This paper draws on some of the preliminary findings of a small pilot study which aimed to discover what evidentiary challenges a range of practitioners with experience of different international trials faced in the cases they were involved in, and what practices were developed to deal with these challenges. The findings in this study are based on the data collected from The Hague-based institutions, the ICC, the ICTY, the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber, and the Special Tribunal for the Lebanon (STL). It is argued that professionals moving from institution to institution are engaged in a process of cross-pollination which itself influences the practices that develop, although a common understanding of certain evidentiary issues in international trials remains fragmented and at times elusive.

In February 2006 Judge P. H. Kooijmans retired from the International Court of Justice after having served a full nine-year term. The article focuses on the manner in which Peter Kooijmans has performed his task as a judge by taking a close look at his most significant individual opinions. It focuses on three aspects of his contribution to the work of the Court: settling disputes, applying legal logic, and the development of international law.

This article establishes the normative connection between Japan’s responses to regional hegemonic order prior to the nineteenth century and its subsequent engagement with the European standard of civilization. I argue that the Japanese understanding of the ‘standard of civilization’ in the nineteenth century was informed by the historical pattern of its responses to hegemony and the discourse on cultural superiority in the Far East that shifted from Sinocentrism to the unbroken Imperial lineage to the national-spirit. Although Japanese scholars accepted and engaged with the European standard of civilization after the forced opening up of Japan to the Western world in the mid-nineteenth century, they did so for instrumental purposes and soon translated ‘civilization’ into a language of imperialism to reassert supremacy in the region. Through intellectual historiography, this narrative contextualizes Japan’s engagement with the European standard of civilization, and offers an analytical framework not only to go beyond Eurocentrism but also to identify various other loci of hegemony, which are connected through the same language of power.

This paper explores the role of domestic courts in the development of international immunity rules. It assesses how domestic immunity decisions take meaning in the process of law formation and law determination, and examines whether the distinct influence of domestic-court decisions (as compared to international-court decisions) in that process results in a different role, and concomitant different rules, in the process of interpretation of rules of international law. The paper argues that while domestic courts are as a matter of international law bound by the same rules of interpretation as international courts, they are particularly well placed to address access to court concerns raised by immunity rules and may play a prominent role in the development of international law in this field in the years to come.

The Leiden Journal of International Law (‘LJIL’) has always endeavoured to promote diversity and interdisciplinary enquiries in the international law epistemic community. Interdisciplinarity and diversity, albeit necessary in the long-term to refresh and update the discipline, raise numerous questions and epistemic challenges in the short-term. On the initiative of Jean d'Aspremont and Larissa van den Herik, today continued under the present editorship, these challenges have been at the heart of past LJIL editorials.

The use of criminal law in border control has gained increasing and warranted scholarly attention. International criminal law is no exception, although the orientation of the debates in international law is different from that at the national level. While scholarship on domestic border control is characterized by a deep scepticism of the use of criminal sanction, the focus in international criminal law has been on the exclusion of individuals suspected of involvement in an international crime from the protective sphere of refugee law. The divergence of this scholarship does not fully account for how responses to allegations of involvement in an international crime are often embedded within domestic immigration laws, making concerns regarding domestic border control relevant for discussions in international criminal law. To examine these domestic entanglements, this article analyses an independently generated dataset of 122 cases in 20 countries concerning 102 individuals alleged to have participated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This dataset enables an empirical analysis of the role that international criminal law is playing in their extradition, deportation or domestic prosecution. It argues that these cases are underpinned by plural types of expressive work. They communicate not only an ongoing commitment to recognizing the universal wrong of genocide, but also more ambiguous messaging about what constitutes a fair trial in Rwanda, who constitutes a ‘criminal migrant’ and, to a Rwandan audience, the transnational penal reach of the Rwandan state.

Article 31(1)(d)1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) presents an important opportunity to reconsider the defence of duress in cases of unlawful killing. While the case of Erdemović has done much to substantiate the existence of the defence of duress at international law it appears to have curtailed the doctrine by interpreting it with reference to a strict form of proportionality characteristic of duress as justification. On the other hand, duress as excuse requires some measure of proportionality. This article will contend that the hybrid approach of Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs), defined duress and the moral choice test primarily by reference to culpa in causa, not resorting to duress, and a ‘softer’ proportionality and in doing so, provided a more flexible and workable model for duress. Article 31(1)(d) of the ICC Statute, although an interesting attempt to find the balance between duress as excuse and justification, is a missed opportunity to redefine the defence in international criminal law. An alternative test for duress, with reference to the principles that emerged from the jurisprudence of the NMTs, is required in order to find the correct balance between duress as excuse and justification.

