This paper examines the economic consequences to the Soviet Union of not participating in proposed aid programs in the immediate postwar period. The cost of World War II to the Soviet Union is compared with the value of economic aid received in the postwar period and with aid potentially available. The traditional story—which suggests that had the USSR received some combination of the proposed aid prgorams, in lieu of reparations, the postwar impact would have been significantly reduced—is rejected.

In accordance with the proper procedures of economic history and nicely within the limitations of my own knowledge, my comments upon the three papers presented take the form of recollections of some of the business conditions met with in my forty-four years of service with a single manufacturing and selling company.

This seeks to examine the thesis of family limitation in pre-industrial England proposed by E. A. Wrigley on the basis of birth intervals evidence in his famous 1966 paper, “Family Limitation in Pre-industrial England.” A simulation model of a stochastic reproductive system is used to investigate the possible effects of a variety offerees acting on birth intervals. It is argued that although the Wrigley hypothesis remains plausible it is likely that he has exaggerated the role of birth control.

We examine the relationship between international trade and regional American credit markets. The evidence presented suggests that foreign payment flows had a significant effect on the level of interest rates in the East North Central, West North Central, Pacific, and Southern regions of the United States.

For many years Arthur Young (1741–1820), greatest of all English agricultural publicists, was closely associated with the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, established in London in March 1754. Each year the Society of Arts, as it soon came to be called, offered premiums for desirable inventions and improvements in such diverse fields as agriculture, manufactures, chemistry, colonies and trade, and the polite arts. In his numerous books Young frequently commented on the activities of the Society, while the eight volumes of Young manuscript letters in the British Museum contain scattered references to his relations with the Society. A large portion of this article is based, however, upon the manuscript records of the Society of Arts, which I was permitted to examine and use through the courtesy of Mr. Charles Durant Cassidy, librarian and examinations officer, and Dr. Frank R. Lewis, assistant secretary. These records consist of minutes, letters, unpublished transactions, and especially records of the various committees which examined all applications for premiums and made the awards. Among the records are eight unpublished manuscript letters written by Young, two of which are reproduced as an appendix to this article.

If “colonial politics” denotes the objectives of a metropolitan power vis-à-vis its colony, then, for purposes of this paper, we may define “colonial psychology” as the frame of reference that determines the attitudes of “metropolitans” vis-à-vis the “colonial problem.” By “metropolitans” we mean the inhabitants of those Western societies that are linked to part of the non-West by the historical, political, economic and psychological ties that have always accentuated the dominance of the West. By “colony” we shall here mean only the areas with a multiracial population of which a white element considers itself so integrally a part that it feels itself more strongly associated with its own “colonial” society than with the metropolitan country of its origins.

The flurry of British investment in American manufacturing industry from 1887 to 1891 was viewed with alarm, particularly in the West. At this time the farmer was preoccupied with the economic power of monopolistic industries and trusts, and so die British investor became deeply involved in this phase of the agrarian battle. In the past, capital from die United Kingdom had entered industrial concerns, chiefly railroads, without wresting the management out of American hands. More recently British investors had been building up and controlling dieir own enterprises in the West. Now, well-established and profitable American businesses were bought and directed from Britain. The farmer regarded this unaccustomed interest in American industrials either as a step toward die formation of great monopolies, or, even worse, as part of an imperialistic design conceived by London bankers to enslave the American people.