The concept of a generalized quantifier of a given similarity type was defined in [12]. Our main result says that on finite structures different similarity types give rise to different classes of generalized quantifiers. More exactly, for every similarity type t there is a generalized quantifier of type t which is not definable in the extension of first order logic by all generalized quantifiers of type smaller than t. This was proved for unary similarity types by Per Lindström [17] with a counting argument. We extend his method to arbitrary similarity types.

This paper is concerned with the determination of the proof-strength of the power set axiom relative to axiom systems for Feferman's explicit mathematics. As conjectured by Feferman, we obtain that the presence of the power set axiom does not increase proof-strength.

Results are achieved by reducing the systems including the power set axiom to subsystems of classical analysis. In those cases where only the induction axiom is available, we make use of the technique of asymmetrical interpretations.

We characterize the bimodal provability logics for certain natural (classes of) pairs of recursively enumerable theories, mostly related to fragments of arithmetic. For example, we shall give axiomatizations, decision procedures, and introduce natural Kripke semantics for the provability logics of (IΔ0 + EXP, PRA); (PRA, IΣn); (IΣm, IΣn) for 1 ≤ m < n; (PA, ACA0); (ZFC, ZFC + CH); (ZFC, ZFC + ¬CH) etc. For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions of theories these results are extended to modal logics with propositional constants.

The monadic second-order theory of trees allows quantification over elements and over arbitrary subsets. We classify the class of trees with respect to the question: does a tree T have a definable choice function (by a monadic formula with parameters)? A natural dichotomy arises where the trees that fall in the first class don't have a definable choice function and the trees in the second class have even a definable well ordering of their elements. This has a close connection to the uniformization problem.

My aim in this paper is to propose what seems to me a distinctive approach to set theoretic methodology. By ‘methodology’ I mean the study of the actual methods used by practitioners, the study of how these methods might be justified or reformed or extended. So, for example, when the intuitionist's philosophical analysis recommends a wholesale revision of the methods of proof used in classical mathematics, this is a piece of reformist methodology. In contrast with the intuitionist, I will focus more narrowly on the methods of contemporary set theory, and, more importantly, I will certainly recommend no sweeping reforms. Rather, I begin from the assumption that the methodologist's job is to account for set theory as it is practiced, not as some philosophy would have it be. This credo lies at the very heart of the so-called ‘naturalism’ to be described here.

A philosopher looking at set theoretic practice from the outside, so to speak, might notice any number of interesting methodological questions, beginning with the intuitionist's ‘why use classical logic?’, but this sort of question is not a live issue for most practicing set theorists. One central question on which the philosopher's and the practitioner's interests converge is this: what is the status of independent statements like the continuum hypothesis (CH)? A number of large questions arise in its wake: what criteria should guide the search for new axioms? For that matter, what reasons support our adoption of the old axioms?

This paper deals with: (i) the theory which results from by restricting induction on the natural numbers to formulas which are positive in the fixed point constants, (ii) the theory BON(μ) plus various forms of positive induction, and (iii) a subtheory of Peano arithmetic with ordinals in which induction on the natural numbers is restricted to formulas which are Σ in the ordinals. We show that these systems have proof-theoretic strength φω0.

Models of normal open induction are those normal discretely ordered rings whose nonnegative part satisfy Peano's axioms for open formulas in the language of ordered semirings. (Where normal means integrally closed in its fraction field.)

In 1964 Shepherdson gave a recursive nonstandard model of open induction. His model is not normal and does not have any infinite prime elements.

In this paper we present a recursive nonstandard model of normal open induction with an unbounded set of infinite prime elements.

The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, T0. We address a problem that was posed in [6]. Let MID be the principle stating that any monotone operation on classifications has a least fixed point. The main objective of this paper is to show that T0 + MID, when based on classical logic, also proves the existence of non-monotone inductive definitions that arise from arbitrary extensional operations on classifications. From the latter we deduce that MID, when adjoined to classical T0, leads to a much stronger theory than T0.

Let be a first-order structure; we denote by DEF() the set of all first-order definable relations and functions within . Let π be any one-to-one function from ℕ into the set of prime integers.

