The main argument of this article is that the middlemen paradigm which since the Second World War has come to dominate academic writings and popular perceptions of Chinese business in late colonial Indonesia is generally flawed, and has hindered the development of a more nuanced picture of the nature of Chinese economic activity in pre-war Southeast Asia.

The leader-follower relationship among the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in northern Thailand is analyzed through the application of patron-client theories. It is argued that the relationship has been embedded in a particular socio-cultural context, which incorporates both Han Chinese culture and the native ethos of long-distance caravan trade, and that it is characterised by both instrumental and emotional forms.

On February 15, 1942, it was all over for the British in Malaya; the British troops surrendered to the Japanese. The victorious Japanese troops entered Singapore on the sixty-ninth day after they landed on Songkhla in Thailand and on Koto Bharu in Malaya. Stunned but cheerful Malays and Indians greeted General Yamashita's conquering army as it entered the city. For a great majority of the Chinese, however, an air of uncertainty hung heavily upon them because they had been active, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the anti-Japanese movement for many years and a good number of them even fought with the British in the last ditch battle that ended in their defeat. In the midst of the chaos and rumours about what the Japanese might do with the Chinese, the latter remained uneasy.

Since the fall of Suharto's New Order government the number and variety of media available have grown at a remarkable rate in Indonesia. In the process these new media, particularly radio, have created new forums for expressing local identity. This article examines how various radio stations, and specific programmes, in Pekanbaru, Riau have provided a new conduit for marginalised ethnic, linguistic and social groups – particularly Riau Malays – to address issues of their identity in an increasingly globalised, and decentralised, Indonesia.

The K5 Plan for the defence of the Cambodian–Thai border was the response of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and its Vietnamese mentors to the threat posed by the resistance forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge, to its efforts to rebuild the nation and consolidate its administration. The very real defence gains, however, were made at the cost of bitter popular resentment over the way those gains were made.

On 31 December 1985, Singapore left the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), turning against the ‘New International Information Order’ demanded by UNESCO at that time. In October 2007, after 22 years of absence, Singapore rejoined UNESCO, looking for an intensification of cultural and scientific exchange. Taking this example of reviving co-operation between Singapore and UNESCO, this paper assesses the concept of ‘creative industries’ as a boundary concept that allows for increased co-operation between players with generally opposing knowledge concepts — as manifested in their respective knowledge and cultural politics. The paper starts with a conceptual discussion on the crossing of boundaries. This is followed by an assessment of first, UNESCO's and second, Singapore's gradual repositioning towards culture. While UNESCO turned from distinctly separating ‘culture’ and ‘market’ in the 1970s and 1980s to an increased openness for profit-oriented conceptualisations of culture today, Singapore identified the economic potential of culture, creativity and the arts, and therefore the need to foster these as part of its development into a knowledge-based economy. The underlying differences in interests and the orientation of content, expressed by the traditionally opposing conceptualisations of knowledge and culture, are still valid today, yet the concept of ‘creative industries’, adopted by both sides, seems to offer a common meeting ground. It acts clearly as a bridge, and hence a boundary concept, allowing for an intensification of mutual co-operation. This is discussed in the final part of the paper.

Forty-odd years ago, when I became involved in the study of Southeast Asia, it appeared to be a new region, struggling to assert itself in the political world from the lingering ties of colonialism and in the academic world from those who would absorb it in the empires of Further India or the Far East. The centre of this new field of study was indisputably the United States, where in the 1950s and early 1960s Southeast Asia programmes were set up as part of the great expansion of regional studies funded by the US government and foundations. Their guiding assumption was that the interests of America and what would become known as the Third World were compatible and that sympathetic knowledge would aid in bringing about progress towards modernity as envisioned in the American dream.

From the 1970s most scholars have rejected the Cold War orthodoxy that the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was a result of instructions from Moscow, translated into action by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). They have instead argued that local factors precipitated violence, and that the MCP was relatively unprepared when the Emergency was declared. This article puts the international element back into the picture. It shows that the change from a ‘united front’ to a ‘two camp’ international communist line from 1947 played a significant role in deciding local debates in favour of revolt. It also demonstrates how the MCP had plans for a graduated build-up to armed revolt before an Emergency was declared. This article therefore offers a model for a dynamic, two-way relationship between the international and local levels of Cold War.

