This article analyzes the ownership structures and governance institutions of New York's corporations in the 1820s, using a new dataset collected from the records of the state's 1823 capital tax, and from the corporate charters. In contrast to Berle and Means's account of the development of the corporation, the results indicate that many firms were dominated by large shareholders, who were represented on the firms' boards, and held sweeping power to utilize the firms' resources for their own benefit. To address this problem, many firms configured their voting rights in a way that curtailed the power of large investors.

The enormous Nazi voting literature rarely builds on modern statistical or economic research. By adding these approaches, we find that the most widely accepted existing theories of this era cannot distinguish the Weimar elections from almost any others in any country. Via a retrospective voting account, we show that voters most hurt by the depression, and most likely to oppose the government, fall into separate groups with divergent interests. This explains why some turned to the Nazis and others turned away. The consequences of Hitler's election were extraordinary, but the voting behavior that led to it was not.

Occupation charges paid by France to Nazi Germany represent one of the largest international transfers and contributed significantly to the German war effort. We employ a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the occupied economy to assess the welfare costs of the policies that managed the payments to Germany. Our lower bound estimates show that occupation payments required a severe cut in consumption. A draft of labor to Germany and a reduction of real wages added to this burden. Management of the accumulated domestic debt required large budget surpluses; but post-Liberation inflation slashed the real debt.

Torn between divergent disciples, economic history needs to prove its usefulness as well as its scholarly virtuosity. Innovations in method and data have carried the field forward, but perhaps not fulfilled the claims of their champions. To economics in particular, economic history contributes a richer sense of space and time, and the importance of demographic factors. Three vignettes attempt to illustrate that useful economic history can result from confrontations of past and present that improve our understanding of both. Finally, emerging developments in the underlying fields may herald a more central future role for our discipline.

Gold discoveries in 1848 set off a large and extremely rapid migration to California. This article uses newly collected data from the 1850 and 1852 Censuses of Population together with the public use sample of the 1850 Census of Population to examine who went to California and how they did economically. We find that the propensity to migrate was affected by the individual's age and literacy, distance of the state from California, and average state latitude. Consistent with the historical literature, we find that economic outcomes were generally small or even zero for miners but were positive and large for nonminers.

Through a detailed reconstruction of 1933 GDP for the two provinces in China's most advanced region, the Lower Yangzi, I show that their per capita income was 55 percent higher than China's average, and they had experienced a growth and structural change between 1914–1918 and 1931–1936 comparable to contemporaneous Japan and her East Asian colonies. This article highlights the unique political institution of early-twentieth-century Shanghai as a city state, with its rule of law and secure property rights laying the foundation for economic growth in the Lower Yangzi with long-term impact throughout East Asia.

The Panama Canal was one of the largest public investments of its time. In the first decade of its operation, the canal produced significant social returns for the United States. Most of these returns were due to the transportation of petroleum from California to the East Coast. The United States also succeeded in leveraging the threat of military force to obtain a much better deal from the Panamanian government than it could have negotiated otherwise.

The businesses of developed Europe—transporting freight by a more advantageous mix of ships, trains, and horses—encountered logistic barriers to trade lower than those in the sparsely populated United States. Economically integrated, compact northwest Europe was a multinational market space larger than the United States, and, arguably, as open to interstate commerce as the contemporary American domestic market. By the early twentieth century, the First European Integration had enabled its manufacturers to build more than half the world's giant plants—many more than in the United States—as variously required by factor endowments, consumer demand, and scale economies.

Meat transformed North Atlantic shipping, leading to dominance of liners and changed the economics of freight rates. Management coordination of meat shipment led to concentration in shipping. Only liner companies could provide specialized ships with the regularity needed and they dominated North Atlantic shipping. The cargo capacity of cattle ships, beyond that used for animals, lowered freight rates on grain below levels that would otherwise have prevailed. The berth rate on wheat from New York to Liverpool was most affected. Consequently, this readily available freight rate can be potentially misleading as an indicator of ocean shipping developments.

By analyzing a newly compiled data base of grain prices, this article finds that prior to the nineteenth century the grain trade in India was essentially local, while more distant markets remained fragmented. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that these premodern structures were transformed, and a national grain market had emerged. In the Great Divergence debate, the California School's claim that early modern “Asia” reached a similar stage of economic development as early modern Europe is therefore rejected for India.

Does a legal tradition adopted in the distant past constrain a country's ability to provide the protection that investors need for financial markets to develop? I look at the relationship between legal origin and the development of bond markets and find too much variation over time in bond market size, creditor protections, and court enforcement of bond contracts to assume that the adoption of a legal system constrains future financial development. I examine the evolution of bond markets in Brazil, a French civil law country, and provide preliminary results of similar variation for a small cross-section of countries.

