It seems theoretically convenient to construe knowledge practices in financial markets and organizations as “applied economics.” Alternatively or additionally, one might argue that practitioners draw on economic knowledge in order to systematically orient their actions towards profit-maximization; models, then, are understood as devices that make calculative rationality possible. However, empirical studies do not entirely confirm these theoretical positions: Practitioners’ actual calculations are often not “framed” by models; organizations and institutions influence the choice and adoption of models; and different professional groups in financial markets have diverging attitudes towards model calculations. In order to account for this diversity, this article proposes the concept of cultures of economic and financial expertise; the concept focuses on the patterns of knowledge practices and knowledge-related self-definitions of groups within financial organizations and markets; it also facilitates an analysis of the relations between and, more specifically, the hierarchies among different practices and identities. The article then goes on to explore the process of foreign exchange forecasting in a particular bank. The description immediately reveals that two groups are involved in this process: economists and analysts. These groups maintain quite different practices and self-descriptions in relation to models: While the economists in the bank use the models as organizational resources for consistent forecasting procedures and observe data with the help of simple model structures, analysts approach model forecasts from the perspective of critics: They see limits in the variable-centered, as opposed to a “thematic” approach and they disregard a model's imposed temporality. Nevertheless, analysts use model forecasts as anchors for developing their own “paths” and stories about possible future expectation changes in the markets. The specific division of labor between economists and analysts, and specifically the dominant role of analysts in the forecasting process, fit into a larger picture: The rise of institutional investors in the foreign exchange markets and their demand for genuine market knowledge for speculative investment projects has contributed to the rise and dominance of analysts’ culture.

Kuhnian phases of paradigmatic development correspond to characteristic variations of citation measures. These correlations can in turn be predicted from a simple model of human information processing when applied to the common environments of scientists. By combining a scientometric and a human information processing approach to the history of scientific thought, structures of disciplinary development, and in particular paradigmatic cycles, can be more reliably assessed than before. Consequently, the quantitative historian of science is liberated to some extent from the vagaries of qualitative judgment, as exemplified by traditional narrative type approaches to the history of science.

This article explores the relationship between Goethe's administration of the duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach and his investigation of nature. The notion of the budget was crucial to both enterprises. In Goethe's morphological and mining works, nature's budgets were a heuristic tool by which one could elucidate natural processes. Goethe applied his epistemological approach of investigating nature to the realm of social order. Law, order, balance, and budget formed the basis of Goethe's financial reform of the duchy. He tried, unsuccessfully, to construct artificial budgets, which were intended to mirror natural budgets to guide his plans of reform.

Hugo Dingler lived from 1881 to 1954. During the academic years 1901–2 and 1903–4 he studied mathematics and physics at the University of Munich. He spent the intervening year (and then the summer of 1906) in Göttingen, where he studied mathematics with David Hilbert and Felix Klein as well as – for the first time – philosophy (with Edmund Husserl). In 1907 Dingler completed his doctorate in Munich with Aurel Voss with a dissertation on general surface deformation. His Habilitation followed in 1912, also at the University of Munich, but only for the prospectless field of “Method, Didactics and History of Mathematical Sciences.”

In this essay I will sketch a few instances of how, and a few forms in which, the “invisible” became an epistemic category in the development of the life sciences from the seventeenth century through the end of the nineteenth century. In contrast to most of the other papers in this issue, I do not so much focus on the visualization of various little entities, and the tools and contexts in which a visual representation of these things was realized. I will be more concerned with the basic problem of introducing entities or structures that cannot be seen, as elements of an explanatory strategy. I will try to review the ways in which the invisibility of such entities moved from the unproblematic status of just being too small to be accessible to the naked or even the armed eye, to the problematic status of being invisible in principle and yet being indispensable within a given explanatory framework. The epistemological concern of the paper is thus to sketch the historical process of how the “unseen” became a problem in the modern life sciences. The coming into being of the invisible as a space full of paradoxes is itself the product of a historical development that still awaits proper reconstruction.

