The full story of the Indians in Malaya has yet to be told. Here an attempt is made to assemble the information relating to some aspects of their settlement in Singapore over the last one hundred and fifty years.

The changing role of women's economic activities in developing countries is a topic of particular importance, not only because women represent a significant resource of much underutilized labour in the non-household sector but also because women's activities are intimately tied to the structure of the family. Low levels of female participation in the labour force suggest that much of the potential human talent and skills in a society are restricted to household endeavours. For the objectives of both eliminating discrimination against women in employment and expanding the pool of human resources for development, there is a growing scientific and policy interest in the study of socioeconomic development and women's labour force participation. Of considerable interest is the relationship between women's economic roles and fertility. While the causal structure of this relationship is still an unresolved topic, there is a basic consensus that the transition from high to low fertility levels is closely intertwined with the changing social and economic roles of women.

While the organization of the Philippine sugar industry evolved to promote and balance the short-term interests of planters, millers and traders, it now undermines the industry and threatens the economic fortunes of those who depend upon it. By perpetuating inefficiency and fostering a frenzy of trading that affords inordinate profits for the least productive sector, this structure has become the major obstacle to restoring the Philippines to its former status as one of the world's most efficient and technologically advanced producers of cane sugar. As efficiency falls further behind that of other sugar producing countries, and as industrial consumers become more disgruntled with paying high prices for sugar, the nation risks the collapse of an industry that has already proven vulnerable to intermittent crises. The last time a crisis occurred — in the mid-1980s — planters faced foreclosure, mills stood idle, and workers and their families suffered malnutrition and dislocation, leading commentators to refer to Negros, the nation's premier sugar-growing island, as “Asia's Ethiopia” and a “social volcano”. While conditions have improved since the EDSA Revolution, the structure that has emerged does little to encourage productivity, efficiency and fairness. Since the industry continues to employ 500,000 workers, with as many as three million dependents, a collapse would lead to mass displacement, hunger, and political upheaval.

This paper will outline the history of the Philippine sugar industry, examine its current structure, and describe the political and economic forces that sustain it. My first contention is that the institutional organization, rather than government policy, cultural attitudes, or neo-colonial dependency, is fundamentally responsible for the poor performance of the industry in recent decades and, unless major changes are forthcoming, will be mainly responsible for its ultimate demise.

Prior to entering a coalition with the ruling Alliance party at the beginning of 1973, and incorporation in the broader National Front coalition in June 1974 Parti Islam Se Malaysia (usually abbreviated to Party Islam or PAS, though until recently widely known as the Pan Malayan Islamic Party) had long been established as Malaysia's leading opposition party; within the National Front its position is second only to that of the Alliance. Nonetheless political scientists and historians have devoted little attention to this party, though they have almost uniformly condemned it for an alleged association with a most reactionary form of Malay communalism. Not surprisingly the picture that has emerged is partial and rather obscure. For example, we know little of the events surrounding the party's origins and its initial formative years: virtually all accounts of PAS begin with its successes in the 1959 national and state elections, and the few statements hazarded on its earlier history have been incomplete and factually wrong. In this article I want to clarify some of the factual confusion relating to these events, and to offer an interpretation of the various ideological forces that gave rise to the formation of this party.

This article presents the hard work, and eventual failure, of the elder branch of the main lineage within a village of steel producers to reaffirm local identity through the recreation of a common ritual space dedicated to the spirit of the village's founder, original artisan, and their ancestor. It presents this process as a struggle over the meanings and representations of community and space in a time of rapid social and economic transformation. The ultimate failure of this struggle, which only becomes evident after 15 years, has affirmed something else: the spaces of practice associated with the village's public administration and family-based commercial interests.

This paper is an attempt to analyze briefly the origin and growth of the Darul Islam movement with emphasis on the life of the leader of the rebellion, his ideology for establishing an Islamic theocratic state and a discussion on some of the problems he encountered in his effort to achieve his objective.

Sukarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo: A Brief Biography

Sukarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo was born in the small town of Cepu in North Central Java on the day of Selasa Kliwon (Tuesday Kliwon), 7 February 1905.

The island of Borneo has maintained until fairly recently a number of tropical rainforest hunting-gathering groups, generally referred to as Punan or Penan (though other local ethnonyms are found). Today, a large proportion of them have switched to a partly settled way of life and some form of agriculture, but even these groups still rely heavily on the forest, collecting jungle products for trade and, often, processing the wild sago palms for their subsistence while collecting. The Bukat, one of these partly settled groups, are found (see Map 1) in Indonesia's West Kalimantan (three hamlets, totalling 300 persons) and East Kalimantan (one hamlet of 150), and in Malaysia's Sarawak (one hamlet of 150).

There are only a few studies on the Indonesian youth movement in the pre-World War II period. Apart from those dealing with specific organizations and hence not concerned with the more general trend, most of the authors tend to emphasize the unity of the movement after the 1928 youth congress. The usual story told is that after that year, a clear concept of an Indonesian nation emerged and the movement was no longer divided. There is hardly any discussion about the division between secular and Islamic movements. Concerning Indonesian national symbols, the impression is created by these authors that they were adopted unanimously in 1928 although evidence shows that at that time only certain groups accepted them. The general acceptance of these national symbols took place only late in the thirties.

There is considerable concern amongst development planners at the large and apparently growing areal disparities in the level of development in many underdeveloped countries. A number of theoretical studies support the view that economic growth inevitably results in widening disparities in the initial stages of economic development which may or may not be reversed with later growth. Empirical studies, although frequently lacking in comparability and deficient in data, confirm the existence of widening disparities in a large number of countries. Some planners have questioned the policy of maximising growth of gross product as the panacea for under-development and attempted to ensure more even patterns of development. Where economic and political unrest, including “insurgent activity”, have occurred, and have been equated by government officials with regional concentrations of poverty, further weight is given to policies directed towards reduction of regional disparities. However, where the results of schemes aimed at reducing regional imbalance have been assessed the success rate is slight. This paper examines the experience of Northeast Thailand, the Korat plateau, as an example of a backward region that has had considerable planning effort directed at it over the last twenty years.

