Sekolah Islam in Indonesia, this article unveils social transformations that may also take place in the larger Muslim world.

In Malaysia, a Muslim-majority country in Southeast Asia, a dynamic market for Muslim fashion has evolved over the past decade, especially concerning the abaya, a female Muslim dress. Malay Malaysian designers, producers and consumers focus on this garment because it represents a style of female Islamic clothing that is perceived as ‘authentic’. The abaya originates from the Arabian Peninsula and is generally worn by Arabic Muslim women with a syariah-compliant design that is commonly simple, loose and opaque. Embedded into the broader marketising processes of a halal industry in Malaysia, Malay women started to adopt this material object and transformed it into a distinct expression of Malaysian Muslim style. The original abaya that follows Islamic rules became a colourful and decorated dress. This transformative process is not only an expression of variation in fashion and style but profoundly transcends powerful social, placial and spatial orders within the Muslim world. The Malaysian fashion market for abayas is embedded in wider dynamics of sacred landscaping in which the Arabian Peninsula is considered to be the ‘centre of Islam’ while Malaysia is positioned and positions itself at the margins. However, Malay Malaysian social actors have shifted this constellation towards a Malaysia that has pushed itself to the forefront of a commercialising Islam through the development of the related Muslim fashion market, among other things. Thus, within a Muslim world order, transregional connections lead to an entangled web of meaning-making regarding power structures, Islamic principles and social practices.

A paradox lies at the heart of the biennial Southeast Asian (SEA) Games. On the one hand, the region's premier sporting event has consistently celebrated themes of regional friendship and cooperation; on the other, the SEA Games are synonymous with controversy and poor sportsmanship, especially over the strategic selection of sports by host nations. Yet the Games go on – every second year – just as they have done since 1959. In introducing sport to existing debates on regional community in Southeast Asia, this article seeks to understand the key features of the sporting community of the Southeast Asian Games, particularly the emergence and development of the institutions and norms that help this event to thrive in the face of national self-interest. Through this analysis, the article argues for a distinctive approach to regional community in Southeast Asia, based not on notions of unity but principles of reciprocity and exchange.