Argument

How did Boyle’s religious concerns and views cause his experimental philosophy to differ from received views on the goals and methods of natural philosophy? I argue that Boyle predicated his experimental philosophy on two fundamental doctrines. The first claimed that attributing causality to natural entities was idolatrous, that is, intellectually and morally erroneous. The second doctrine claimed that causal relations in the natural world were the property of God’s benevolent government. Boyle’s experimental studies were accordingly intended to identify specific manifestations of this property, while philosophers traditionally construed experiment as an aid to observation of phenomena. Boyle rendered experiment a learning tool that enabled believers to accommodate themselves, theoretically and practically, to God’s benevolent rule. As a servant of the public good, this experimental philosopher formed an important turning point in the emergence of modern science and its role in the social division of labor.

Using the example of the anti-tuberculosis vaccine BCG during the 1920s and 1930s, this article asks how a labile laboratory-modified bacteria was transformed into a genuine standard vaccine packaged and commercialized as a pharmaceutical product. At the center of the analysis lies the notion of standardization inquiring why and how a local laboratory process with standard operating procedures (SOPs) reached its limits and was transformed when the product faced international distribution. Moving from Paul Ehrlich's initial technological notion of Wertbestimmung referring to a practice physiologically testing the effects of ill-defined antitoxins, the concept of standardization is extended to pharmaceutical and economical meanings implying quality control for biological therapeutic agents produced by a variety of industrial entrepreneurs. Following the request for product uniformity, two ways to maintain levels of compatibility and commonality are depicted opposing SOPs and end-product control. Furthermore, standardization is understood as a spiral, never ending process where progressive transformation of the vaccine in its production and medical uses periodically recreated the necessity of standardization. Developments analyzed are thus understood as a stabilization process aligning laboratory settings, products, and practices with medical theories and practices through technical, bureaucratic, and organizational systems. A paradox of the analysis is that standardization as a historical phenomenon and moment in the history of drug development was initially linked to a problem of under-determination of what was to be standardized and to a knowledge gap before it could become a central concept for quality control.

This article is based on a detailed survey of three British popular science magazines published during the interwar years. It focuses on the authors who wrote for the magazines, using the information to analyze the ways in which scientists and popular writers contributed to the dissemination of information about science and technology. It shows how the different readerships toward which the magazines were directed (serious or more popular) determined the proportion of trained scientists who provided material for publication. The most serious magazine, Discovery, featured almost exclusively material written by professional scientists, while the most popular, Armchair Science, favored writers who were not professional scientists, but who probably had some technical knowledge. Another magazine, Conquest, tried to provide a balance between authoritative and popular articles; however, it survived for only a few years.

The “raison d'être” of this paper is my dissatisfaction with current portrayals of the place and the fate of the so-called rational sciences in Muslim societies. I approach this issue from the perspectives of West European visitors to the Ottoman and Safavid Empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I show that these travelers encountered educated people capable of understanding and answering their visitors' scholarly questions in non-trivial ways. The travels and the ensuing encounters suggest that early modern Muslim societies and their institutions, their ways of producing knowledge, the types of their knowledge, and their material resources contributed important elements to various early modern West European approaches to gaining knowledge about nature, history, and politics.

This paper examines the debate in China over the shape of the earth during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main arguments are as follows. First, trust plays an important role in knowledge transmission. Second, partial communication between different woridviews is possible. In the case of the debate over the shape of the earth, partial communication was accomplished by the spread of Western astronomical instruments and calculating tools. Third, such alien concepts as the four elements and the experience of navigation did not serve as effective cultural resources to convince Chinese literati of the sphericity of the earth. Fourth, as a result, the legitimacy of the sphericity of the earth had to be reconstructed in an alien environment. The theory of the Chinese origins of Western learning was fabricated within such a context. Fifth, debate over factual knowledge bears social and cultural implications. Thus the debate over the sphericity of the earth involved not only how the phenomenon could be understood but also how the Chinese empire was to be positioned in the new cultural atlas. Finally, the sphericity of the earth eventually became a matter of common sense for the Chinese largely because of the political and cultural transformation of modern China.

Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) developed a very detailed theory of science and experiment. Using Lambert's hygrometric studies, this article provides an introduction to Lambert's theory and its practice. Of special interest is his well-founded theory on the emergence and definition of concepts and his neat eye for heuristics that should ultimately lead to a mathematization of physical phenomena. His use of visualizations in this context is especially remarkable.