Hans Kelsen's vast body of work is perhaps one of the best examples of the unremarkable but important point that one's legal theory and methodological choices are intricately tied up with how one understands international law. Kelsen stands for a huge number of different positions, but chief amongst them must be his insistence on developing a ‘pure’ theory of law that accounted for the unique normativity of law, separate from empirical facts and causality on the one hand, and substantive theories of justice on the other. For Kelsen, the unique normativity of law is found within the legal system itself, in the idea of normative imputation – the ‘linking of a conditioning material fact with a conditioned consequence’. According to Kelsen, this specifically legal sense of ‘ought’ is an a priori category that allows us to correctly cognize the legal meaning of empirical data.

The objective of this article is to evaluate whether the distinctive nature of the international law on indigenous peoples reflected in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) can be explained by reference to the service conception of authority developed by Joseph Raz. The article rejects arguments that the distinctive character of UNDRIP can be justified by ideas of ‘Indigenous Sovereignty’, not least because ‘sovereignty’ was developed in Western political thought in contradistinction to a constructed and imagined dystopian state of nature endured by the indigenous populations of the Americas. Instead, the work seeks to understand the UNDRIP regime in the light of Raz’s conceptualization of legitimate political authority, concluding that the inchoate and under-theorized international law on the rights of indigenous peoples becomes comprehensible within this framework.

The last decade marked the unprecedented increase in the importance of the role of judicial bodies in the maintenance of international legal order and their assumption of hitherto unprecedented judicial powers. The principle of consent and its implications are the issues that pose major questions on possible limitations in this process. The tension between these conflicting factors has been witnessed in the treatment by the ICJ of the disputes related to the right of convicted foreign nationals to consular notification. In LaGrand, the Court made substantial advances in terms of diminishing the role of the principle of consent as an obstacle to proper judicial enforcement of international obligations. Avena – a similar case – demonstrates that such an approach has acquired an important degree of consistency in the ICJ's jurisprudence.

International environmental law (IEL) as a discipline has failed to respond to problems of fairness in a meaningful and systematic fashion. Whilst IEL has long acknowledged the existence of competing claims regarding the fair distribution of costs, resources, and responsibilities, fairness remains at the periphery of the disciplinary discourse. The present essay considers some possible explanations for this neglect. The first part of the essay examines a set of implicit assumptions and beliefs in which IEL is embedded, which somewhat prevent genuine and critical engagement with fairness issues. The second part of the essay considers normative and policy arguments recently developed in the law and economics literature that explicitly argue against the notion that fairness should play a role in the design and implementation of environmental regimes. The essay concludes by calling for a more robust engagement with fairness issues and by considering some of the implications this project may have for IEL.

The trials at Indonesia's Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights in East Timor have been widely condemned. ‘Sham’ and ‘show trial’ are the terms frequently used to describe the process, yet to date there has been little substantive assessment that adequately explains or documents the process. This article offers a detailed assessment of the first three trials at the court, namely that of a former governor of East Timor (Abilio Soares), a former police chief of East Timor (Timbul Silaen), and five members of the military, police, and civil administration accused of responsibility for the Suai church massacre. In 2000, the international community gave a shamed nation the opportunity to redeem its honour and reputation by bringing to justice those of its nationals responsible for the destruction of East Timor in a process that met international standards. But the inescapable conclusion for the author is that the cases of Abilio Soares, Timbul Silaen, and the Suai church massacre were not conducted in a way that was consistent with an intent to bring to justice persons responsible for gross violations of human rights in East Timor.

