Water in many different forms and contexts is of central significance in Southeast Asia, and these differences are reflected in the vast range of spirits and deities. Despite wide variation, the most obvious distinction is between spirits associated with fresh and salt water. Those linked to water associated with fertility are typically regarded as female and sympathetic to human requests for assistance. By contrast, the spirits who inhabit turbulent river waters and patrol the shorelines may be male, female, or only vaguely gendered. Although they can be capricious and sometimes cruel, they are nonetheless amenable to individual or communal supplication. The same ambiguity is exemplified by the sea spirits, who extend rewards to those they favour but inflict harsh punishments when their anger is aroused. Yet regardless of their nature or the place with which they were associated, the ‘power base’ of indigenous spirits was always locally concentrated. The limitations in their reach help explain the appeal of cosmologies that extended across a much larger area, and even across the entire globe. The accompanying conceptualization of new and benevolent beings is especially evident in the maritime environment. Here human activity is male-dominated, and the male divinities and saints associated with supra-local belief systems might appear to be the natural guardians of mariners. Even so, culturally entrenched ideas of connections between water and maternal care facilitated the adoption of female deities as protectors of ocean-going voyagers.

This article investigates the emergence of new partisan identities in Thailand. Using data from Thailand's last several elections I trace the emergence of partisanship over the last 15 years, particularly in the north and northeast. The change in the nature of partisanship has helped turn long-simmering tensions into an increasingly intractable political conflict. This mass partisan alignment has upset the equilibrium of Thai politics, transforming what was once an inefficient but modest-stakes game of political horse-trading into a zero sum game with extremely high stakes.

The role of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council) in influencing the construction of democracy through its fatwas has fluctuated since its establishment in 1975. During the Suharto regime, which was characterised by authoritarian national leadership, MUI fatwas tended to serve the interests of the regime. Since the reform era, they have stimulated undemocratic circumstances in Indonesian Islam. This article examines MUI fatwas and their influence on democracy in the context of Indonesian Islam. The main argument of this article is that fatwas in themselves can improve or worsen the implementation of democracy. Fatwas may impede democracy if their contents are not aligned with democratic principles, while they may support the development of democracy if their contents promote democracy. Rising conservatism in Indonesia has been influenced by the issuance of fatwas that do not promote democratic values. In addition to examining the roles of fatwa givers and the methodology of fatwa issuance, this article analyses the social and political circumstances driving their issuance. This article presents examples of MUI fatwas that have democratic and undemocratic characteristics. It concludes that democratic circumstances can be achieved through opening spaces for fatwa issuance among additional fatwa institutions in Indonesia, as the monopolisation of fatwa issuance has created undemocratic tendencies in Indonesian Islam.

Water symbolisms permeate Ifugao religion, rituals, and oral tradition. Water plays a part in death, rebirth, and cleansing in Ifugao cosmology. As such, Ifugaos consider water as sacred. However, water is also central in Ifugao economy and politics. As a culture that highly values intensive wet-rice production in a mountain environment, managing access to water is necessary to maintain stability. Ifugao practices follow what Richard O'Connor described as the “agro-cultural complex” in which agricultural practices, social systems, and political, historical, and, cultural changes are understood as interlocking processes (O'Connor 1995). In this paper, we focus on the relationship between Ifugao water and agricultural rituals with the synchronizing and sequencing of agricultural activities. Using the concept of self-organization, we argue that water and agricultural rituals in Ifugao are not only meant to reinforce community cohesion, they also synchronize the farming activities crucial to a terraced ecology. Utilizing the practice of puntunaan (a ritual plot or parcel in the centre of an agricultural district) and the institution of tomona (the ritual leader of an agricultural district) as a case study, we observed that disruptions in the water and rice rituals stimulated great change in Ifugao sociopolitical organization.

Although biographical and life history approaches are potentially important tools for historical geographers, biographical methodologies have rarely been used to specifically investigate borderland dynamics. In this article, I argue that biography can be useful for understanding the ways in which borders have been recognised and negotiated historically. As a case study, I examine the life of Chao Sone Bouttarobol, a member of the Champassak Royal House, who was born in 1895 and died in 1979. As his life story illustrates, the emergence of new national borders had a significant impact on Sone, although family ties and relationships allowed him to cross the national administrative borders that now exist between Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, often with relative ease. Studying one individual makes it possible to explore the ways in which he interacted and negotiated with borders that cut across the Champassak Royal House's traditional space of influence.

