This paper examines Japanese attitudes toward the independence movement in Vietnam, the Japanese idea of “independence”, and Japanese relationships with the Vietnamese nationalists during the period between 1940 and 1945.

The Japanese used French Indochina, one constituent of which was “Vietnam”, as a supply base and a stepping stone for their troops on their way to other battle grounds such as Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, or the Philippines. The defeated units were returned to Vietnam, rested, and reorganized into new military units. Coal and rice and other foodstuffs used by the Japanese in these battlefields often came from Vietnam. For these objectives, the Japanese kept the political and administrative structure of French Indochina intact under the French. But on 9 March 1945, the 30, 000-man Japanese military attacked the 50, 000-man French Indochinese Army in a surprise attack under the command of Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi, commanding general of the 38th Army. (This operation is identified in Japanese military terms as “Meigo Sakusen” [Bright Moon Action].)

The philosophical basis of the Indonesian state, first framed in 1945, is the Panca Sila or Five Principles. Since 1985 all political and social organizations including religious ones have had to subscribe to the Panca Sila as their sole philosophical principle (Azas Tunggal). The first of the Five Principles is belief in Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, normally, though not entirely satisfactorily, translated as the One Supreme God. The founders of the state had accepted this principle rather than a more specific statement of belief in the God of Islam, the religion of the majority of the people. Its formulation was clearly a compromise, aimed at stressing the importance of religion in the state, but avoiding declaring Islam as the state religion. As it stood, the principle was generally acceptable to followers of Islam, Christianity and Hinduism, and all religions which did acknowledge the existence of God, in one form or another.

The ideas of the ancient Khmers about the connection between kings and gods, as known from sources bearing on the Angkorian kingdom, have received considerable attention from modern scholars. As early as 1904, Aymonier in the third volume of his history described the cult of the Devarāja as “une sorte de déification aux divinités brahmaniques, des rois et même des personnages de distinction, hommes ou femmes, qui érigent des temples ou contribuent d'une façon quelconque à rehausser le culte de ces divinités.” The stele of Sdok Kak Thom, edited by E. F. Aymonier in 1901, by L. Finot in 1915, and again by G. Coedès and P. Dupont in 1946, is particularly important in yielding fragmentary information about the history of the devarāja cult, and the introduction to the last-named of these editions contains a discussion of the cult, which appears to link the person of a king to the god Siva, or some other. G. Coedès has discussed aspects of royal divinity in several places, his most general and best-known account of the subject, originally presented as “Cultes Personnels à l'Epoque du Bayon” appearing as the third chapter of Pour mieux comprendre Angkor. The scholarly literature describing the statuary and architecture of the Angkor monuments abounds in references to the apparent deification of kings and their relatives, as represented in statues and in titles attributed to them. J. Filliozat's notable study of the symbolism of the Bakheng may be mentioned as an example of the attention which has been devoted to Khmer architecture as a reflection of ideas associating a king with a god. Among other relevant discussions, J. Przyluski's views on the nature. of the Angkorian monuments and B. P. Groslier's analysis of the kings' religious functions in the light of their social, political and economic rôles may be mentioned here. The representation of kings as gods is a theme commonly recognized in Angkorian studies, and even in other periods of Khmer history. A comparatively recent article suggests the existence of the “god-king” in pre-Angkorian times.

Studies of early Southeast Asia focus largely on its ‘classical states’, when rulers and their entourages from Sukhothai and Ayutthaya (Thailand), Angkor (Cambodia), Bagan (Myanmar), Champa and Dai Viet (Vietnam) clashed, conquered, and intermarried one another over an approximately six-century-long quest for legitimacy and political control. Scholarship on Southeast Asia has long held that such transformations were largely a response to outside intervention and external events, or at least that these occurred in interaction with a broader world system in which Southeast Asians played key roles. As research gathered pace on the prehistory of the region over the past five decades or so, it has become increasingly clear that indigenous Southeast Asian cultures grew in sophistication and complexity over the Iron Age in particular. This has led archaeologists to propose much greater agency in regard to the selective adaptation of incoming Indic beliefs and practices than was previously assumed under early scholarship of the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century.

Using Chiang Saen in northern Thailand as a case study, this paper describes the practice of archaeology as conducted by the Thai Fine Arts Department. In particular, it examines how the Chiang Saen archaeological site has been treated under the rubric of “cultural resource management”.

In the late 1960s, archaeological theory underwent a period of rapid and significant change. A group of scholars became known as progenitors of an approach termed New Archaeology. Some of these changes have been critized as lacking in substance, but it cannot be denied that much archaeological research and analysis performed during the 1970s and 1980s followed a new and more constructive agenda.

