In every contested election there are inevitably winners and losers,
both among the candidates and among the voters. Some candidates will
take their seats as elected officials, and others will not. Some
voters will be happy with the outcome, others will not. Here I seek
to better understand the relationship between whether a voter casts
a ballot for the winning candidate in U.S. House elections and that
voter's evaluations of her representative. I build on a burgeoning
literature on the relationship between voters and their elected
governments to derive and test a theory about this connection. The
data will show that voters whose preferred candidate wins a seat in
the House of Representatives are systematically happier with their
representative than those voters whom did not vote for the winning
candidate. While this finding is not especially groundbreaking, the
implications for the way in which we draw congressional and state
legislative district lines are quite provocative. Specifically,
since district lines in the House are necessarily an artificial
construct, I argue that map makers ought to “pack” districts with as
many like-minded partisans as possible. Trying to draw “competitive
districts” effectively cracks ideologically congruent voters into
separate districts, which has the effect of increasing the absolute
number of voters who will be unhappy with the outcome and
dissatisfied with their representative. I discuss the benefits of
fundamentally rethinking the way in which we draw congressional and
state legislative districts, as well as address likely concerns that
might be raised about drawing districts this way.I would like to thank Jim Adams, Valerie Brunell,
Bruce Cain, Geoff Evans, Bill Koetzle, Bernie Grofman, Sam
Hirsch, Michael D. McDonald, Iain McLean, Sam Merrill, Glenn
Phelps, David Rueda, Alec Stone Sweet, Chris Wlezian, and the
Politics Group at Nuffield College for their comments.