To what extent do rules of general international law apply between international organizations and their members? The article tackles this question by distinguishing between two categories of relations: those that take place on the international plane and those that are, rather, situated on the institutional plane constituted by the organization’s internal law. I argue that general international law applies by default to relations belonging to the first category, only being displaced when the internal law of an organization contains applicable lex specialis, but that it cannot claim a similar role at the level of internal institutional relations. The question there becomes one concerning the dialogue between relatively autonomous international legal orders, so that it is the internal law of each organization that defines the terms on which rules of international law are allowed in. At the same time, a normative argument can be made for a ‘monistic presumption’ for the application of general international law in cases where the rules of the organization are silent. By delving into such questions of applicable law and identifying the relevant analytical frameworks, the article aims to help international lawyers dealing with complex disputes opposing international organizations and their members to structure the legal analysis.

This article examines several questions relating to international humanitarian law (jus in bello) with respect to the conflicts against the Islamic State. The first question explored is the classification of conflicts against the Islamic State and the relevant applicable law. The situation in Iraq is a rather classic non-international armed conflict between a state and a non-state actor with third states intervening alongside governmental forces. The situation in Syria is more controversial, especially with respect to the coalition's airstrikes against the Islamic State on Syrian territory. If the Syrian government is considered as not having consented to the coalition's operations, then, according to this author's view, the coalition is involved in two distinct armed conflicts: an international armed conflict with the Syrian government and a non-international armed conflict with the Islamic State. The second question analyzed in the article bears on the geographical scope of application of international humanitarian law. In this context, the article examines whether humanitarian law applies: in the entire territory of the state in whose territory the hostilities take place, in the territories of the intervening states, and in the territory of a third state.

The participation of developing countries in the international legal system poses a perennial dilemma. On the one hand the brutal facts of international economic and commercial interdependence make such participation inevitable. On the other hand, developing countries, for various reasons and with varying degrees of intensity, have articulated their reservations, or indeed experienced considerable difficulties, with respect to such participation. This article considers this dilemma with special reference to the experience of Sub-Saharan African countries in international commercial arbitration.

When Peter Kooijmans took up his position as judge in the International Court of Justice on 6 February 1997, a formal end came to a career of about 30 years of teaching public international law in the Netherlands. This is why the Leiden Journal of International Law has asked me to write a few words about the work and person of Peter Kooijmans as a teacher of public international law, a task which I accepted with great pleasure, also on behalf of other staff members who have worked with Peter Kooijmans for many years.

The decision of the US Supreme Court rendered in NML v. Argentina has enabled the vulture funds to enforce in full their claims against the payments to be made by Argentina in favour of those holders who had tendered their bonds under a previous exchange offer. This scenario may have a disruptive impact on the functioning of the financial markets and endanger the restructuring processes of sovereign debt. The race to the courts by the vulture funds could be stopped under the UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Financing where the behaviour of those creditors who acquire debt instruments of sovereigns in distress and remain aloof from a restructuring to secure preferential treatment is marked as abusive. Unfortunately, so far the legal status of this abusive behaviour is unable to overturn the interpretation of the pari passu clause under New York law given by the US Federal Courts which stands at the base of the problem. To overcome this impasse the suggestion is to insert in the UN proposal of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign restructuring processes a specific provision qualifying as overriding a mandatory restructuring plan approved through a certain quorum which has received certification by the IMF. This qualification would serve the purpose of applying the plan to all creditors, and not just to those who register under the process. Moreover, this qualification would be considered as part of the public policy of the states participating to the UN proposal so as to block the enforcement of judgments rendered in non-participating fora.

The CSCE/OSCE is linked in public opinion to one of the following headings: Helsinki Final Act and Cold War; arms control and disarmament; crisis management and conflict prevention. This picture is not completely incorrect in that it indicates more than 20 years of CSCE/OSCE history. Being no more than a series of conferences from 1973 to 1990, the ‘old’ CSCE attempted to bridge East and West, and it mainly contributed to developing military aspects of security in Europe. Following the collapse of the former Eastern bloc, the ‘new’ CSCE, later renamed the OSCE, was called upon to assist in managing the epochal change involving the resurgence of regional crises, and it has been equipped with a fully developed organizational and instrumental structure to that end. The most prominent examples of CSCE/OSCE activity in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict peacebuilding, are places such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, or Albania.