This article analyzes asset pricing behavior during the period leading up to the Crisis of 1873. Evidence is presented that equities, options, and bonds priced risks consistently, suggesting that investors were actively monitoring the risk of investing and were not caught up in an irrational, speculative mania. Implied probability density functions for stock returns suggest that option markets exhibited growing concern about substantial price declines prior to the crash. Concerns were concentrated on riskier, more leveraged firms. Deteriorating balance sheet fundamentals for the riskiest U.S. railroads set the stage for a market disruption in 1873 as information asymmetries worsened.

Was the adoption of state utility regulation the result of a negative-sum competition among special interest groups vying for the monopoly rents created by regulation or a positive-sum elimination of corruption arising from appropriable quasi-rents? Previous empirical studies of the adoption of regulation have assumed the former. Using discrete hazard analysis, this study considers the latter and finds the data more consistent with the positive-sum protection of quasi-rents than the negative-sum creation and appropriation of monopoly rents.

New England experienced a significant economic transformation after the Revolutionary War. Despite an extensive literature on American development, little is known about the precise role of banks in this process. This article exploits a detailed dataset from Plymouth County, Massachusetts to show that the first bank during its early stage was far more selective in lending than the pre-existing personal credit market. Thus the mere introduction of a single bank did not broaden access to credit. Following the liberalization of chartering policy in the 1820s, however, freer entry and competition drove banks to extend credit to farmers and artisans.

Economists played a crucial role in military intelligence during World War II. Economists working at the Office of Strategic Services estimated enemy battle casualties, analyzed the intentions and capabilities of both enemies and allies, and helped to prepare for negotiations regarding the postwar settlement. Economists working at the Enemy Objectives Unit helped to select enemy targets for bombing. Finally, economists working at the Statistical Research Group worked on a variety of problems brought to them by the U.S. military services. As a consequence of their usefulness during the war, the military continued to employ economists after the war.

Like the rest of the poor periphery, Mexico fought with de-industrialization in the century before the 1870s. Yet, Mexican manufacturing defended itself better than did the rest of the poor periphery. Why Mexican exceptionalism? This article decomposes the sources of de-industrialization into productivity events abroad, globalization forces connecting Mexico to those markets, and domestic forces. It uses a neo-Ricardian model to implement the decomposition, advocates a price dual approach, and develops a new price and wage data base. Mexican exceptionalism was due to weaker Dutch disease effects, better wage competitiveness, and the policy autonomy to foster industry.

The use of height data to measure living standards is now a well-established method in economic literature. Although blacks and whites today reach similar terminal statures in the United States, nineteenth-century African American statures were consistently shorter than those of whites. Greater insolation (vitamin D production) is documented here to be associated with taller black statures. Black farmers were taller than workers in other occupations, and, ironically, black youth statures increased during the antebellum period and decreased with slavery's elimination.

From the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, Genoese bankers collected money from a variety of sources and lent it to the king of Spain. It was all made possible by the Bisenzone exchange fairs, which created an efficient financial network under Genoese control and permitted arbitrage among northern Italian financial markets. At Bisenzone, Genoese bankers raised money for these loans from a variety of sources, which reduced the risks of lending and funded the king's long-term obligations via short term loans. Bisenzone was in many ways an offshore capital market which operated on an international scale, or, in the language of the sixteenth century, a fair without a place—una fiera senza luogo.

Economic historians have devoted enormous attention to the collapse of the interwar gold standard. This article proposes a discrete time duration model (using a panel data set of 24 countries for 1928–1936) to analyze how economic and political indicators affected a country's term on the gold standard. High per capita income, international creditor status, and prior hyperinflation increased the probability of continuation. In contrast, democratic regimes left early. Unemployment, sterling group membership, higher inflation, and the experience of banking crises reduced the time a country remained on the gold standard. This study also predicts sample countries' survival probabilities.

The Baring Crisis is the nineteenth century's most famous sovereign debt crisis. Using a database of more than 15,000 observations, we assess its effect on emerging market borrowers and find empirical evidence of a regional crisis but not a global crisis. During the crisis, Latin American yield spreads increased by more than 200 basis points relative to the rest of the world, even after controlling for macroeconomic, trade, political-institutional factors, and other country-specific effects. Our evidence suggests that European investors may have sold off or reduced their holdings of Latin American securities in the wake of the Baring Crisis.