Western historiography assumes a chronological linear unfolding of progress, and early Western commentators on Asian societies tended to see them as stagnant variants of earlier phases in European history, as feudal despotisms and passive, unchanging village communities. In assessing levels of “development” or “progress” such observers looked for recognizable specialist institutions in politics and the economy; finding few such institutions, they saw only “backwardness”. To most Europeans, trying to make sense of unknown societies and cultures, the alien could only be made comprehensible by identifying it with the familiar. It was then all too easy to proceed as if the unknown was simply a mutant or primitive version of the known. Ideas, social relationships and values which were literally beyond their ken, were often simply not seen at all. In their observations of both political and economic systems, they saw decline, corruption and confusion because they failed to recognize the patterns which structured society. So it seemed natural that the West should dominate such societies and guide them on the correct path.

Writing about political parties in Indonesia makes one suddenly aware of how little research has been done on the subject. With the decline of the parliamentary system since 1957, interest has shifted away from the party order towards the forces of Guided Democracy: President Soekarno, the army, and the Communists. Among the parties, only the Communists have received a great deal of specific attention.

The Strait of Melaka and connected waterways have been critical to, and directly affected, the formation of littoral states, societies and economies in eastern Sumatra, the Riau Islands, the Malay Peninsula, and Singapore. The history and nature of statehood in the region is interrelated to the way in which naval capabilities evolved, but, as argued in this article, perhaps not in the straightforward fashion often assumed. Naval capabilities and strategies evolved in tandem with state policy to adapt to changes in the wider Asian maritime political economy which was dominated at various times by China and India. This article examines the factors that affected maritime policy in the Melaka Straits c. 500 to 1500 CE, and the extent to which these furthered the viability of the mainly Malay port-polities, and in particular the regional hegemonic state of Srivijaya in eastern Sumatra. The study utilises textual records, epigraphic materials, and literature to reconstruct a more nuanced picture of maritime states and naval power in premodern Southeast Asia.

The article studies migrants from Uttar Pradesh in Singapore who have historically identified themselves as ‘Hindustani’ – a group that has largely been ignored in historical literature of the Indian diaspora in Singapore. Through an examination of British expansion in India in the early nineteenth century, parallel developments in Southeast Asia, community publications and oral testimonies, the article attempts to ‘(re)discover’ the history of Hindustani migration in Singapore.

The Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) is today one of Burma's largest remaining ethnic opposition armies. This paper investigates ethnic politics of the SSA-S and their strategic use of media. It argues that Shan insurgency today has moved into a new phase characterised by its intense involvement with mass media. The paper examines, on the production side, the Shan insurgency's media products and its networking with the Thai press. On the reception side, it explores how the images of ethnic insurgency are consumed by Shan audiences living in exile, analysing how long-distance Shan nationalism is generated through the spectatorship of these ‘militarised’ images.

The notion of dhammamātā is one of the last items of the legacy of the late Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu. In order to accord women practitioners better social status and provide them with opportunities for spiritual training, Buddhadāsa avoided committing himself to the reintroduction of bhikkunī ordination. Instead, he proposed the notion of dhammamātā, which literally means ‘dhamma mother’. This article postulates thatby using the metaphor of the mother, Buddhadāsa invited less conflict, appealing to the high respect which Thai people generally held for women. Moreover, the article argues that with dhammamātā Buddhadāsa challenged the common notion of motherhood which usually regards women as nurturers of the Sanġha. Dhammamātā nurture people's spirituality through their teaching and virtues. Whilst the social impact of dhammamātā cannot be compared to that of bhikkunī, whose yellow robes visually suggest a status equivalent to that of male bhikkhu, the concept of dhammamātā was a new creation revolving around the image of the female religious teacher, a role that Buddhist women had wanted.

The 1940 Franco-Thai border conflict coincided with the beginning of a four-year campaign to weaken the Catholic Church's position in Thailand. The government closed down schools, confiscated property and imprisoned clergy. Angry mobs looted and burned churches, while the local populace boycotted businesses owned by Catholic Thais. The state-led persecution was part of a broad effort to deal with the legacy of western imperialism in Thailand. Catholicism's strong association with French colonialism, combined with France's decline, made the Church the ideal target for anti-imperialist forces. This overlooked incident provides strong evidence that Phibun Songkhram's strategy was not simply to survive the war, as historians have often claimed. The anti-Catholic campaign, which complicated the country's post-war status, was part of an attempt to re-position the country vis-à-vis the West and provide complete independence for Thailand.

This article investigates the role of prophet in the Batak millenarian movement of Parmalim against the colonial order. The Parmalim movement was organized in 1890 by Guru Somalaing who claimed to be able to gain access to the source of European power while retaining the essence of Toba-Batak values.

This paper uses the example of songket to explore translocal Malay cultural processes in Sambas, West Kalimantan. I argue these intra-Malay cultural exchanges reframe selected Sambas Malay cultural forms as Malay ‘cultural heritage’, making it difficult to view cultural practices in purely localised terms. Consequently, many cultural forms lose their localised normative values and become aspects of a wider cultural heritage to be preserved, performed and consumed. The paper begins with a discussion of the historical, political and social grounds that forge a sense of translocalism amongst many Sambas Malays. Building on this, the more specific interest in participating in intra-regional Malay cultural exchanges is explained with reference to commodification, internationalisation and institutionalisation.