On 27 February, 1623, Gabriel Towerson, the chief factor or merchant of the English East India Company in Amboyna, was beheaded by command of the local Dutch governor, Herman van Speult. Nine other Englishmen, ten Japanese and one Portuguese shared Towerson's fate. The charges brought against these unfortunate men were that they planned to kill Speult and overwhelm the Dutch garrison of Fort Victoria as soon as an English ship appeared in the roadstead to support them. It is not the purpose of the present article to re-open the more controversial aspects of the Amboyna tragedy. Suffice it to say that the plausibility of the Dutch accusation has never commanded much respect in the estimate of British historians and it is unlikely that this attitude will change. On the other hand, there is every evidence to suggest that Speult, despite English suspicions to the contrary, was genuinely convinced that an English plot was afoot to overthrow his government. Normally the governor was a humane and reasonable man, who had received Towerson at his table on many occasions, and his bitterness at the strange turn of events in February, 1623, is very understandable. Dr. Stapel has recorded the reputed reply of Towerson to Speult when the latter upbraided him for thus abusing his hospitality and friendship: “Alas! If it were to beginne againe, it should never be done”. Is this the response of a man who knew he was innocent? asks Dr. Stapel. On the face of it, Towerson would appear to be condemned by his own words, but it must be remembered that his physical condition at that time was pitiful. He had firmly protested his innocence under prolonged and severe torture until his powers of endurance were broken, after which he sought relief, presumably, by telling the Dutch what they wanted to hear. In these circumstances, it is difficult to attach to Towerson's rather cryptic expression of repentance the importance it would otherwise deserve.

This article explores the common bases of knowledge on race among Malay intellectuals and British scholar-officials in British Malaya. It focuses on genealogies of knowledge that not only lead back to Europe, but to contexts in the Malay Archipelago, encompassing both coloniser and colonised as agents of production of colonial knowledge on race. Race was a strategy adopted by Malay intellectuals in a colonial milieu, in line with histories and conditions before and during the period of British control over Malaya. The notion of complicities is explored in studying the interaction between British and Malay intellectuals which produced colonial knowledge on race.

New data from an archaeological survey of Sriksetra suggests that this important site is set for a major reinterpretation. The city functioned over a much longer period than was previously believed. There are many more buildings than had been previously recorded. Some of the city walls and moats, once considered to have been military fortifications, prove to be part of a multifunctional and evolving system of hydraulic management.

This study discusses paid domestic service employment in Thailand. Disparities in income distribution in the country and elsewhere in Southeast Asia provide a supply of domestic workers. Despite being commonly known as an exporter of domestic workers, Thailand is in fact a primary importing country as well. Domestic service is an arena in which gender, class and ethnicity collide.

The state-administered monopoly on the production of distilled rice alcohol instituted in Vietnam after 1897 evolved into one of the colony's most pervasive and unpopular institutions. This article examines the origins and operations of the monopoly, focusing on how much revenue it generated and for whom. It reveals that the monopoly generated little net revenue for the state, and instead functioned to promote the creation of a centralised and ostensibly civilian administration, capable of intervening in the economy to promote the accumulation of capital by local French entrepreneurs, but ultimately dependent on vast, invasive and frequently brutal systems of surveillance and control.

Previous scholarship on the Hikayat Patani by Andries Teeuw and David Wyatt, and more recently by Davisakd Puaksom, has focused upon the political context of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that surrounded its authors. In this article, I adopt a different approach by arguing that court intellectuals wrote the Hikayat Patani as a way to re-establish a moral order through writing during a era of political and social collapse. Set within the context of region wide economic decline after 1650, the present study of the Hikayat Patani portrays a society in anguish with comparative possibilities across all of Southeast Asia.