In recent publications a rising tide of criticism directed against the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is discernible, principally concerning whether or not the ICTY grants the accused a fair trial. The perceived lack of ability, or willingness, to satisfy the highest standards of human rights concerning the right of accused to a fair trial is regarded as a death-knell both for the broad acceptance of the ICTY's jurisprudence as well as the prospects for a permanent international criminal court. While most of the criticism centres around the interpretation and application of provisions of the ICTY's Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence addressing the right to a fair trial, some of it concerns the vigorousness with which ICTY officials insist upon the surrender of indicted persons. With all due respect these commentators, by applying norms that are not wholly applicable, misconceive the threat to the accused's fair trial rights.

Global constitutionalists argue that the international legal order can only be meaningfully construed as having an objective, value-based purport. There is, however, something hybrid about the constitutionalist argument, as constitutionalists espouse a normative agenda whilst at the same time setting out to ground their approach in positive international law. It is contended that to avoid both this foundational problem and the charge of utopianism, and as a rejoinder to positivistic arguments for the denial of objective purport, constitutionalists are forced to reason along indirect, transcendental lines. Thus, constitutionalists are to be construed as avouching global values as necessary conditions for making sense of existing international legal practice, rather than merely invoking direct, positivistic evidence and/or mere normative arguments to ground their position. Moreover, it is submitted, first, that global constitutionalists would do better by adopting a less objectivist stance as regards global values, as on the ideal-agent theory of value. Second, it is argued that even though there might be room for so-called constitutionalist ‘mindsets’, these fall short of establishing the objective purport of the international legal order. Third, d'Aspremont's positivistic argument contra objective purport is construed as (also) an argument to the effect that the rules and architecture of the international legal order only warrant the existence of Hobbesian interests as necessary conditions for making sense of it. The constitutionalist case for objective purport, then, hinges on the issue of whether constitutionalism is necessitated by considerations as regards the intelligibility of international legal argument, by explanatory desiderata regarding trends in international law-making, and as a viable response to the problems posed by fragmentation, deformalization, and international legal scepticism.

Over the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of interstate politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate's expected vote share. A candidate's qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates co-ordination of vote choice across states.

This article examines international responses to the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, where two distinct governments were established due to contradiction between the election results proclaimed domestically and those certified by the internationally entrusted authority observing the election. Between two competing authorities, the international community stood firmly in favour of the internationally recognized president-elect as ‘legitimate authority’ while acting against the opponent whom they considered to hold ‘illegitimate authority’. Considering the principle of democracy as the underlying rationale grounding the international responses, this article identifies three mechanisms that incorporate and thus promote the principle of democracy: international election monitoring as setting mechanism, international representation as consolidating mechanism, and international intervention as enforcing mechanism. In accordance with these analyses, the current stage of democracy in international legal discourse is queried, particularly the democratic entitlement of a government in relation to determination of its international legitimacy.

From a due process perspective, the essential problem with the UN Security Council's targeted sanctions regime is the persistent lack of sufficient access to confidential material relied upon for the designation of targeted individuals. Despite the Security Council's efforts to amend the procedures of the sanctions regime, it is highly unlikely that this deficiency can ever be remedied within its present top-down structure. Therefore, this article proposes to decentralize the regime's designation procedure, to mitigate the problem of being unable to challenge or review confidential information and evidence, which underlies an individual's designation. Such an amendment would entail that the designation of a particular individual and the possible subsequent judicial review procedure would take place domestically, prior to a universal blacklisting by the UN Sanctions Committee. As a consequence, any confidential material relied upon could stay within the designating state, and would be shared only with courts and possibly special security-cleared advocates, within that domestic legal order. This would make it more acceptable for the relevant authorities to make such information available.

Five decades after the wave of independence of the 1960s, have all African territories been decolonized in accordance with international law? On the basis of the General Assembly and state practice, this study argues that only the continuing possession of African territories by colonial powers is contrary to the obligation to decolonize under international law. Thus, colonialism is still persisting in Africa with regard to the Glorious Islands, Mayotte, the Chagos, Ceuta and Melilla, the islands Alhucemas, Chafarinas, Leïla, and Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera. These territories belong respectively to Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, Mauritius, and Morocco. However, the obligation to decolonize under international law, which is premised on the existence of a colonial possession, does not provide any legal basis to claims directed against independent African states. Besides, the maintenance of boundaries existing upon the achievement of African countries to independence is not a case of enduring colonialism.

In recent years, the academic field of international institutional law has taken a clear ‘constitutional’ turn. In this normative endeavour, liberal ‘rule of law’ ideals are being reinvigorated, translated and projected onto international organizations. This article trades this well-trodden path for a socio-legal inquiry into how the ‘rule of law’ is produced, practiced and performed in the everyday political and operational life of one specific international organization (the World Bank) during one contentious historical episode. To grasp what it means for ‘law to rule’, I argue, we need to expand our archives to the daily praxis of legality: the actors that embody it; the consciousness that drives it; the politics that rely on it; and the fragile institutional balances that give it meaning. Grounded in this pragmatist perspective, I retrace the intervention of legal expertise during the Bank’s turn to state reform in the wake of the Cold War. Descending from principles to practices, from norms to acts, from abstract heights to situated performances, the article not only strives for an enhanced understanding of the ‘rule of law’ within the World Bank, but also aims at a critical methodological intervention in the field of international institutional law.