This paper investigates the new and hitherto unstudied boom in cross-border Burmese amber (Burmite) trade between Myanmar and Tengchong, Yunnan province. Based on interviews with amber dealers and local officials, it describes how since 2012–13 the amber trade has become increasingly lucrative for Chinese and Myanmar traders, and has attracted a large number of people to Tengchong, which, within Yunnan, virtually monopolises the trade. After a brief historical introduction, the paper analyses the conditions that, in both countries, have made the Burmite trade boom possible. It further describes the current composition of the amber market in both Myanmar and China, before analysing recent attempts to monitor and regulate the amber trade through the institution of the Tengchong Amber Association by the city's main amber traders in collaboration with local authorities.

Indonesian women were at the forefront of activism during the turbulent period prior to reformasi and were a part of the leadership that demanded democratic change. Two decades after Indonesia embarked on democratic reforms, the country continues to face challenges on socio-religious and political fronts. Both the rise of political Islam and the increased presence of religion and faith in the public sphere are among the key features of Indonesia's consolidating democracy. This development has reinvigorated the discourse on citizenship and rights and also the historical debate over the relationship between religion and the state. Bearing this in mind, this paper looks at the narrative of women's rights and women's status in the public domain and public policy in Indonesia. It is evident, especially in the past decade, that much of the public conversation within the religious framework is increasingly centred on women's traditional social roles. This fact has motivated this study. Several norms and ideas that are relied on are based on cultural and faith-based interpretations - of gender. Therefore, this paper specifically examines examples of the ways in which social, legal, and political trends in this context affect progress with respect to gender equality and gender policy. I argue that these trends are attempts to subject women to conservative religious doctrines and to confine them to traditional gender roles. The article discusses how these developments should be seen in the context of the democratic transition in Indonesia.

This article offers an ethnographically-based counterpoint to recent optimistic macro-approaches to the “migration-development nexus” that view international labour migrants as “agents of change,” depict migration as a win-win for the sending and receiving states, and associate migration with positive changes in the sending community, including the influx of monetary remittances and the entry of new ideas, such as gender equity and human rights (Faist 2008). Based on over sixteen months of ethnographic field research among Indonesian and Filipino migrant workers who became mothers in Hong Kong, I argue that it is important to consider examples of so-called ‘failed migration’ (not only migratory successes) in order to fully understand the costs of migration, including the gendered risks and gendered inequalities. Cases of migrant mothers vividly reveal how migratory ‘failures’ are often blamed on women's individual gendered moral shortcomings, but as I argue, their experiences, and those of all migrant workers, must be understood within specific contexts of precarious labour migration and Asian neoliberal policies of exception in Asia.

Islamic finance has been growing significantly across the globe. In Southeast Asia, interest in Islamic finance and its growth is significant in Malaysia. Compared with Malaysia, in Indonesia, however, the largest Muslim population country where an Islamic resurgence has been widely taking place, the growth of Islamic banks remains slower and on a smaller scale. Furthermore, recent research shows that Islamic piety does not systematically translate into the use of Islamic banks among middle-class Indonesians. Against these findings, this article highlights a relatively understudied Islamic finance institution, Islamic Savings and Credit Cooperatives, in Indonesia commonly known as Baitul Maal wat Tamwil (BMT). The BMT sector is separate from the banking sector and as such has received little scholarly attention as part of Islamic finance in Indonesia. The number of the BMTs in Indonesia has increased significantly since the 1990s and they are grass-roots Islamic financial institutions offering financial services to relatively small-scale traders in urban areas. Based on data from anthropological research in Central Java, this article argues that Islamic propagation is an important element among the BMT founders and workers. They perceive their economic activities as Islamic propagation by deeds (dakwah bil hal) to achieve social justice.

What drives institutional reforms in regional organisations? And what explains the institutional design of ASEAN? Despite many differences, conventional approaches to the institutional design of regional organisations more generally and ASEAN in particular are united in regarding them as either determined by factors endogenous to the region − such as varying state interests or collective norms − or as exogenously driven, most importantly by hegemonic states like the US or China. This article offers a diffusion account of ASEAN's institutional design. Building on a more recent strand in the diffusion literature emphasising that diffusion rarely leads to convergence, the article makes two genuine contributions. First, it argues that members of regional organisations engage in modular adoption: they select institutional templates from a variety of regional as well as international organisations thereby taking advantage of available information on the costs and benefits of alternative institutions. Second, it argues that contextual conditions and cognitive priors influence what templates are chosen. The argument will be illustrated with a case study on ASEAN's adoption of a single market and a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, and contrary to arguments that institutional borrowing might increase the expectations-deliverance gap within regional organisations, it argues that if conducted consistently, modular adoption can lead to substantial innovation and success.

