Twenty years have passed since the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) met for its first stormy session in the spring of 1947. The beginning of the Commission and the first five years of its existence were strongly influenced by the increasing political tensions between what would become two blocs of countries, led by the United States on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other. How this East-West conflict, or Cold War, originated and developed I shall not attempt to clarify at this time, except by stating that it provides an example of what in my analytical work I have defined as “circular causation with cumulative effects.” As reaction followed upon action and further reaction upon that reaction, there developed a perverse but effective cooperation between those on each of the two sides who sought to solidify the blocs against each other. Circular causation does not need to be vicious, however. It can be virtuous, when once the general trend is instead turned toward a lessening of tension.

While the firm-level distributional consequences of market liberalization are well understood, previous studies have paid only limited attention to how variations in domestic institutions across countries affect the winners and losers from opening up to trade. We argue that the presence of coordinated wage-bargaining institutions, which impose a ceiling on wage increases, and state-subsidized vocational training, which creates a large supply of highly skilled workers, generate labor market frictions. Upward wage rigidity, in particular, helps smaller firms weather the rising competition and increasing labor costs triggered by trade liberalization. We test this hypothesis using a firm-level data set of European Union countries, which includes more than 800,000 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2014. We find that, for productive firms, gains from trade are 20 percent larger in countries with liberal market economies than they are in coordinated market economies. Symmetrically, less productive firms in coordinated market economies experience significantly smaller revenue losses compared to liberal market economies. We show that both the presence of an institutionalized wage ceiling and the availability of subsidized vocational training are key mechanisms for reducing the reallocation of revenue from unproductive to productive firms in coordinated market economies compared to liberal market economies. In line with our theory, we find that wages and employment in liberalized industries increase differentially across both types of labor markets. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that trade liberalization triggers a differential demand for redistribution at the individual level across different labor markets, which is in line with our firm-level analysis.

One of the responsibilities of the UN General Assembly is to encourage the progressive development and codification of international law. One method it may use in discharging diis responsibility is the convening of conferences to draft international conventions for submission to governments. The International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, draws up draft treaties which may be utilized as working documents at such conferences. This method does not differ fundamentally from die normal procedures of creating international law, since, in substance, it involves die drafting and signing of treaties. However, the General Assembly has, at least potentially, other means (the study of which is die subject of this article), which have not been fully utilized and die use of which would perhaps permit a liberalization of the creative process of developing and codifying international law. Here we shall examine, in general terms, only one of tiiese, i.e., die possibilities and limitations of purely declarative codes of customary rules adopted by the General Assembly as means of discharging that organ's responsibilities.

Whether it is called an assembly, a conference, or something else, there is in most if not all international organizations an organ, for which the United Nations General Assembly is the prototype, in which the entire membership is represented. The importance of these bodies is generally acknowledged. Constitutionally, they usually have final authority in such matters as the appointment of the executive officer, the election of smaller organs, the adoption of the budget, and the determination of overall policy. Few studies of an international organization or of the interaction between a state or a group of states and an international organization can neglect the assembly of the organization under scrutiny.

The Andean Common Market, the most recent attempt at regional integration in Latin America, differs from the other Latin American efforts both in the factors that prompted its formation and in the support it had when it was established. More importantly, it differs in its terms and provisions, providing for a higher level of integration than any other Latin American effort. Several of its features—a common policy on foreign investment, regional planning and coordination in such fields as industry and agriculture, a quasi–supranational secretariat — make it an innovative approach to integration in Latin America. Numerous factors enhance the integrative potential of Andean integration. Among these are relatively favorable ratings on several of the neo–functional variables of regional integration. These indicators suggest that the effort may attain its objectives and perhaps even set an example to be followed by other economic groupings among Latin American countries. Still, projections about the future of the Andean Common Market must remain mixed. Some negative factors exist within the movement that could, if they triumph over the positive factors, lead to the same stagnation that now characterizes LAFTA and the CACM.

