Recently, Cohen and Gujarati [2] have suggested that when multicollinearity is present there is “ …danger involved in mechanically dropping variables from multiple regression equations by t tests because t values of the regression coefficients may not be significantly different from zero when the true (population) values of these coefficients are in fact not zero…” The problem they discuss is not a new one and has been extensively treated in the existing literature. However, their approach is straightforward and will certainly aid the practitioner in his understanding of the problems associated with multicollinearity.

Survey assessments have found limited evidence of benefits of executive attractiveness. We use an objective measure of facial attractiveness that is correlated with survey assessments but less noisy and identify several benefits from executive facial attractiveness previously found in the general population but heretofore empirically elusive among executives. We examine the effect of both measures on executive compensation, promotion to CEO and the corresponding shareholder reaction, and promotion to board chair. The objective measure identifies significantly positive labor market effects for executive attractiveness in all outcomes in contrast to survey assessments of attractiveness that do not correlate with any outcome.

We show that a simple, intuitive variable, Goliath versus David (GVD), reflects time variation in discount rates related to changes in aggregate business conditions. GVD is the annual change in the weight of the largest 250 firms in the aggregate stock market and is motivated by research that shows that small firms are more severely impacted than large firms by economic shocks due to differences in access to external finance. We find that GVD is the best single predictor of out-of-sample market returns among traditional predictors, predicting quarterly market returns with an out-of-sample R2 of 6.3% in the 1976–2011 evaluation period.

Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, this paper documents that companies targeted by activists with better investor protection structures outperform those targeted by those with poor investor protection structures by roughly 10% per year. The outperformance is observed only for active targets for which Schedule 13Ds are filed, not for passive Schedule 13G investments, indicating that the effect is not explained by a superior target-selection ability. The evidence suggests that funds with better investor protection achieve increased profitability and valuation ratio of their targets by reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance, and collaborating with other large institutional investors.

Institutional demand for a stock before its earnings announcement is negatively related to subsequent returns. The relation is not attributable to the price pressure of institutional demand and is stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry and/or greater valuation difficulty. These findings support the notion that overconfident institutions misprice stocks. Following announcements, institutions’ behavior exhibits the outcome-dependent feature of self-attribution bias. Whether they become more overconfident and delay their mispricing correction depends on whether earnings news confirms their preannouncement trades. This behavioral bias also offers a new explanation for the well-known post-earnings-announcement drift.

This article provides new evidence on how access to finance affects technological innovation and establishes the role of labor practices in shaping this relation. We exploit a unique setting, pre-Civil War America, where staggered adoption of free banking laws across states encouraged bank entry, and variation in the use of exploited workers in agriculture generated differences in producers’ demands for labor-saving technologies. Results show that access to finance spurred innovation; the positive effect on agricultural innovation diminished with labor exploitation. We establish the causal role of labor exploitation using the 1850s cholera pandemic and the influx of Irish immigrants.

Stocks that hedge sustained market downturns should have low expected returns, but they do not. We use ex ante firm characteristics and covariances to construct a tradable safe minus risky (SMR) portfolio that hedges market downturns out of sample. Although downturns (peaks to troughs in market index levels at the business-cycle frequency) predict significant declines in gross domestic product growth, SMR has significant positive average returns and 4-factor alphas (both around 0.8% per month). Risk-based models do not explain SMR’s returns, but mispricing does. Risky stocks are overpriced when sentiment is high, resulting in subsequent returns of -0.9% per month.

By employing a novel, hand-collected sample of withdrawn and completed share issue privatizations, we show that both groups undergo comparable restructuring processes over the 3 years preceding the event. We employ matching procedures to explicitly control for the restructuring effect, isolating the effect of the ownership transfer from state to private investors on corporate policies and performance. We document that, absent the ownership transfer, most of the gains realized during the restructuring process are reabsorbed over the posttreatment period. The transition from state to private ownership thus represents a necessary condition for the long-term success of privatization programs.

We present a dynamic, continuous-time model in which risk averse inside equityholders set a bank’s lending, payout, and financing policies, and the exposure of bank assets to crashes. We examine whether bailouts encourage excessive lending and risk taking compared to liquidation or bail-ins with debt-to-equity conversion or debt write-downs. The effects of the prevailing insolvency resolution mechanism (IRM) on the probability of insolvency, loss in default, and the bank’s value suggest no single IRM is a panacea. We show how a bailout fund financed through a tax on bank dividends resolves bailouts without public money and without distorting insiders’ incentives.

In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.

We test whether model misspecification or liquidity spirals primarily explain the observed excess dependence in filtered (for economic fundamentals) hedge fund index returns and the links between volatility, liquidity shocks, and hedge fund return clustering. Evidence supports the model misspecification hypothesis: i) hedge fund filtered return clustering is symmetric, ii) filtered Short Bias fund returns exhibit negative dependence with filtered returns for other hedge fund types, iii) negative liquidity shocks are associated with clustering in both tails and market volatility subsumes the role of negative liquidity shocks, and iv) these same patterns appear in size-sorted equity portfolios.