Open nearly any general text on Southeast Asia and you will find that some space is taken up in the introduction assessing the reality and validity of the regional framework on which that text rests. Likewise, with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many scholars question whether or not the regional entity amounts to anything of any substance. In this article, I mount a defence of Southeast Asia as a regional framework in scholarship and draw attention to ASEAN as an evolving regional entity. While the concept of Southeast Asia among researchers and the politics of ASEAN are distinct issues, I treat them together in this article to highlight their interrelationship and parallels. My primary objective is to outline the displaced politics – of both academic and realpolitik varieties – embedded in deconstructive and dismissive critiques of both Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Critiques of both are not without value, as they sharpen our attention to processes through which supra-national regionalism is produced. Nevertheless, I argue that regionalism remains a valuable method in both politics and scholarship, in no small part as a counterweight to the hegemony of methodological nationalism in contemporary thought and research.

In the labour brokerage state of systematic recruitment and export for the maximisation of labour, development, and profit, the Philippines continues to simultaneously fashion migrant workers as temporary, yet heroic and sacrificial. As the largest migrant-sending country in Southeast Asia and the third largest remittance recipient in Asia, the Philippines’ discourse of migrants as modern-day heroes and martyrs reveals the interplay of nationalist myths and cultural values, alongside the neoliberal favouring of finance and flexible labour, to craft filial migrants and celebrate mobile, capitalist subjects over migrants’ welfare and well-being. The article explores the contemporaneous institutionalisation of migrant labour and migrants’ institutionalised uncertainty lived every day to investigate how this profound precariousness in the Philippines is perpetuated historically to shape the resilience and realities of migrants and their left-behind children today. Drawing from news reports and films on migrant lives and ethnographic fieldwork in the Philippines, this article considers how the formation and deployment of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) turns from a focus on sustaining the nation to supporting migrant families and developing translocal communities. Through this examination, the paper seeks to uncover who profits and is indebted from the precarity created and sustained by the larger economic system built on transnational labour migration.

Private sustainability standards for palm oil – RSPO certification and especially the POIG/No Deforestation standards – show more promise than ASEAN in addressing the political-economic drivers of the fires/haze in Indonesia. ‘Sovereignty-free’ private actors – global NGOs, philanthropic foundations, and social investors – harnessed transnational markets and used consumer product multinationals and Asian palm oil traders/processers as intermediaries to reach oil palm growers previously shielded from private regulation. Exclusion of state actors gave regulatory entrepreneurs a freer hand to institute more stringent standards. This contrasts with ASEAN regional governance where state control of regional governance deflects global and local pressure for change. There are limitations, however, to the reach of voluntary private standards, which cannot address irresponsible cultivation practices in illegal supply chains and those catering to the domestic market, despite NGOs and other private regulatory entrepreneurs acting as ‘functional equivalents’ of state authorities in driving change. Nevertheless, palm oil's economic importance to Indonesia and the global market transformations underway mean that global private standards have a first-mover advantage. However, central state actors have denounced private standards as intrusions on national sovereignty. While private standards have sparked national conversations on sustainability, the political bargaining between state authority, private regulators, and their proponents is only just beginning.

During the last two decades, rural-urban migration and government programs have improved livelihood conditions in Javanese villages and brought down levels of poverty considerably. This article, based on two extended surveys in nine villages in Central Java, aims to understand the nature of change in rural Java by focusing on gender and precarity. As a result of migration, old forms of precarity have not completely disappeared: Families without children, elderly and people unable to work continue to live precarious lives. For those who work in the cities, dependence on single-source, low incomes, predominantly earned by men who work in construction, continues to keep families and especially women vulnerable for livelihood shocks and stresses. Increasingly, women from poor families work in low-paid agricultural jobs or keep the family farm running.

Migration to the cities makes it possible for many families to stay in the village and live the ‘good’ village life. The village is generally perceived, socially and ideologically, as a ‘better’ place. The flip-side of this preference is a reproduction of traditional family values and limited room to maneuver for women. Very few interesting and suitable jobs for educated women exist in rural areas. Women from poorer families need to work in agriculture. Their dependence on working men with single sources of income, continues the risk to end up or fall back into living precarious lives.

