This paper focuses on the later history of the York Retreat after the initial period for which it is best known. It discusses the marked changes which occurred in the social composition of its patients and the way in which these changes modified the asylum's management and therapy. It argues that the conventional image of the Retreat, based as it is on the institution's earliest years, needs considerable revision.

This paper argues: (1) that analysis of the issues upon which Popper and Kuhn have been thought to differ – the possibility of conclusive falsification, the incommensurability of theories, and the existence of normal science – reveals no appreciable difference at all; (2) that the basic point of disagreement concerns the role of truth in scientific inquiry, i.e. whether or not truth should be considered the regulative ideal of science; (3) that confusion concerning these issues results from a paradigm shift in epistemology; and (4) that Popper's epistemology proves more attractive than Kuhn's for unification in psychology.

Hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis function was investigated in 72 patients with primary depression. Forty-four per cent of the patients demonstrated abnormal suppression of their cortisol levels after a 1 mg overnight dexamethasone suppression test. Patients with abnormal suppression (‘non-suppressors’) were not clearly distinguished from ‘suppressors’ by the commonly used diagnostic classifications. They did not appear to be more severely depressed, but they were more likely than the ‘suppressors’ to be in-patients. Multivariate analysis of the data suggested that two clinical features were independently associated with non-suppression: the PSE syndromes of Slowness and General Anxiety. However, the association of these syndromes with non-suppression was relatively weak, indicating that the clinical significance of the dexamethasone suppression test is, as yet, unclear. The results raise doubts about the validity of using the dexamethasone suppression test as a diagnostic marker for a specific depressive syndrome.

The modern stereotype that in the Middle Ages there was a general belief that mental illness was caused by sin is reviewed. The authors examined 57 descriptions of mental illness (madness, possession, alcoholism, epilepsy, and combinations thereof) from pre-Crusade chronicles and saints' lives. In only 9 (16%) of these descriptions did the sources attribute the mental illness to sin or wrongdoing, and in these cases the medieval authors appeared to use this attribution for its propaganda value against an enemy of their patron saints, their monastery lands, or their religious values. The medieval sources indicate that the authors were well aware of the proximate causes of mental illness, such as humoral imbalance, intemperate diet and alcohol intake, overwork, and grief. The banality that, since God causes all things he also causes mental illness, was only used by medieval authors under special circumstances and in a minority of cases. It does not constitute evidence of superstitious and primitive notions about mental illness in the early Middle Ages.

It is suggested that chlorosis, or the ‘green-sickness’, was not a single disease entity, but a name applied to at least two distinct conditions affecting young females in the past. The first (‘chloro-anaemia’) was a form of hypochromic anaemia possibly associated with gastric ulceration and poor diet. This form predominated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The second (‘chloro-anorexia’) was a disorder of psychogenic origin resembling, but not identical to, anorexia nervosa. The latter form predominated in earlier periods but also occurred throughout the nineteenth century; it was also known as ‘the virgin's disease’ or ‘febris amatoria’. The ‘green’ of‘;green-sickness’ may originally have indicated innocence rather than a green colour of the skin.