Since the 1990s, the Temple of the Lady of the Treasury of Bắc Ninh province has become a religious destination for local people as well as thousands of pilgrims from around the country. The resurgence of this cult is one of the most visible manifestations of the Đổi Mới (Renovation) revival of religious practices after decades of discouragement and suppression. It also illustrates some of the profound socio-economic changes that have taken place since the advent of Đổi Mới in 1986.

According to the existing studies on Myanmar's economic history, agricultural land in the Lower Myanmar delta was transferred from ‘agriculturists’ to ‘non-agriculturists’ under British colonial rule. However, a clear distinction could not be drawn between the agriculturists and non-agriculturists as was generally thought with respect to their economic activity. More importantly, the categories could be applied interchangeably. The purpose of this study is to reconsider the very concept of ‘agriculturist’ as a colonial category in British Burma by exploring the hitherto unused register of holdings (Register IA, U pain hmatpoun sayin).

The 1940 Franco-Thai border conflict coincided with the beginning of a four-year campaign to weaken the Catholic Church's position in Thailand. The government closed down schools, confiscated property and imprisoned clergy. Angry mobs looted and burned churches, while the local populace boycotted businesses owned by Catholic Thais. The state-led persecution was part of a broad effort to deal with the legacy of western imperialism in Thailand. Catholicism's strong association with French colonialism, combined with France's decline, made the Church the ideal target for anti-imperialist forces. This overlooked incident provides strong evidence that Phibun Songkhram's strategy was not simply to survive the war, as historians have often claimed. The anti-Catholic campaign, which complicated the country's post-war status, was part of an attempt to re-position the country vis-à-vis the West and provide complete independence for Thailand.

Protestant Akha highlanders of Northern Thailand held a Silver Jubilee in 1987 celebrating the initial conversions to Christianity twenty-five years earlier. The Akha-language translation of the passage from the Gospel of Matthew selected as the Jubilee's theme evokes the image of a laden basket from a pre-Christian folktale accounting for the differentiation of Akha from other ethnic groups, and the Protestant Akha used this traditional image to separate themselves from non-Christian Akha. This paper explores the transformation of a symbolic vehicle for interethnic differentiation into a vehicle for intraethnic differentiation. Use of this laden basket image is viewed as part of intraethnic dialogues of identity, which are themselves embedded in dialogues of identity between Christian as well as traditionalist members of the Akha tribal minority and Buddhist Thai, who are Thailand's dominant majority both politically and culturally.

Referencing insights from Cultural Studies and taking a jazz-age perspective, this essay aims to historicise and ‘locate the popular’ in colonial Indonesia and the Philippines. A new cultural era dawned in the 1920s urban hubs of Southeast Asia, associated with the creation of novel forms of vernacular literature, theatre, music and their consumption via the print press, gramophone, radio broadcasting and cinema. By investigating the complex relationship between the elusive phenomena of modernity, cosmopolitanism and nationalism as articulated by two pioneering artists active in commercial music and theatre, the social significance of popular culture is scrutinised.

After the riots and bloody clashes between the Malays and the Thai Police in 1948, there were no movements of a similar scale. Nevertheless, Muslim irredentist sentiments persisted in certain quarters. An event which contributed to the increasing dissatisfaction of Thai Muslims was the mysterious disappearance of Haji Sulong in 1954. After his disappearance, Sulong's relatives and followers did not remain inactive. Tension continued and separatist movements have spread quietly up to the present time. Complaints about governmental discrimination against Thai Muslims have been heard from time to time.

The homesteading system instituted in the Philippines in 1903 was intended to stimulate economic development through increased agricultural output from previously unoccupied lands and also to relieve agrarian problems in densely settled parts of the country. A case study shows that while early homesteaders did significantly improve their conditions, the intense demand for land rapidly led to the development of squatting and tenancy. Average farm sizes are declining but there are simultaneously indications of a trend towards concentration of land ownership, which accords with experience in other peasant economies.

During the intense concern for economic development over the past 25 or so years, many governments have expressed their faith in the development of new agricultural land as at least a partial answer to a wide range of economic and social problems. These problems include regionally dense populations with inadequate farm sizes, inequitable systems of holding and renting land, inefficient methods of production and marketing, lack of capital and difficulties of capital formation, and low yields from land that is losing fertility through constant cropping. Frequently, ignorance, poverty or the agrarian structure inhibits the adoption of measures for improvement.