Successive wars and the establishment of a border between the kingdom of Burma and British India in the nineteenth century challenged Burmese conceptions of sovereignty and political space. This essay investigates how European, and more specifically Anglo-American, notions of race, nation, and consular protection to nationals, progressively informed the Burmese concepts of ‘categories of people’ (lumyo) and ‘subject’ (kyun). First, I present the semantic evolution of these concepts in the 1820s–1830s, following the annexation of the western Burmese province of Arakan by British India in 1824. Then, I argue that the Burmese concept of lumyo was progressively associated with the European concept of ‘nations’ in the 1850s–1860s, following the annexation of Lower Burma in 1852. Finally, I uncover developments in the 1870s, when British consular protection extended to several freshly categorised ‘nations’, such as Shan, Karenni, and Kachin.

We argue in this article that the social and economic conditions in the Angkorian society of the tenth century or earlier contributed to the decline in status of some middle-level officials, as is evident from the mid-eleventh century. Many Angkorian inscriptions written between the late ninth and late twelfth centuries record purchases and donations of lands acquired for religious foundations. The texts often contain details of transactions and disputes seeking to validate title to these holdings. The buyers include middle-ranking loñ and vāp, and increasingly, higher-ranking officials. An analysis of the roles and activities of the officials reveals something of their relative status and helps explain the disappearance of vāp from the inscriptions in the eleventh century, and the relegation of loñ to temple roles by the twelfth century. The transfer of communal lands and lands owned by these officials to elites is attributed to hierarchical restrictions on land purchases, a reduction in fiscal immunities, and the need for taxes to be paid to the centre with high-value goods in Angkor's moneyless economy.

This article traces the evolutionary record of urbanism at two sites in Myanmar: their transition from late prehistory in c. second to first century BCE to proto-urban and fully urban development at Sri Ksetra and Beikthano by the mid-first millennium CE. The Pyu cities are remarkable because of their spatial continuity, for their early achievements in water control, iron production, ritual and domestic ceramics, brick monumental architecture, rich funerary culture, literacy and adoption of Buddhism on both elite and popular levels. Though the radiocarbon dates for Pyu urbanism are at present earlier, they share many features with other urbanising societies in mainland Southeast Asia, where new chronologies are emerging for social and economic complexity at Dvaravati, Pre-Angkorian and Co Loa sites. The article provides new and specific evidence on the dates and types of contacts between the Pyu, India, and other areas of Southeast Asia to interrogate the meaning of Indianisation in Southeast Asia.

Thailand's ‘southern border provinces’ of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – along with four districts of neighbouring Songkhla – are the site of fiery political violence characterised by daily killings. The area was historically a Malay sultanate, and was only loosely under Thai suzerainty until the early twentieth century. During the twentieth century there was periodic resistance to Bangkok's attempts to suppress local identity and to incorporate this largely Malay-speaking, Muslim-majority area into a predominantly Buddhist nation-state. This resistance proved most intense during the 1960s and 1970s, when various armed groups (notably PULO [Patani United Liberation Organization] and BRN [Barisan Revolusi Nasional]) waged war on the Thai state, primarily targeting government officials and the security forces. In the early 1980s, the Prem Tinsulanond government brokered a deal with these armed groups and proceeded to co-opt the Malay-Muslim elite. By crafting mutually beneficial governance, security and financial arrangements, the Thai state was able largely to placate local political demands.

An important but little-studied act in the history of postwar Singapore was played out at the margins of the city. Here, the state was involved in a major campaign to socialise the ‘squatters’ of urban kampong into citizens of a high modernist state. The fire hazard in these settlements also contributed significantly to the process, as the residents were mobilised into fire-fighting squads and politicians acted on behalf of the victims of infernos by rehousing them in emergency public housing. This article proposes a new approach to postwar Singapore historiography at the interface between politics and social developments. It underlines the social agents, spatial dimension and historical continuity uncovered in the venture.

This article discusses the changing spirit world of maritime communities in Southeast Asia by differentiating ‘oceans’ from ‘seas’ and by linking historical evidence to modern anthropological studies. Since the lives of seagoing peoples are fraught with unpredictability, propitiation of local sea spirits was a traditional means of ensuring good fortune and protection. As long-distance voyages expanded in the early modern period, the global reach of the world religions, extending beyond familiar seas into the more extensive ocean environment, held out particular appeal. Not only were the gods, deities and saints attached to larger religious systems themselves ocean travellers; in contrast to the unpredictability of indigenous spirits, they were always amenable to requests for help, even when the suppliant was far from home waters. At the same time, as world religions were incorporated into indigenous cosmologies, maritime peoples gained greater agency in negotiating relationships with the local spirits that still wield power in Southeast Asian seas.

