In a recent article in this Journal, Amir Barnea [1] proposes a criterion for assessing the market-making efficiency of New York Stock Exchange specialists. The appealing aspects of Barnea's method are that it uses publicly available data (common stock prices) and operates on a variable of primary concern to investors, the variance of returns on common stock. The difficulty we see in applying his approach, however, is that Barnea's performance criterion can be sensitive to a number of factors in addition to any impact the specialist might have, and that effective specialist intervention might have either a positive or negative impact on the performance measure. Thus, his specialist ranking seems to be quite misleading, and his empirical findings appear to be amenable to a substantially different interpretation than that which he provides.

We investigate the implications of recovering real-world conditional expectation of return functions using options on the S&P 500 index and Treasury bond futures. First, we construct estimates of the probability of disasters, defined as higher than 6%, 5%, or 4% equity market declines over option expiration cycles. This measure of disaster probability forecasts realized disasters. Second, we employ options on the futures of the 10- and 30-year Treasury bonds to construct estimates for the expected return of bond futures. These measures display forecasting ability for subsequent futures returns beyond the level, slope, and curvature variables extracted from the yield curve.

Exploring bank-level data from a small open economy, we present evidence that global funding conditions limit the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy in terms of shaping both the volume and the riskiness of bank lending. We show that more favorable global funding conditions associated with a local currency appreciation encourage banks to increase lending, leverage up, take more risks, and thus insulate themselves from lean-against-the-wind domestic monetary policy. These results support the existence of a risk-taking channel of currency appreciation at the bank level.

We find that organization capital is negatively related to the cost of bank loans. This finding is robust to additional analyses including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, we find that organization capital reduces all-in-spread-undrawn. When we decompose the bank loan cost, we find that organization capital increases facility fees due to its risk-engendering characteristics. Finally, we find that organization capital is positively associated with a high likelihood of the presence of inventors and innovation output, consistent with the argument that organization capital is embedded in the key talent within a firm.

This paper discusses the use of simulation as a means of studying the operations of securities markets. To place simulation's role in the proper context, Section I begins with a review of public policy, research, and teaching considerations that have combined in recent years to create a growing need to improve our understanding of the operations of these markets. Following this is a brief discussion of the limitations of traditional price theory models to meet this need. Section II demonstrates the significant, yet largely untapped, potential of simulation in this regard.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the intertemporal relationship between variations in the prices of individual common stocks and variations in the rest of the stock market. Empirical data are analyzed to determine the frequency with which stock prices precede, occur simultaneously, and follow movements in the market average.

The psychology literature suggests that individual commitment has a positive effect on team performance by mitigating the free-rider problem. With its detailed management-team information, the mutual fund industry provides a unique opportunity to study how individual managerial commitment is related to performance. Committed fund managers are defined as those who work only for one fund. With few incentives to acquire private information, teams with no committed members underperform those with committed members. These findings remain robust after we incorporate various controls. We also explore why non-committed teams have been used increasingly often despite their poor performance.

The rise of stock indexing has raised concerns that index investing impedes arbitrage and degrades price discovery. This article uses Russell’s reconstitution to identify the causal effect of index investing on information arbitrage and price discovery. Although index investing has no discernible effect on the ability of arbitrageurs to trade and impound news into the prices of large- and mid-cap stocks, we find that index investing increases the speed of price adjustment to news for micro-cap stocks. Our causal evidence identifies the relaxation of arbitrage constraints as a mechanism through which indexing facilitates informed trading for more arbitrage-constrained micro-cap stocks.

We study the effects of market incompleteness on speculation, investor survival, and asset pricing moments when investors disagree about the likelihood of jumps and have recursive preferences. We consider two models. In a model with jumps in aggregate consumption, incompleteness barely matters because the consumption claim resembles an insurance product against jump risk and effectively reproduces approximate spanning. In a long-run risk model with jumps in the long-run growth rate, market incompleteness affects speculation and investor survival. Jump and diffusive risks are more balanced regarding their importance, and therefore the consumption claim cannot reproduce approximate spanning.

This article provides micro-level evidence for the role of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in the cross-border transmission of global financial uncertainty shocks. Using Chinese firm-level data, we find that rising uncertainty has a significantly larger contractionary effect on real investment for FIEs than their local counterparts. This effect is more pronounced for firms faced with greater investment irreversibility or financial constraints. The contractionary effect is mainly driven by downside uncertainty, whereas upside uncertainty is modestly expansionary. Similar effects are found for other firm-level performances. There is also a spillover effect to local private firms with FIEs concentrated in downstream sectors.