In response to global attention to the young child, early childhood programs have become a national and provincial focus in Indonesia since 2000. The roll out of public programs for low income communities has made use of a longstanding mode of delivery: the volunteered, community-based labour of women. Although susceptible to analysis as a mode of governmentality, an older scholarship on the domestic community, its role in social reproduction, and its shaping by global accumulation offers significant insights as to why this method for delivering social welfare persists, even as it dovetails with more recent work on care and networks of global care labour. Based on ethnographic work in Yogyakarta, this examination of changes in international development regimes considers the contradictory effects for the empowerment of women as against children. Ultimately, the care labour required for early childhood programming, which has been taken to follow from the naturalised link between women's socially appropriate care work and childrearing, provokes instead questions about the awkward relationship between children and women. That is to say, recent developmental regimes seem to promote the empowerment of children as against women. By foregrounding social reproduction, this awkward relationship becomes a productive way to consider the limits of governmentality and to reconsider the domestic community as critical to understand globalisation, neoliberalisation, and the reorganisation of development and social welfare in the early twenty-first century.

In this article, I argue that to capture ASEAN's importance in the promotion and protection of human rights requires embedding the analysis of what ASEAN says and does into an awareness of the broader human rights space of which it is a part. The Southeast Asian human rights space has four dimensions: ASEAN, domestic institutions, civil society, and the global United Nations system, all of which are increasingly linked together in a complex whole. Revealing this human rights space suggests three conclusions. First, ASEAN is important as an educator, enabler, standard setter, and mobiliser of human rights, often despite its flawed institutional design. This importance is the product of its own activities and how it is used by other actors. Second, ASEAN member states engage with each other on questions of human rights broadly, and not only through ASEAN, which illustrates the limits and resilience of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a set of procedural norms. Third, ASEAN, despite its growing importance to human rights promotion, has become increasingly de-centred in that field, with serious consequences for its own security agenda.

Throughout Asia, the relationship between the state and the rural sector has shifted from taxation to subsidy. The political tussles over subsistence between resistant peasants and taxing states, eloquently described by James Scott, have been replaced by a more affluent political dynamic focussed on subsidy and productivity. This article explores this transformation by means of a comparative study of Thailand and South Korea. Like many other countries, Thailand and South Korea have followed the path from taxation to subsidy but Thailand has never successfully addressed its legacy of low agricultural productivity. Contemporary South Korean agriculture, by contrast, is a result of a century-long investment in productivity improvement, in both its taxation and subsidy phases. The interaction between government policy and agricultural productivity has important political implications. Whereas South Korea has made a successful democratic transition and achieved a broad consensus on support for the agricultural sector, Thailand has failed to effectively manage the contemporary dilemmas of exchange between rural people and the state.

This article addresses transnational higher education strategies both to and from Singapore. It does so by focusing on outbound educational mobility from Singapore to the UK and inbound educational mobility from Vietnam to Singapore. Since the turn of the century, Singapore has pursued the agenda of developing itself as a regional hub for higher education, aspiring to be a Global Schoolhouse. Yet, while the number of international students grows in local universities, Singapore's academically brightest do not necessarily take advantage of higher educational opportunities within the shores of the city-state, with many traveling to universities overseas through a form of sponsored mobility. Using two case studies, I trace two logics of commodification and consecration as observed through the processes whereby individuals and institutions devise transnational higher education strategies into and out of Singapore. The first case study draws on interviews conducted with Singaporean undergraduates at Oxbridge while the second case focuses on Vietnamese students at two Singaporean universities. Together, the analysis from these cases uncovers the value for these Southeast Asian students in studying abroad and distinguishes between different types of routes that exist: one where students choose their own educational plans and another where students are chosen for a prestigious educational and occupational pathway. With increasing participation in mass higher education taking place across the region, the article outlines, through the site of Singapore, strategies of transnationalism employed by both individuals and institutions as a means of social differentiation.

More than any other scholar, James C. Scott has drawn attention to the significance of what Marx termed ‘primitive accumulation’ in the historical transformation of the societies of Southeast Asia. Taking Scott's work as its point of departure, this article sketches the broad contours of primitive accumulation across the region from the mid-nineteenth century up through the early twentieth century. The article shows how primitive accumulation unfolded in different ways in different parts of Southeast Asia and suggests how the different modalities of primitive accumulation have continued to shape the trajectories and parameters of politics across the region to this day.