Those countries with significant areas of little used land resources have tended to rely on developing these resources as an answer to agrarian problems rather than attempting to tackle defects in the whole structure. Since the structure is not changed, it is not surprising that in due course the firmly institutionalised problems of the older areas gradually established themselves in areas of new settlement too. This is essentially what Boeke referred to as “static expansion”. More recently, Mellor has pointed out, “Expanding the land area at constant productivity and incomes is not economic development in the usual sense — it is only a holding action in the face of a growing population”. Even with rising productivity such as associated with the Green Revolution, there is considerable evidence to suggest the continuation, if not exacerbation, of agrarian problems.

By examining in detail a case study of colonisation in the Philippines, this paper will show that even if productivity and incomes in a new area are initially high, the operation of customary economic and social processes is likely to ensure the recreation of traditional problems. Such a conclusion is nothing new. It has been repeated depressingly often not only in recent decades but also of course throughout history.

Owing to the absence of dates in historical manuscripts and on monuments, Brunei chronology has been based upon traditional dates of uncertain origin. The object of this article is to take such events in Brunei as can be chronicled in external sources and to compare these foreign dates with those traditionally accepted.

It is evident from the brief historical survey presented in this paper that the French found in Cambodia well-established Chinese communities with a long tradition of indirect rule. My argument may be summarised in four propositions:

1. Contact between Cambodia and China has continued more or less uninterrupted since the first century of this era — and perhaps longer. Unlike early Indian contact, which produced distinctly Indian forms in the indigenous cultures of Southeast Asia, contact with China appears to have left them relatively unmarked. Khmer culture is definitely not sinic in language, social structure, religion, or the arts.

2. The long history of Chinese contact was not associated with extensive Chinese settlement in Cambodia until the fifteenth century, when there occurred a marked change in the nature of the Cambodian economy. Throughout the Chen-la and the Angkorean periods, the relative homogeneity of the country did not encourage internal trade, and the small amount of foreign trade evident in the capital was limited almost entirely to luxury goods for the court. After 1400, the Cambodian economy came to depend more and more upon trade, a phenomenon that was associated with the establishment of a growing Chinese population in Cambodia, primarily in Phnom-Penh.

3. The evidence of trade relations and large migrations suggests that by the middle of the nineteenth century the Chinese population of Phnom-Penh was mainly Cantonese, possibly with a smaller number of Hokkien. In Kampot, on the other hand, along the coast of the Gulf of Siam, a large number of Hainanese settled following the establishment, in the eighteenth century, of a trading centre at Hatien. We do not know the size of this population, but we do know that by 1860 it was primarily engaged in growing pepper. It is clear that by the time of the French Protectorate was established in 1864, the Chinese community in Phnom-Penh, whatever its make-up, numbered in the thousands and controlled practically all the trade of the country, foreign and domestic.

4. The concept of indirect rule over the Chinese in Cambodia dates from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. This system was not very formal, however, and the legally denned system of congregations in neighbouring Annam, dating from 1814, became the model for the French colonial administrators when they eventually came to consider the “Chinese problem” in Cambodia.

The promulgation of the Constitutional Amendment Act in the Malaysian Parliament in 1971 would seem to suggest an end to intercommunal squabbles over certain major issues which had threatened to bring about an irrevocable split in the tenuously held together multi-communal structure of the country. The Act proclaimed that “in the interest of security and public order” matters pertaining to citizenship (Pt. III of the Constitution), the National Language (Article 152), the special position of the Malays (Article 153), and the Sovereignty of the Rulers (Article 181.) were not to be questioned in public, in state legislatures, and in Parliament. Proscription on these issues had come about as a direct result of the cataclysmic events of 13 May 1969. The promulgation of the Act was the first item of business in the reconvened Malaysian Parliament following the dissolution of the National Operations Council (NOC) which had temporarily ruled the country.

Since regaining its independence in 2002, nation-building has been the focus of much scholarly research on Timor-Leste. National identity construction is a crucial aspect of this process, yet the ways in which this identity is officially represented has been largely overlooked. This article takes the national flag of Timor-Leste as a case study to explore the ways in which a historic East Timorese national identity has been symbolically constructed and visually embodied. By considering the potency of flags in an East Timorese cultural context, and by analysing the origins of Timor-Leste's flag alongside that of the political party Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente), it becomes clear that post-independence re-imaginings of its symbolism have rendered it a powerful national symbol in the contemporary nation-state.