What were the indigenous agricultural and population patterns in peninsular Malaysia's southern lowlands? What factors produced these patterns? Based on our analysis of ethnographic and historical evidence, as well as aerial photographs taken in 1948 in the Tasek Bera and Sungai Bera watersheds, the Semelai, an Orang Asli group, had a robust and productive subsistence agricultural system emphasising rice but insured by cassava. These photographs, from the P.D.R. Williams-Hunt Collection, provide an unusual record of Semelai agriculture prior to settlement in 1954 and contribute to our knowledge of indigenous economic patterns in the southern lowlands, which have received little ethnographic attention.

… the chief social basis of radicalism has been the peasant and the smaller artisan J i n the towns. From the facts, one may conclude that the wellsprings of human freedom lie not only where Marx saw them, in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to roll.

The Southeast Asian peasantry has historically sought, as best it could, to secure its economic and physical well-being against the claims and threats of either the state or local elites. In this context, the defense of peasant subsistence and security needs i s morally underwritten by a “little tradition” that asserts both the priority of local custom over outside law and the priority of local subsistence needs over outside claims on the local product. This aspect of the little tradition amounts to a normative justification for resistence whenever agrarian elites or the state violate important local practices or threaten what villagers consider their minimal ceremonial and subsistence fund.

The opening of Philippine provincial ports to the world market in 1855 served to solidify the direct incorporation of regions outside Manila into the international capitalist system. This article reconstructs the events surrounding this important episode by situating it in the context of global capitalist dynamics and Spanish imperial decay, and the conjuncture in which local interest groups manoeuvred to intervene in the colonial state processes of the Spanish Philippines. In line with Philip Abrams' vision of history as the nexus of structure and action, the 1855 ports policy is reinterpreted as issuing from the articulation of macro and micro spheres, a perspective which allows for contingency in so far as the possibilities of human actors confronting structured totalities are multiple yet theoretically bounded. By eschewing the overdetermined view of socioeconomic change and by accounting for human agency in history, this article serves as a case study to overcome the notion of inexorability that, as David Booth rightly points out, has been frequently imputed to the epoch of global capitalist change.

Ancient Cambodia turned definitively to state Buddhism under King Jayavarman VII at the end of the twelfth century, after four centuries of state Śaivism. This paper explores the motivation behind this momentous change and tries to establish the means by which it was achieved. It uncovers signs of a very large, politically motivated campaign of tantric Buddhist initiations that required a significant overhaul of the king's temples and the creation of a new series of sacred icons.

This article traces the changing relationships between the living and the dead in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. Fuelled with fear, confusion, and massive displacement, these relationships initially consisted of distrustful interactions. Over time, however, reciprocal relations of support were established, enabling a transformation of the dead from frightened and frightening beings, to benevolent allies in the reconstruction of post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. These relationships allowed both the living and the dead to be brought in from the ‘forest’, thus showing how managing the dead was an integral aspect of post-conflict security. By comparing such relationships at Choeung Ek Genocidal Center (a national memorial site) and Koh Sap (an island in the Bassac River) this article shows how the dead replicate the locally situated politics of the living in these encounters.

Through much of the last four decades of Dutch rule in Indonesia (1900-1941) the question of “native welfare” increasingly concerned colonial administrators and scholars. In her speech in 1901, Queen Wilhemina drew attention to the declining state of native welfare in Java, thus ushering in the so-called period of ethical policies. One aspect of the problem of declining welfare among the indigenous population both in Java and elsewhere which became the subject of government investigation was the burden of taxation. Writing in 1901, P. Brooshooft drew attention to the fact that “the present [colonial] budgets are always closed with a deficit…and the most pressing needs cannotbe filled; the capacity of the people to pay is exhausted more and more through heavier taxation”. Twenty years later, W. Huender, in surveying the economic conditions of the indigenous people of Java and Madura, felt

it is disquieting that taxation is not increasing more…it is impossible to maintain that the indigenous population is not taxed heavily enough. Taking account of the low capacity of people to pay the contrary is rather the case; and present plans to have the people pay even more (for example, by increasingthe head tax and the landrent) can only make one shudder. In fact the most difficult and pressing problem in Java and Madoera is that, while the people have been taxed to the utmost limit and are “minimum sufferers”, apparently the various government measures taken to improve the situation have not been effective.