The crime of attack on peacekeepers has gained specific attention in the practice of various international courts and tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. This article revisits the historical origins, the foundations, and the main issues from a prosecutorial perspective arising in the interpretation and litigation of this crime. It argues that the crime poses unique challenges in relation to charging practice and evidence.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg established a legal precedent for the proposition that waging a war of aggression is an international offence, for which individuals may be held criminally accountable. The efforts of the First Review Conference of the Rome Statute have resulted in a definition of the crime of aggression being included in the Rome Statute. Although a framework for the International Criminal Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was also included in the amendments adopted at the Review Conference, such exercise of jurisdiction has not been given immediate effect and is subject to further action by the members of the Assembly of States Parties.

This essay examines the impact of the distinction between situations and cases under the Rome Statute in national laws on co-operation with the ICC. It argues that this distinction is likely to create difficulties in three areas: (i) the communication of the notitia criminis to the Court; (ii) admissibility issues in proceedings under Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute; and (iii) the efficacy at national level of admissibility rulings by the Court.

Jeff McMahan's challenge to conventional just-war theory is an attempt to apply to the use of force between states a moral standard whose pertinence to international relations (IR) is decreasingly contestable and the regulation of which international law (IL) is, therefore, under pressure to afford: the preservation of individual rights. This compelling endeavour is at an impasse given the admission of many ethicists that it is currently impossible for international humanitarian law (IHL) to regulate killing in war in accordance with individuals’ liability. IHL's failure to consistently protect individual rights, specifically its shortfall compared to human rights law, has raised questions about IHL's adequacy also among international lawyers. This paper identifies the features of war that ground the inability of IL to regulate it to a level of moral acceptability and characterizes the quintessential war as presenting what I call an ‘epistemically cloaked forced choice’ regarding the preservation of individual rights. Commitment to the above moral standard, then, means that IL should not prejudge the outcome of wars and must, somewhat paradoxically, diverge from morality when making prescriptions about the conduct of hostilities. In showing that many confrontations between states inevitably take the form of such epistemically cloaked forced choices, the paper contests the argument by revisionist just-war theorists like McMahan that the failure of IL to track morality in war is merely a function of contingent institutional desiderata. IHL, with its moral limitations, has a continuing role to play in IR.

The article critically examines the use of the doctrine of command responsibility by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in two of its judgements, Kayishema & Ruzindana and Musema. It argues that in assessing superior-subordinate relationships the ICTR applied the wrong standard in both cases. While there is no doubt that civilian superiors are liable to prosecution for command responsibility, the doctrine will be properly operative only in cases where the superior's control of subordinates strongly resembles that enjoyed by military commanders. The article builds upon the arguments of the ICTY's Čelebići judgement on this point, and emphasises the difficulty in holding lower-ranking Rwandan civilians responsible as superiors for genocide committed by supposed subordinates.

This article examines the reasoning and findings of the International Court of Justice in its judgment in Djibouti v. France on issues pertaining to the immunities and inviolability of state officials. While recognizing the Court's contribution to the clarification of certain aspects of the legal regime of the immunities and inviolability of state officials, the article emphasizes a number of points on which a clear response cannot be found in the judgment. Moreover, some concerns or doubts are raised about the way in which the Court dealt with certain issues regarding, in particular, the classification of immunities, their scope, their implementation, and the acts precluded by their operation. The Court's judgment clearly shows the complexities surrounding the legal treatment of numerous aspects of a topic which continues to be of the highest importance and sensitivity in international law and international relations.

The participation of developing countries in the international legal system poses a perennial dilemma. On the one hand the brutal facts of international economic and commercial interdependence make such participation inevitable. On the other hand, developing countries, for various reasons and with varying degrees of intensity, have articulated their reservations, or indeed experienced considerable difficulties, with respect to such participation. This article considers this dilemma with special reference to the experience of Sub-Saharan African countries in international commercial arbitration.

Before the 2015 annual meeting of the European Society of International Law, participants were notified of a ‘women in international law’ happy hour for exchanging ideas on ‘the improvement of representation of women’. At the convivial and well-attended event in Oslo, organizers thanked the men who were present, remarking that their support was not only welcomed but also necessary. This theme of inclusion resurfaced in side conversations about past conference panels on gender that noted the supportive role of senior male academics in audiences comprised primarily of women. Gender was mainly discussed along a single axis of male/female rather than intersectionally. Other categories of identity, such as ethnicity and nationality, remained on the sidelines of this event, which focused on the role of women within the field.