Let ∣ and • be respectively the divisibility relation and multiplication as function. We show that the sets DEF(ℕ, π, ∣) and DEF(ℕ, π, •) are equal. However there exists function π such that the set DEF(ℕ, +, ∣), or, equivalently, DEF(ℕ, π, •) is not equal to DEF(ℕ, +, •). Nevertheless, in all cases there is an {π, •}-definable and hence also {π, |}-definable structure over π which is isomorphic to 〈ℕ, +, •〉. Hence theories TH(ℕ, π, ∣) and TH(ℕ, π, •) are undecidable.

The binary relation of equipotence between two positive integers saying that they have equal number of prime divisors is not definable within the divisibility lattice over positive integers. We prove it first by comparing the lower bound of the computational complexity of the additive theory of positive integers and of the upper bound of the computational complexity of the theory of the mentioned lattice.

The last section provides a self-contained alternative proof of this latter result based on a decision method linked to an elimination of quantifiers via specific tables.

In this paper we mainly study preservation theorems for two fragments of the infinitary languages Lκκ, with κ regular, without the equality symbol: the universal Horn fragment and the universal strict Horn fragment. In particular, when κ is ω, we obtain the corresponding theorems for the first-order case.

The universal Horn fragment of first-order logic (with equality) has been extensively studied; for references see [10], [7] and [8]. But the universal Horn fragment without equality, used frequently in logic programming, has received much less attention from the model theoretic point of view. At least to our knowledge, the problem of obtaining preservation results for it has not been studied before by model theorists. In spite of this, in the field of abstract algebraic logic we find a theorem which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of infinitary languages without equality which, apart from function symbols, have only a unary relation symbol. This theorem is due to J. Czelakowski; see [5], Theorem 6.1, and [6], Theorem 5.1. A. Torrens [12] also has an unpublished result dealing with matrices of sequent calculi which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of a first-order language. And in [2] of W. J. Blok and D. Pigozzi we find Corollary 6.3 which properly translated corresponds to our Corollary 19, but for the case of a first-order language that apart from its function symbols has only one κ-ary relation symbol, and for strict universal Horn sentences. The study of these results is the basis for the present work. In the last part of the paper, Section 4, we will make these connections clear and obtain some of these results from our theorems. In this way we hope to make clear two things: (1) The field of abstract algebraic logic can be seen, in part, as a disguised study of universal Horn logic without equality and so has an added interest. (2) A general study of universal Horn logic without equality from a model theoretic point of view can be of help in the field of abstract algebraic logic.

In this paper we study the logic of relational and partial variable sets, seen as a generalization of set-valued presheaves, allowing transition functions to be arbitrary relations or arbitrary partial functions. We find that such a logic is the usual intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic first order logic without Beck and Frobenius conditions relative to quantifiers along arbitrary terms. The important case of partial variable sets is axiomatizable by means of the substitutivity schema for equality. Furthermore, completeness, incompleteness and independence results are obtained for different kinds of Beck and Frobenius conditions.

We study the expressive power in the finite of the logic Fixed-Point+Counting, the extension of first-order logic which is obtained through adding both the fixed-point constructor and the ability to count.

To this end an isomorphism preserving (‘generic’) model of computation is introduced whose PTime restriction exactly corresponds to this level of expressive power, while its PSpace restriction corresponds to While+Counting. From this model we obtain a normal form which shows a rather clear separation of the relational vs. the arithmetical side of the algorithms involved.

In parallel, we study the relations of Fixed-Point+Counting with the infinitary logics and the corresponding pebble games.

The main result, however, involves the concept of an arithmetical invariant. By this we mean a functor taking every finite relational structure to an expansion of (an initial segment of) the standard arithmetical structure. In particular its values are linearly ordered structures. We establish the existence of a family of arithmetical invariants with the following properties:

• The invariants themselves can be evaluated in polynomial time.

• A class of finite relational structures is definable in Fixed-Point+Counting if and only if membership can be decided in polynomial time on the basis of the values of one of the invariants.

• The invariant r classifies all finite relational structures exactly up to equivalence with respect to the logic

We also give a characterization of Fixed-Point+Counting in terms of sequences of formulae in the : It corresponds exactly to the polynomial time computable families (φn)n ∈ ω in these logics.