The history of Israeli science and technology offers a unique case study of a young and small nation that has developed an unprecedented love affair with science and technology. Unlike other nineteenth-century ideologies, Zionism was never considered to be founded on science. Nevertheless, from the very start, the Zionist movement perceived the sciences, pure and applied, as central to its program of creating a new Jewish society in the Land of Israel (Funkenstein [1985] 2003). Modern science was to provide twice for the Jews: a relief from their suffocating religion and the tools needed to recover their ancient land from its ruins. Israel would remain the people of the book, but it would be the Book of Nature, not of God, that would set it free. Sharing the universal knowledge and values of science with mankind, the Jews would finally become both normal and self-determined. Thus, already in the nineteenth century, long before the State of Israel was founded, Zionist visionaries had dreamt of it as a modern version of Francis Bacon's utopian Kingdom of Bensalem, where science and technology would provide health, wealth, and power (Elboim-Dror 1993; Herzl 1902).

Argument

During the early nineteenth century, the German Association of Investigators of Nature and Physicians (Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte) drew upon the cultural resource of choral-society songs as a way to promote male camaraderie and intellectual collaboration. Investigators of nature and physicians wished to forge a unified, scientific identity in the absence of a national one, and music played a critical role in its establishment. During the 1820s and 30s, Liedertafel and folk songs formed a crucial component of their annual meetings. The lyrics of these tunes, whose melodies were famous folk songs, were rewritten to reflect the lives of investigators of nature and physicians. Indeed, the singing of these Liedertafel songs played an important part in the cultivation of the Naturforschers’ persona well into the twentieth century.

This paper examines the early institutionalization of sociology in Belgium. It displays how different intellectual and social contexts bred their own research interests and research approaches. It shows, more particularly, how ideological affiliations and divisions defined the setting within which this new discipline had to develop in Belgium in the decades around 1900. As a consequence of the ideological controversies, sociology had difficulty gaining legitimacy as a theory-driven analysis of society. Most scholars in Belgium could not avoid taking an explicitly normative position on society. This paper also displays how secularization and the reinforcement of the international level and its infrastructure gradually allowed for more academic autonomy for sociology in Belgium.

This article describes how science and law were called upon (and failed) to resolve a controversy that created a painful rift between the Israeli State and some of its elite soldiers. The controversy, which came to be known as “the Kishon affair,” erupted in 2000, when veterans of an elite and secretive unit in the Israeli navy claimed that pollution in the Kishon River where they had trained and dived during their military service had been the cause of a rash of cancers. The veterans demanded that the Ministry of Defense take responsibility for their illnesses, finance their medical treatment, and support their families if they die. The military denied the causal connection between the polluted river and the veterans’ cancers and rejected their demands. The dispute quickly escalated into a bitter public controversy, and a high-rank commission comprised of one of Israel's top jurists and two prominent scientists was called upon to study the disputed causal relation and reveal its true nature. However, after nearly three years of intense inquiry the jurist and the scientists reached opposing conclusions: the jurist found a causal connection while the scientists rejected it.

An Andalusian tradition of zījes seems to have been predominant in the Maghrib due to the popularity of the zīj of Ibn Is[hdotu]āq al-Tūnisī (fl. Tunis and Marrakesh ca. 1193–1222) and derived texts compiled in the fourteenth century. This tradition computed sidereal planetary longitudes and allowed the calculation of tropical longitudes by using trepidation tables based on models designed in al-Andalus by Abū Is[hdotu]āq ibn al-Zarqālluh (d. 1100). This tradition also used Ibn al-Zarqālluh's model to calculate the obliquity of the ecliptic, which implied that this angle had a cyclical period of oscillation between a maximum of 23;53° and a minimum of 23;33°: after reaching this minimum value the obliquity of the ecliptic was bound to increase. This paper argues that some new Maghribi sources give information on observations made in the Maghrib in the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries that imply that precession had increased beyond the limits allowed by the Zarqāllian trepidation theory, while the obliquity of the ecliptic had diminished below the level accepted by astronomers who followed Ibn al-Zarqālluh. This explains the introduction in the Maghrib of Eastern zījes, which computed directly tropical longitudes and did not accept the cyclical variation of the obliquity. Information about observations of dawn and twilight made both in Egypt and in the Maghrib in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is also presented.