In the eighteenth century the descendants of a variety of groups, including Minangkabaus, formed a new Malay state known as Siak. Through an examination of a traditional text, Hikayat Siak, a better understanding of how Malay identity expanded beyond the polity of Johor–Melaka, and was understood, is provided. A key factor in this transformation is how a prince, Raja Ismail, developed a Malay identity through raiding and violence.

Theravada Buddhism as the traditional religion of the dominant ethnic Lao majority in Laos historically has played a key role in structuring Lao society and in assuring the continuity of Lao culture. Though the dhamma (the Buddha's teaching) may be only superficially understood and practised by most of the lay population, Buddhism has provided a set of moral values and a view of life which have strongly influenced modes of thought and action over the centuries. As a result, the sangha (the order of Buddhist monks) has come to command high respect and its activities pervade every aspect of the social and cultural milieu.

Unity within the Malay-Indonesian region evolved as an economic force from within and was not artificially superimposed by any political authority. The region was inextricably linked as a ‘geo-economic’ unit which was of paramount importance to international trade. Although it was trade which laid the area open to external intrusions which ultimately forced the region into a single matrix, colonial authority was imposed largely upon a pre-existing inter-regional economic infrastructure.

The Thammakai movement in Thailand has won increasing attention over the past decade for its popularity, for the devotion of its supporters and the size of their contributions, and for its links with influential individuals in the Thai government, army, and business communities. This suburban monastery's ability to draw a congregation of 50,000 participants each year for its most publicized annual religious observance is perhaps unprecedented in Thai ecclesiastical history. Thammakai leaders see themselves heading a key Buddhist reform movement to improve the lives of their followers, to strengthen the religion, and to bring prosperity to the nation. But Thammakai's detractors criticize the meditation method around which the movement has been built, deplore the movement's expenditure rates and fund-raising techniques, charge that it uses hypnotic mind-control methods over its followers, and criticize its increasingly acquisitive tendencies. Thai observers of all persuasions have noted Thammakai's skilful use of positive national and religious symbols in its public relations, its abilities in organizing students and young urban professionals to work for organizational goals, and its skill at staging visually and emotionally appealing public displays.

The study presents a relational database of words referring to material items and institutional processes in over 700 Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian inscriptions, from the sixth to the fourteenth centuries CE. The lexical items within the database have been spatially and temporally referenced, and a geographic information system (GIS) is used to show trends and anomalies over time and space in the distributions of temple sites; key items and materials; and the roles of the rulers, the founders, the donors and temple workers. The current study identifies changes in the socio-economic institutions and relationships within Khmer society through the Pre-Angkorian and into the Angkorian period in Cambodia.

The coexistence of Islam and matriliny has been viewed as a ‘paradox’ because of strict patriliny that Islam prescribes. This article attempts to disentangle this enigma by comparing the Minangkabau, Kerala and coastal northern Mozambique that represent the most well-known cases of simultaneous practice of Islam and matrilineal kinship, which initially was a result of peaceful Islamisation through Indian Ocean networks. In the nineteenth century, the Dutch and British colonial regimes helped matriliny to survive, despite all the efforts of the Islamists to the contrary, by codifying local juridical rules. The Portuguese integration of the local matrilineal nobility into their colonial administrative system preserved matriliny within the local Muslim order. Nowadays these communities are influenced by modernisation, nation-state policies, and Islamic reformist movements, but matrilineal principles still regulate the use of the ancestral land.

Ships sailing from Fujian to Southeast Asia could choose between two different sea routes. The first route followed the China coast to central Guangdong; it then led to Hainan, the Champa coast and Pulau Condore, an island near the southern tip of Vietnam. From there it continued in three directions: to Siam, to northwestern Borneo and to the Malayan east coast. Going south to the Malayan east coast was the most direct way to Trengganu, Pahang, Pulau Tioman, Johore and modern Singapore whence it was possible to sail into the Indian Ocean or to cross over to Sumatra, Bangka Island and Java.

The surge in Song foreign trade affected Ða[under dot]i Viê[under dot]t greatly, helping to integrate the upper and lower valley of the Red River first economically in the twelfth century, then politically with the rise of the Trâ[grave accent above]n dynasty in the thirteenth, and finally culturally in the fourteenth. Coastal wealth, power and classical Chinese scholarship entered the inland capital of Thăng Long (Hanoi) and strongly influenced it, leading to major changes across the land.