Towards a positive assessment of the expressive power of Fixed-Point+Counting, it is shown that the natural extension of fixed-point logic by Lindström quantifiers, which capture all the PTime computable properties of cardinalities of definable predicates, is strictly weaker than what we get here. This implies in particular that every extension of fixed-point logic by means of monadic Lindström quantifiers, which stays within PTime, must be strictly contained in Fixed-Point+Counting.

In this article we give a forcing characterization for the Ramsey property of -Sets of reals. This research was motivated by the well-known forcing characterizations for Lebesgue measurability and the Baire property of -sets of reals. Further we will show the relationship between higher degrees of forcing absoluteness and the Ramsey property of projective sets of reals.

Recently, Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar showed that the multiplicative fragment of second order intuitionistic linear logic is undecidable, using an encoding of second order intuitionistic logic. Their argument applies to the multiplicative-additive fragment, but it does not work in the classical case, because second order classical logic is decidable. Here we show that the multiplicative-additive fragment of second order classical linear logic is also undecidable, using an encoding of two-counter machines originally due to Kanovich. The faithfulness of this encoding is proved by means of the phase semantics.

It is well known that every Boolean algebra of size ω1 can be embedded into (ω)/fin. E. van Douwen proved that if CH failed then there is a Boolean algebra of size ω2 which cannot be embedded into (ω1)/ctble. We show that ◇ is equivalent to the statement that a certain natural Boolean algebra of size embeds into (ω1)/ctble. I would like to thank B. Velickovic for many helpful conversations.

We give a solution stated in the title to problem 3 of part 1 of the problems listed in the book of Eklof and Mekler [2], p. 453. There, in pp. 241-242, this is discussed and proved in some cases. The existence of strongly λ-free ones was proved earlier by the criteria in [5] and [3]. We can apply a similar proof to a large class of other varieties in particular to the variety of (non-commutative) groups.

The syntactic structure of the system of pure implicational relevant logic P − W is investigated. This system is defined by the axioms B = (b → c) → (a → b) → a → c, B′ = (a → b) → (b → c)→ a → c, I = a → a, and the rules of substitution and modus ponens. A class of λ-terms, the closed hereditary right-maximal linearλ-terms, and a translation of such λ-terms M to BB′ I-combinators M+ is introduced. It is shown that a formula a is provable in P − W if and only if α is a type of some λ-term in this class. Hence these λ-terms represent proof figures in the Natural Deduction version of P − W.

Errol Martin (1982) proved that no formula with form α → α is provable in P − W without using the axiom I. We show that a β-normal form λ-term M in the class is η reducible to λx.x if the translated BB′ I-combinator M+ contains I. Using this theorem and Martin's result, we prove that a λ-term in the class is βη-reducible to λx.x if the λ-term has a type α → α. Hence the structure of proofs of α → α in P − W is determined.

We give a decision procedure for the ∀∃-theory of the weak truth-table (wtt) degrees of the recursively enumerable sets. The key to this decision procedure is a characterization of the finite lattices which can be embedded into the r.e. wtt-degrees by a map which preserves the least and greatest elements: a finite lattice has such an embedding if and only if it is distributive and the ideal generated by its cappable elements and the filter generated by its cuppable elements are disjoint.

We formulate general criteria that allow one to conclude that a distributive upper semi-lattice has a decidable two-quantifier theory. These criteria are applied not only to the weak truth-table degrees of the recursively enumerable sets but also to various substructures of the polynomial many-one (pm) degrees of the recursive sets. These applications to the pm degrees require no new complexity-theoretic results. The fact that the pm-degrees of the recursive sets have a decidable two-quantifier theory answers a question raised by Shore and Slaman in [21].

We prove:

Theorem. A complete first order theory in a countable language which is strictly stable, trivial and which admits finite coding hasnonisomorphic countable models.

Combined with the corresponding result or superstable theories from [4] our result confirms the Vaught conjecture for trivial theories which admit finite coding.

The main result of this paper is a probabilistic construction of finite rigid structures. It yields a finitely axiomatizable class of finite rigid structures where no formula with counting quantifiers defines a linear order.