This paper argues that ancient Babylonian signs (omens) reflect a mode of inferential reasoning as a function of their syntactic and logical structure as conditionals. Taking into account the institutional context that produced a systematic written body of omens, the paper is principally interested in the cognitive disposition of such texts. Investigating what constitutes system in these works, formal aspects of the material are examined in terms of the nature of conditionals and the logic of conditional statements. It is argued that conditional statements about ominous phenomena speak as much to a notion of conceivability and possibility as to empirical physical actuality. It is claimed that the epistemological character of the Babylonian compendia of signs cannot be understood without due attention to epistemic possibility and further, that the cuneiform omen texts comprise a different kind of scientific knowledge from that limited to a knowledge of physical phenomena and their laws.

It is well known that the development of a diphtheria anti-toxin serum evolved in a competitive race between two groups of researchers, one affiliated with Emil Behring in Berlin and Marburg, and another affiliated with Émile Roux in Paris. Proceeding on the basis of different theoretical assumptions and experimental practices, the two groups developed a therapeutic serum almost simultaneously. But the standardized substance they developed took on very different forms in the two countries. In Germany the new serum was marketed in the private sphere and subjected to state regulations, becoming a kind of prototype of industrial medications. In France, however, the same substance was marketed as a gift of science to humanity and distributed through the communal health care system. This article demonstrates how a new medication emerged from the efforts to produce, market, regulate, distribute, and apply it in the two respective countries. It attributes the difference to the negotiations between the respective actors (scientists, industrialists, politicians, officers, and the public) and institutions (firms, academies, private and public institutes, legislative bodies, professional corporations). I develop this argument on three different levels: First, I stress the importance of the institutional foundations of serum production; second, I illustrate the decisive role played by existing “ways of regulating” in the rapid development of new legal statutes; and third, I describe the consequences that flowed from the respective administrative organization of marketing and dissemination. In sum, I explore how an experimental object was transformed into an object of the public health system and stabilized by administrative means.

Argument

I wish to propose that the history of genetics reflects the history of the concept of reductionism in the life sciences. Reductionism is the thesis that explanation of laws or phenomena in one realm by those of another realm are always likely to be successful as explanations. By 1900 reduction of biology to the laws of chemistry and physics was not self evident: Although bottom-up preformationist explanations were largely inadequate for development, top-down epigenetic hypotheses often adopted metaphysical assumptions. Similarly, top-down theories of evolution as dependent on the accumulated impact of the past confronted those of bottom-up notions of fitness of specific traits that are relevant for future evolution. Mendel's 1865 methodological reductionist study of inheritance of traits was embraced in 1900 as evidence for reduction at the conceptual level. With the achievements of research of the mechanisms of inheritance, genetics became increasingly genocentric in its explanatory arsenal of development, and accordingly it was in conflict with the top-down, life-as-organized-systems' notions of embryology. Similarly, evolution was conceptually reduced to changes of gene-frequencies in populations. It was, however, precisely the increasing attempts to ground the bottom-up approach at the molecular level that eventually pushed conceptual reductionism to its crisis. Modern developments of molecular and computational methods finally forced, or allowed, researchers to apply bottom-up methodologies to top-down systems' analyses.

Cultural history has investigated the appropriation of mountain wilderness in considerable detail, without however systematically including the contributions of science and technology in the process. This paper suggests a way of filling this gap. It argues that cartography was instrumental in giving mountains their modern shape. In the course of the nineteenth century, mountains arguably gained a new factual existence at the intersection of new aesthetic, scientific, economic, and political concerns with landscape. Taking the case of Swiss cartography, the paper shows how mapmakers strived to represent this matter of concern in ever more perfect ways, culminating in the three-dimensional rendering of mountains as plaster reliefs. The paper concludes with the observation that this transformation is to a certain extent irreversible. The mountains made in Switzerland in the nineteenth century are probably here to stay.