Theory says an American call should never be exercised early, except possibly just before an ex-dividend date. But the best market bid is regularly lower than the intrinsic value for in-the-money short-maturity options. An American option can always be exercised to recover the intrinsic value, whereas selling a European call in the market may return considerably less. The article derives the liquidity value of American exercise in closed form as a function of the bid–ask spread and shows empirically that it is of comparable magnitude to, and often greater than, the theoretical value of American exercise to collect a dividend.

This article introduces a new holding horizon measure of active management and examines its relation to future risk-adjusted fund performance (alpha). Our measure reveals a wide cross-sectional dispersion in mutual fund investment horizons, and shows that long-horizon funds exhibit positive future long-term alphas by holding stocks with superior long-term fundamentals. Further, stocks largely held by long-horizon funds outperform stocks largely held by short-horizon funds by more than $ 3\% $ annually, adjusted for risk, over the following 5-year period. We also find a clientele effect: to reduce liquidity costs, long-horizon funds attract more long-term investors through share classes that carry load fees.

This article studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash-flow volatility shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms’ ability to make good on promised future payments to managers. When volatility is low, firms with full commitment ability implement high pay–performance sensitivity to motivate effort from managers, and they impose large penalties on the arrival of volatility shocks to incentivize prudent risk management. In contrast, firms with limited commitment may allow excessive risk taking in exchange for low pay–performance sensitivity. When volatility becomes high, firms with full commitment defer compensation more, whereas firms with limited commitment must expedite payments.

Prior research finds that Dodd–Frank Act’s regulations on credit rating agencies (CRAs) increase rated firms’ risk of rating downgrades, regardless of their credit quality. Our difference-in-difference estimates suggest that after Dodd–Frank, low-rated firms, which face steep costs from a further downgrade, significantly reduce their debt issuance and investments compared to similar unrated firms. Our results are not driven by credit supply or the financial crisis. They reveal an unintended consequence of Dodd–Frank: Greater regulatory pressure on CRAs leads to negative spillover effects on firms concerned about credit ratings, regardless of their credit quality.

Our paper extends prior work on abandonment and replacement policies by analyzing the effects of both the Darby and the Fisher interest rate hypotheses. In most of the new cases developed, the effect of increased inflation on economic life is ambiguous. In the abandonment problem, we find a greater tendency under the Fisher hypothesis than under the Darby hypothesis for increased inflation to result in an extension of economic life. In contrast, for the replacement problem, there is a greater tendency under the Fisher hypothesis (than under Darby) for inflation to shorten the asset holding period.

One of the most important innovations in bond financing and in mortgage lending has been the rapid adoption of variable-rate instruments in recent years. Notes and bonds bearing an interest rate between one and two percentage points above the prime rate are becoming common in corporate financing. Similarly, variable-rate mortgages (VRM's) with the interest rate tied to the deposit rate of S&L's or linked to the changing yields on competing investments have spread beyond Florida and California to many states. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has recently endorsed the variable-rate concept and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is preparing guidelines for secondary market operations in VRM's. Portfolio managers are thus taking note of the possibility of acquiring long-term instruments providing some of the resiliency of yields and a measure of real value protection characteristic of short-term issues.

In the literature dealing with bond price volatility, there have been two divergent approaches. On the one hand, theoretical papers have looked at bond price volatility in the instantaneous framework of the calculus. Using the derivative of bond price (P) with respect to yield to maturity (y), it has been shown that volatility is linearly related to this derivative (dP/dy). (See [10].)

Models of return generation for securities are potentially important for a number of reasons, including their possible utility in normative portfolio construction. Multi-index models of the process are frequently suggested as an alternative to the familiar single-index models, but, while the multi-index models are intuitively appealing, their empirical superiority remains largely undemonstrated. This paper examines the extent to which three multi-index models succeed in eliminating dependence in the return residuals for a portfolio of common stocks. The relevance of this research lies in the promise that, while obviously requiring additional inputs to determine the efficient set of portfolios, multi-index models may succeed in identifying a more accurate set of efficient portfolios.

The financial experiences of the last two years impel a careful and wide-ranging review of the stability of our major types of financial institutions. That review ought to be followed by actions to redress weaknesses or proclivities that, upon analysis, are judged to contribute an undesirable degree of instability within the financial system.

Recently, agency theory has become popular as a means of explaining the structure of contracts between various classes of economic agents. Oftentimes the contracts of interest represent sharing rules for the payoffs that result from some production activity. In the usual two-party model of the contracting problem, one party designated the principal delegates authority for decisions affecting production to another party designated the agent. Typically, the assumptions made about the consequences of the agent's actions are that they are associated with effort on the part of the agent for which the agent (but not the principal) has disutility, and that greater effort will result in higher payoffs from production in every state of nature. Moral hazard is then introduced by assuming that the principal is unable to observe the agent's effort, or to infer what effort the agent applied through an ex post observation of the payoff that results.