This article considers the law of maritime delimitation as applied by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 2014 Bangladesh v. India case. The dispute concerned the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two states in the north-eastern part of the Bay of Bengal. The Tribunal's Award covers several important issues which require careful examination, such as the land boundary terminus, the delimitation methodology, the role of objectivity, predictability and transparency in maritime delimitation, and the impact of the established case law on the present delimitation procedures. The commentary analyses the Award from the viewpoint of the law of maritime delimitation and traces how the Tribunal applied and developed the methodology used in maritime delimitation. The key points where the Award advances the law of the sea concern the concavity of the coast as a relevant circumstance and the creation of grey area. The Tribunal made significant pronouncements on the continental shelf, especially, beyond 200 nm. It confirmed the concept of a single continental shelf and reasoned that legal regimes of the EEZ and the continental shelf are independent and separable. However, the creation of another grey area met with strong disagreement from Dr Rao. The author considers the Award and the Dissenting Opinion to argue that the adjustment of the equidistance line raises certain concerns and that the creation of grey area is permissible under UNCLOS.

The Spring Conference of the British Branch of the International Law Association exemplified to the authors some of the ways in which the ‘old’ encounters the ‘new’ in contemporary international law. Followed by a selective Bibliography of new-stream international legal writing, this Editorial tries to unravel the ‘interested distance’ maintained by the mainstream towards new trends in international legal scholarship.

The article reviews (i) the qualifications of judges of, and (ii) the distribution of seats in, the ICJ. (i) Since 1966 there has been only one judge elected who merely satisfied the requirement relating to highest national judicial office. It is clear that with the increase in the supply of competent public international ‘jurists’ from the developing countries and because of the increasingly complicated and specialized nature of international law national judicial office has become irrelevant and insufficient as a qualification. Recognized competence as a public international jurist should be the only valid criterion. On the other hand, the latter concept has been given an unwarranted and undesirable extension by the UN, especially in connection with candidates from developing countries. (ii) While, in keeping with Article 9 of the Statute, there is some agreed regional distribution of seats among the non-permanent members of the Security Council, equity seems to be disregarded, particularly among the non-Western European states, by rotation among states being ignored. This is not in keeping with the Statute.

The Rundu – Grootfontein Project, a project by which Namibia wants to divert waters of the Okavango river, may significantly affect the flow of that river through Botswana. The present paper discusses and tests rules of global and regional international watercourse law as to their applicability to the problems posed by the project. In this respect the UN Framework Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, as well as the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Shared Watercourses form the main focal point.

Belgian legislation gives the national criminal justice system far reaching competence to prosecute international core crimes. International and national judicial decisions as well as policy considerations may however dictate restrictions.

It can be shown that – as with the tie between crimes against humanity and the perpetration of other international crimes in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg – the context element of the crimes against humanity as set out in the Rome Statute is based on the international law principle of non-interference in the affairs of a foreign country, and only serves to justify ‘international’ jurisdiction in respect of crimes which are typically already punishable pursuant to the lex loci commissii. As a consequence, the feature of a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ is not an aggravating circumstance in respect of the material facts of the case that define the wrong of the act (Unrecht) or the offender's blameworthiness (Schuld), but a jurisdictional element which is a mere precondition for prosecution only.

International criminal tribunals have developed a number of legal theories designed to hold individuals responsible for their role in collective criminal conduct. These doctrines of criminal participation, known as modes of liability, are the subject of significant scholarly commentary. Yet missing from much of this debate, particularly as regards the International Criminal Court, has been an analysis of how current doctrine on modes of liability responds to the need to hold collective perpetrators criminally responsible for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Indeed, many writings in this area of the law address perceived shortcomings in the theoretical underpinnings of modes of liability doctrine in the abstract but ignore the application of this doctrine in concreto. As a result, facially neutral writings on modes of liability may in fact be gendered in application, either because they fail to account for the specific characteristics of sexual and gender-based violence or because they are applied in a manner that requires higher thresholds for finding culpability for the commission of SGBV crimes. This article fills the gap between theory and practice, examining past and present doctrine, and suggesting ways in which the treatment of modes of liability by international criminal courts and tribunals can both properly respond to the need for personal culpability and the dangers of collective criminal activity, particularly as regards SGBV crimes.