This article uses data on regional output and imports to examine the relationship between imports and regional growth in the Northeast. The tariff rates, both nominal and effective, are considered as evidence of national policy that may have benefited this particular region. The findings are that particular industries do benefit from tariff protection, but their location is due to regional resource advantages.

Historians frequently use values to explain behavior. Since their studies focus on the behavior, they have neglected to measure values and change in values. The current practices of historians of values will not yield conclusions usable in the history of behavior.

Between 1890 and 1950 the labor force of the United States creased by some 37.3 million workers. decade-by-decade States in-increments fluctuated widely, roughly half of the sixty-year increase (18.9 million) occurred over the first thirty years, and half (18.4 million) over the second.

We present quantitative evidence that the mita introduced by the Spanish crown in 1573 caused the decimation of the native-born male population. The mass baptisms after the conquest of Peru in 1532 resulted in the assignation of surnames for the first time. We argue that past mortality displacement and mass out-migration were responsible for differences in the surnames observed in mita and non-mita districts today. Using a regression discontinuity and data from the Peruvian Electoral Roll of 2011, we find that mita districts have 47 log points fewer surnames than non-mita districts, and fewer surnames exclusive to one location.

The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled “pro-democratic dynasties,” show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

The Industrial Removal Office funded 39,000 Jewish households to leave enclave neighborhoods in New York City from 1900 to 1922. Compared to neighbors with the same baseline occupation, program participants earned 4 percent more ten years after relocation. These gains persisted to the next generation. Benefits increased with more years spent outside of an enclave. Participants were more likely to speak English, and married spouses with less Jewish names. More Jewishly-identified men (as measured by own names) were more likely to return to the city. We contextualize these results with new national evidence on Jewish economic and cultural assimilation.

The dictatorial Dominion of New England (1686–1689) saw the rise and fall of the first operational bank scheme in America. Both events resulted from the appointed rulers' attempts to personally profit from real estate, subject to an absolutist constitution imposed by England. The first, local ruler led a nominally private land bank. The subsequent, foreign ruler invalidated all land titles and thus killed the bank. This unusual case study exemplifies an extension of Mancur Olson's model of stationary and roving bandits, and demonstrates how economic development can be affected in different ways by different types of dictators.