In December 1913, William Ernest Johnson (1858–1931), a Cambridge logician, published a famous article on demand theory in the Economic Journal (EJ) entitled “The Pure Theory of Utility Curves.” Although Johnson's treatment of the subject was in some ways original, in others it strongly resembled the analysis set forth by Vilfredo Pareto in earlier contributions, particularly in the Manuel d'économie politique (Italian edition 1906, French edition 1909). Despite this resemblance, Johnson did not cite Pareto. This failure to acknowledge Pareto's precedence aroused resentment and some suspicion of plagiarism among the Italian Paretians. In the end, however, the Paretian economists of the period generally assumed that Johnson was unfamiliar with Pareto's works and had obtained his results independently. For example, in 1916, Luigi Amoroso published a review of Johnson's 1913 paper in the Giornale degli Economisti, in which he wrote, “From Johnson's article it comes out that Johnson does not know Pareto's work” (Amoroso 1916, p. 410, author's translation). Amoroso attributed Johnson's ignorance of Pareto's work to a more general ignorance on the part of English economists, “Johnson's lacuna, more than particular to him, is a lacuna of the area in which he lives” (Amoroso 1916, p. 410, author's translation).

Economists regularly appear as expert witnesses in antitrust litigations. This paper analyzes how their models and methodologies have performed vis-à-vis the standards of relevance and reliability affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Daubert and its progeny. Some explanations for the economists’ troubles when facing a Daubert challenge in antitrust cases are provided.

In 1885 John Kells Ingram published a lengthy article on the history of political economy in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and in 1888 he republished this same article, with only minor changes, as a book entitled The History of Political Economy. Ingram unashamedly interpreted the historical development of political economy from a Comtean variant of the historicist perspective, and, for this reason, these publications became extremely important for the methodological debate, known as the English Methodenstreit, then raging between the orthodox and historical economists. Although the historicist message dovetailed into Ingram's historical narrative was clearly contentious and polemical, the reviews of both versions of this history from either side of the conceptual divide were overwhelmingly positive. Two exceptions were damning anonymous newspaper reviews in The Scotsman: one in 1885 in response to the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, and another in 1888 in response to the book. It is apparent from an entry made in the diary of John Neville Keynes that the first of these reviews was written by Joseph Shield Nicholson (JNK, July 28, 1885, Add 7834), and since the articles are strikingly similar in tone, substance, and style, and since Nicholson wrote other reviews for The Scotsman, it is safe to assume that the second article was also written by Nicholson. The substance of Nicholson's critique can be reduced to two main accusations: first, that Ingram was neither qualified to write a history of political economy nor competent to comment on the methodological issues then under scrutiny, and second, that Ingram had brazenly plagiarized passages drawn from various German histories of political economy.

The emergence of railroads in France in the nineteenth century raised new debates on analytical issues. The issue lies in the fact that they are natural monopolies. In this paper, I focus on Jules Dupuit’s work on the operations of the railroads. Curiously, he seemed to have defended two contrasting positions: on the one hand, he claimed that unlimited competition is the most efficient way to operate in the railroads; on the other, he stated that State management was the best way to run them. I aim to restore the consistency of Dupuit’s positions. I show that, for him, unlimited competition is not possible in the railroads and that it is not necessarily good for the welfare of society. Therefore, the State should regulate this sector. Then, I specify the conditions under which Dupuit believed the State should manage the railroads instead of offering concessions to private companies.

This paper sheds light on Albion Small’s views on the inequalities resulting from capital concentration. As a leading intellectual of the Progressive Era, Small sought ways to reduce social injustice, which in his view was key to avoiding class conflict and preserving democracy. He emphasized the need to devise social policies with a view to ensuring the equality of opportunities for all to realize what Small termed their “interests”—through the combination of their labor with “tool-capital.” Small entrusted the State with the central role of fighting capital inequalities through social policies, the treatment of inequalities dealing with morals. He embraced the then-fashionable idea of reasonable capitalism, as expounded by fellow progressive scholars, the likes of Richard T. Ely, John Dewey, or John R. Commons, who all sensed that such an economic system would survive only if it improves the social well-being as well as the self-development of all individuals.

Thorstein Veblen's theory of institutions has often been interpreted as explaining that institutions (social habits) are formed in previous time periods under the influence of earlier states of technology. Accordingly, in the modern era institutions are “static, backward looking, and resistant to change, alterations…occurring only under pressure from the dynamic of technological progress” (Rutherford 1984, p. 331). As a recent case in point, R. W. Ault and R. B. Ekelund (1988, p. 438; see also p. 435) stated that Veblen's “view of habits was an inert and exogenous view.” Malcolm Rutherford (1984) has noted that Veblen described several processes of internal development of institutions within a system governed by a given logic, e.g., the business enterprise system under the logic of pecuniary values.