In a recent article in this Journal, Haugen and Pappas (H-P, hereafter) [1] attempted to prove, within the framework of the capital asset pricing model, the already proven proposition that the cost of capital is invariant with respect to leverage even with risky debt. The H-P proof contains a serious error which we would like to point out in this note.

Most insurance companies are involved in reinsurance activities. For the majority, reinsurance means laying-off portions of the risk that they have assumed in the primary insurance market. A few other companies assume these laid-off risks. Our concern is with the former companies; that is, those seeking to cede a portion of their risk.

The striking and powerful conclusions of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) [13,8] arise from imposing the requirement that optimal individual portfolio decisions must be consistent with a market equilibrium for securities. That simple requirement–of market balance–produces the strong results that have been the centerpiece of research in finance in the last fifteen years. But despite the huge payoffs to imposing equilibrium requirements on financial markets, the CAP model remains a partial equilibrium result. The risks which are attributed to securities are strictly exogenous. Securities are risky because their prices fluctuate, but the cause of those price fluctuations is rarely specified. The literature seems to associate “market risk” with the business cycle and individual security risk with either random technological change or demand uncertainty. But whatever attribution is made, such risk remains outside of the model itself. Since the keystone of the CAPM is its important distinction between “real” or nondiversifiable risk and purely financial uncertainty, it is disconcerting to recognize that it is a model in which real quantities do not appear at all.

In recent articles, Myers, Dill, and Bautista [15] (MDB) and Franks and Hodges [7] (FH) provide valuable contributions to the leasing literature. MDB derive a simple formula for lease valuation in a Modigliani-Miller world with corporate taxes. The paper by FH presents a simpler derivation of the same formula. FH also extend MDB's analysis to consider the empirically significant case of a lessee company currently in a non-tax-paying position, but which expects to resume paying taxes at some (specified) future date. The work of FH is important here in laying bare the economics of leasing. Temporary non-tax-paying lessees joining tax-paying lessors in non-zero-sum contracts; however, their paper leaves the problem as a programming application. This paper explores the difference equations underlying the MDB-FH approach for finding the adjusted present value of the lease contract. It is found that the order of the system of difference equations depends on the treatment of taxation complexities. Also described is a simple procedure for solving these higher-order difference equations to find the appropriate adjusted discount rates to use in MDB's lease valuation formula, extending its application to these more complex tax situations. The paper is set out in six sections.

A review of the textbooks and syllabi used in courses on international financial management in several Eastern and Midwestern business schools reveals the existence of a number of common topics but substantial differences in the relative emphasis accorded to issues. Some concentrate on the financial and foreign exchange markets and on exchange rate forecasting; some on the measurement and hedging of exposure; some on the financing of international transactions; some on international accounting and control; and some on portfolio theory and capital market issues. Why do they differ? In part, because the educational objectives of institutions are different, some being much more practiceoriented than others. The M.B.A. students at Chicago, for example, are much more willing to engage in a theoretical discussion than are those at Columbia, who have a stronger decision-making orientation. Other differences arise from the pedagogical approach–the heavy use of cases, for example, tends to require a concentration on applicable techniques.

An individual is repeatedly offered the opportunity to invest in a risky asset whose return distribution is unknown. Because the return distribution is constant over time, however, he is able to learn about that distribution by observing investment outcomes. Results are presented regarding the asymptotically optimal investment behavior of a risk-averse individual under these circumstances when his aim is to maximize the expected utility of his end-of-horizon wealth. For the class of isoelastic utility functions with constant relative risk averson less than one, the optimal investment approaches a constant proportion of wealth. The limiting proportion is the same as the proportion put up by the most optimistic individual when the investment opportunity is offered only once. These results are then extended by generalizing the class of utility functions under consideration and, at the same time, restricting the class of possible investment schemes. This paper is distinguished from the previous literature by the assumption of conditional independence of returns across periods.

In the evaluation of investment opportunities risk is often a primary consideration. Risk is usually not a factor of such importance, however, in the evaluation of borrowing opportunities. But when the borrowing opportunities include the borrowing of foreign currencies, then the possibility of exchange rate fluctuations during the loan period may introduce a significant component of risk. It is our purpose to develop a method for evaluating and selecting international borrowing sources in the face of exchange rate uncertainties.

This paper examines how the progressive personal tax rate affects the equilibrium asset pricing model. In a continuous-time framework with progressive taxation, it can be shown that the expected excess rate of return on a risky asset is an increasing function of (i) the covariance of asset return with aggregate consumption rate changes, and (ii) the covariance of asset return with the aggregation of individual wealth change, weighted by the investor's tax scheme progressivity index. The capital asset pricing model derived in the absence of tax is shown to understate the expected excess rate of return and to have a misspecification error under the progressive tax scheme. Furthermore, the expected excess rate of return can be decomposed as the consumption risk premium and tax premium. The tax premium depends on the tax structure prevailing in the economy.

In an earlier note in this Journal Strangways and Yandle (S-Y) [2] reported the results of a series of statistical tests on the effects of state usury laws on housing starts in 1966. Using cross sectional analysis, they focused on both the absolute level of single family housing starts in 1966 and the change in housing starts from 1965 to 1966.