Since the end of the Second World War most sections of Malaysia's multi-racial and polyglot society have been significantly affected by political and economic developments. It is doubtful if any of the young nation's many communities have been more dramatically and profoundly influenced during the last few decades than the Orang Asli of Wes: Malaysia. This paper briefly scans the changes which have taken place in the Orang Asli's relationships and contacts with “outsiders” since the British took a direct and active part in the affairs of the Malay States in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The 1959 election marked a turning point in the constitutional and political development of Singapore. It was the culmination of what had happened since the restoration of British government in Singapore after the Second World War. After the war, the British returned to Malaya to re-establish their rule. But Singapore had seen the humiliating defeat of the British in the march of Japanese militarism. The myth of the invincible supremacy of the white colonialists was shattered. The mood and tempo of the times were increasingly different from that of the pre-war period. The call of the day was decolonisation and independence from colonial domination.

The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of independent Indonesia contains an ideological tenet called Pancasila As the name implies — panca (five) and sila (principles or pillars) — it is composed of five principles: Belief in One God, Humanity that is just and civilized, Unity of Indonesia, Democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation, Social justice for all Indonesians. Since its installation as a state ideology, Pancasila has been the most commonly used rhetoric in political discourse and the governing principle of social life.

The 1930s was a unique, exciting, explosive and highly politicised decade for the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya due to the blossoming forth of Chinese nationalism aimed at China's national salvation in the wake of the Japanese invasion. This China-oriented nationalism took various forms. There was a boycott movement against Japanese goods; there were public and political rallies, cultural variety shows, and propaganda in the press and the schools, stirring up national feelings. There were campaigns for the return of skilled and professional Chinese in serving the Kuomintang (KMT) Government at Chungking, and for relief funds and funds for strengthening China's war footing. Undoubtedly, the Chinese nationalism that began in 1928 was a mass movement, and at its height in 1938 and 1939, the movement involved some 300,000 Chinese in Singapore for national salvation work, or 50 per cent of the total Chinese population on the island. It was during this politically volatile decade that various socio-enonomic forces within the Chinese community surfaced or re-surfaced in the bid for leadership. It also saw the rise, consolidation, collaboration and rivalry of various emergent elites and counter-elites in a rather restricted political arena, sensitively guarded and regulated by the British authorities. It is the concern of this paper to identify the nature and composition of various contending elites and counter-elites, to examine their roles in the national salvation movement and, finally, to analyse why a non-partisan elite headed by Tan Kah Kee ( 1874–1961) was able to capture and maintain the leadership during the period under examination.

The first Japanese investments in Malaya were in rubber planting but their most important were in iron-mining. This article traces the development of Japánese interests in these two fields and shows how these ventures contributed to the expansionist impulse which, among other factors, eventually led to the military invasion of Malaya in December 1941.

Ayu Utami's Saman, published in May 1998, describes female sexuality openly, a factor which has caused some controversy in Indonesia. Several critics have applauded the explicit descriptions of sexuality in this novel, claiming they are a means of ‘talking back’ and/or challenging patriarchal authorities in Indonesia. In contrast, some senior and well-known Indonesian writers have alleged that the novel is an example of the increasing Westernisation of their culture. The contemporary debate regarding depictions of sexuality in Saman, however, has failed to appreciate the complex post-colonial situation of the novel.

Much research has sought to understand why mixed communities in Indonesia have been torn apart by violent conflict. By contrast, little is known about how people live together successfully in the mixed, low-conflict communities that exist in abundance throughout the Indonesian archipelago. This paper explores the inter-communal relations in the multiethnic, Christian-Muslim coastal village of Oelua in Roti, Nusa Tenggara Timur province. Mechanisms of agreement across ethnic, religious and livelihood differences have shaped and reproduced a low-conflict community — including transfers of land, labour, technology and surplus; use of customary law and conflict management; and social mixing and interpersonal relations. The findings suggest that there are lessons to be learned from communities like Oelua about how to foster social and economic inclusion, which could inform national and regional political agendas concerned with governing difference in a post-New Order Indonesia.

When historians refer to the “classical” period in Southeast Asia, they usually mean the era roughly between the ninth and fourteenth centuries A.d. When they speak of the “classical” states, they are referring most often to the region's first great kingdoms — Pagan, Sukhothai, Angkor, Dai Viet, Srivijaya, and Majapahit — the civilizations that gave birth to many of the nations in Southeast Asia today. Yet, the very idea of a “classical” Southeast Asia has not been debated sufficiently in the literature.