Historians of the social sciences and historians of economics have come to agree that, in the United States, the 1940s transformation of economics from political economy to economic science was associated with economists’ engagements with other disciplines—e.g., mathematics, statistics, operations research, physics, engineering, cybernetics—during and immediately after World War II. More controversially, some historians have also argued that the transformation was accelerated by economists’ desires to be safe, to seek the protective coloration of mathematics and statistics, during the McCarthy period. This paper argues that that particular claim 1) is generally accepted, but 2) is unsupported by good evidence, and 3) what evidence there is suggests that the claim is false.

Why did classical utilitarian thinkers offer only a thin defense of the institution of private property? Utilitarians might have viewed such a defense as irrelevant, trivial, or impossible. A fourth hypothesis holds that utilitarians were ambivalent about the institution, itself. The utilitarians are clear on the relevance of a defense. Triviality would have to be based on 18th century philosophers and historians. Impossibility would raise serious questions about the utilitarian project. Ambivalence seems the most plausible explanation. Utilitarian writings throw considerable doubt on their own commitment to the strongest versions of the defense of private property.

The equation of exchange is identified with the name Irving Fisher. Although it is not the quantity theory, a point often made by him, it is the core organizing ingredient for his subsequent quantity theoretic analyses. It has in fact been argued that the quantity theory was central to Fisher's work, that “his fundamental premise and basis for all other analysis and policy prescription was this: money matters and matters most, [that he indeed was] the first of the modern ‘monetarists’” (Allen 1977, p. 563).

Economics in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s was notable for the richness of its methodological and theoretical approaches. Encompassing the peak period of American institutionalism, these years also witnessed a recurrent debate over the proper scope and method of economics which was bracketed by a minor methodenstreit in the 1920s and the measurement-withouttheory dispute of the late 1940s. In retrospect it is apparent which lines of thought would dominate economic discourse in later decades. At the time, however, this future was not as clear. A late 1920s evaluation by Paul Homan of the state of contemporary economics concluded that economists “seem in our own day to be separated by more impassable barriers of thought than at any time in the past” (Homan 1928, p. 10). In looking beyond “the present impasse,” as he called it, Homan concluded that “whether economics in the future shall consist of a body of doctrines, or a body of facts scientifically ascertained, or a technique, or more or less of one and the other, is on the laps of the gods” (ibid., pp. 466-67).

Historians of economics have acknowledged the significant role François Quesnay and the Physiocrats played in the early development of mathematical economics. It is, however, important to note that although the Tableau économique could well be translated into algebra, Quesnay never did it. As part of our research on Charles Richard de Butré, an obscure collaborator of François Quesnay, we have uncovered documents that show that he was one Physiocrat who did use algebra to explain his theoretical conceptions. In two texts written at the end of 1766 and the beginning of 1767, Butré systematically used algebra as an aid for economic reasoning. Our argument is that these texts provide very interesting insights into the development of early mathematical economics.

This paper consists of a rhetorical interpretation of two essays published fifty years ago, at the beginning of the so-called “Latin American economic school.” Both were written by the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch (1901–1986), who was then working at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). As the most prominent Latin American economist, Prebisch fostered the construction of a theoretical framework that heavily influenced Latin American development policies after World War II.

This article presents some observations on “public happiness” in order to clarify the idea’s meaning in the eighteenth-century Italian context. It examines Lugino Bruni’s interpretation of this concept, and criticizes his understanding of public happiness as the continuation of Artistotle’s eudaimonia. Bruni stresses the social and collective nature of happiness in the civil economy of the Italian eighteenth century. By examining the works of Ludovico Antonio Muratori and Antonio Genovesi, this article addresses instead the political meaning of public happiness for absolute monarchies, and underlines its origins in the German tradition of natural law.

The transformation of economics through its mathematization has been of interest to historians of economics and economic thought. While considering aspects of this history, Philip Mirowski (1986a, 1992) and Lionel Punzo (1989, 1991) have introduced David Hilbert's work, the Hilbert program, formalism, and Kurt GddePs results into their discussions in a way that is inconsistent with the mathematical community's understanding of mathematical history.

“…a remarkably clever book, the result of close thought, much observation, and some research. Yet, after having read the book with attention, we are disposed to ask, why has it been written?” (The Athenaeum, May 1865).

In the spring of 1860, Henry C. Carey, the Philadelphia political economist and apostle of protectionism, offered a revision of his doctrine in hope of saving the Union. For several years, in such writings as The Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign (1853) and The North and the South (1854), he had argued that reimposition of high protective tariffs promised material prosperity for the free population and gradual emancipation of the slaves. With secession looming he enlarged the argument. In a series of letters to the Memphis Daily Enquirer, he explained how the original error of liberal trade beginning in 1833 had interacted with climate and migration to produce economic crises and sectional conflict. Political economy not only pointed to the right course, it showed why the course was blocked from view. Prosperity, gradual emancipation, and preservation of the union all depended on the inhabitants of the central "Mineral Zone," from Pennsylvania to Tennessee, first seeing the blockage and then uniting to correct the combined policy errors of the northern "Trading Zone" and the southern "Planting Zone." Carey's neglected "zone theory" shows the direction and ambitions of an important strain of American political economy in the immediate antebellum period. It also merits attention as an early example of economic theories of geography and institutions akin to those claiming attention today.