A hierarchical regional system may be defined as a regional international system composed of a single Great Power and a number of relatively small states. This article attempts to clarify the conditions under which member states of a hierarchical regional system, including both the great-power regional hegemon and the relatively small powers, seek to influence the salience that boundaries have for such a system. Scholars and policymakers alike may use several criteria in defining the boundaries of a regional system: 1) A system may be delimited geographically; 2) marked discontinuities in transactional interchanges (language, trade patterns, communication flows) may serve to set it off from the general international system as may common membership in formal international organizations; 3) boundaries may similarly be established by emphasizing behavioral criteria, i.e., by identifying norms especially pertaining to conflict management and resolution which are specific to a group of states. Unless otherwise specified, I employ the last definition throughout this article.

Three different methods are used to estimate the loss and gain in fulfillment of basic needs, for industrial and less developed countries, from possible global transfers of income. Focusing on prospective changes in life expectancy and infant mortality rates, the gain attributable to a given income increment for a person in a very poor country is on the order of seventy-five times greater than the loss to be expected for the average person residing in a rich country. Benefits to the poor are greater if income is distributed relatively equally within poor countries. Income transfers designed to meet basic needs would help to reduce birth rates in poor countries. The prospective gains in basic needs from the transfers are sufficiently large to exceed prospective losses from disruption of the global economy caused by the transfers. Fundamental questions of justice are thus raised.

Does diplomacy affect the prospects of international conflict and cooperation? Systematic empirical assessment has been hindered by the inferential challenges of separating diplomacy from the distribution of power and interests that underlies its conduct. This paper addresses the question of diplomacy's efficacy by examining the intragovernmental politics of US foreign policy, and the varying influence of diplomatic personnel in the policy process. I claim that diplomats hold the strongest preferences for cooperative relations with their host countries, relative to other participants in the foreign policy process. They also exert substantial influence over the formation and implementation of US policies toward their host countries but their influence is intermittently weakened by the short-term shock of an ambassadorial turnover. As a result, when ambassadors are removed from post, diplomacy is more likely to be eschewed for more conflictual means of settling international disagreements, and opportunities for economic exchange are less likely to be realized. I test this theory using newly collected data on US diplomatic representation, for the global sample of countries from 1960 through 2014. To address concerns of diplomatic staffing being endogenous to political interests, I leverage a natural experiment arising from the State Department's three-year ambassadorial rotation system. The turnover of a US ambassador causes a decrease in US exports to the country experiencing the turnover, and heightens the risk of onset of a militarized dispute between that country and the US. These findings point to bureaucratic delegation as an important but overlooked determinant of macro-level international outcomes.

While debate continues on whether the foreign policies of small states are1 or are or not generically different from those of large states, little has been written explicitly about the association of size of donors with the quality of their foreign aid. This essay hypothesizes that the aid policies of small states will differ from those of large states in ways that may be measured empirically, just as Plischke, East, Sawyer, and Hermann have demonstrated with quantitative data that the general foreign policy behavior of small states varies significantly from that of large ones. More particularly, it is hypothesized that small states give higher quality aid, and give it relatively more generously, than large states. This hypothesis is grounded on general impressions—Sweden is widely acknowledged as a “good” donor and the United States an indifferent one—and on extrapolations from small state theory that will be sketched below.

Bargaining models play a central role in international relations, particularly in the study of conflict. A common criticism of this approach is that it fails to account for nonmaterial (e.g., psychological) factors that may influence the bargaining process. We augment a standard bargaining model by allowing actors’ preferences over conflict to diverge from the “fitness” payoffs (e.g., resources) typical of such models. Preferences are subject to evolutionary forces—those who attain high fitness reproduce more. We find that (1) there is a trade-off where being “irrationally” tough leads to better bargains but also more inefficient conflict; (2) actors develop behavioral biases consistent with empirical findings from psychology and behavioral economics; and (3) these behavioral biases inevitably lead to conflict. By bridging the strategic and psychological approaches to conflict, our models provide new insights into questions such as how changes in military and intelligence-gathering technology affect the likelihood and expected cost of war, and how to interpret the purported decline of violence over recent human history.

Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) has been an important issue in NATO throughout the 1970s. Increasingly, national political and military leaders have expressed the concern that doctrine, procedures, and materiel should be harmonized more effectively as one means of counterbalancing the Warsaw Pact. However, in the past decade RSI initiatives have been largely unsuccessful. Weapons standardization in NATO depensupon the scope and degree of ideological advocacy for the collaborative security imperative and the influence of economic competition in arms production and sales among the members of the Alliance. An analysis of the disparate views of the member-states and of threecase studies—the MX-1 tank treads, the ribbon bridge, and ROLAND II—indicates that ideological advocacy has been high among international and national elites (if not among subnational elites), but that the increased economic competition following the rise of European defense industries during the last fifteen years has exacerbated national policy differences and decreased the prospects for RSI success.

How do voters want their governments to respond when another country unilaterally withdraws from an international institution? We distinguish between negotiation approaches that vary in the degree to which they accommodate the withdrawing state's demands and argue that negotiation preferences are shaped by two issues. The first is voters’ exposure to the costs and benefits of accommodation. This exposure varies across issues, and we argue that citizens will generally prefer non-accommodation on zero-sum issues, but support more accommodation on cooperation issues, where non-accommodation puts existing cooperation gains at risk. Second, withdrawal negotiations create precedents, and citizens should therefore be less willing to accommodate the more they are concerned about the ripple effects of accommodation on the institution's stability. These concerns also confront citizens with two types of dilemmas depending on how favorably they view the institution themselves. To test our argument, we use survey evidence and a conjoint experiment conducted in Germany and Spain during the Brexit negotiations. We find that respondents overall are more willing to accommodate the UK on cooperation issues than on zero-sum issues, but also find evidence that Euroskeptics and Europhiles confront different issue-specific dilemmas. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics surrounding the challenges to multilateralism that have proliferated in recent years.

International organizations, it is sometimes said, are always designed to prevent the last war. An analogous problem besets economic institutions. The inability of some existing international economic organizations to deal with the current problems in their domains is all too apparent. Two of the institutional pillars of the postwar Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (GATT), were shaken in 1971 and are still suffering from severe malaise. The political and economic conditions that led to their formation at the end of the Second World War have changed, calling into question the political and intellectual foundation upon which they were constructed. In the aftermath of the 1973 energy crisis, meetings of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and a special session of the General Assembly have been the scene of demands by poor countries for a new economic order, but the meaning of the phrase has been ambiguous and the formula has impeded rather than promoted agreement.

The Red Cross, a transnational movement, has taken action in conflict situations that both conserves the authority of states and also circumscribes state behavior in the name of fundamental human rights. On the one hand, the Red Cross, principally through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is cooperative toward states and acts discreetly in matters regarded by states as sensitive. On the other hand, the Red Cross has promoted the law of armed conflict to limit states and has accepted quasi-supranational authority in international armed conflict in the form of the right of automatic ICRC access to certain detainees. On the basis of this right, or sometimes on the basis of bypassing legal issues, the ICRC is able to transcend the “sovereignty” of states (and non-state parties as well). While the Red Cross movement is highly fragmented and encompasses a number of non-cosmopolitan elements, the historical impact of the movement has been to help liberalize the nation-state system, largely through the actions of the ICRC, while reinforcing fundamental authority within that system.

The direction of movement of integration between the member states of the European Communities was uncertain in the early 1970s. The increasingly intergovernmental style of decision making was then seen to have a potential for furthering integration, although a number of disintegrative pressures were noted. In 1973–1974, however, the teleological ambiguities were resolved, and in the late 1970s member states increasingly stressed autonomy rather than integration. Intergovernmental decision making then acquired a different character from that which it had shown in the early seventies. A shift in the center of gravity of the Communities' institutions, away from the Commission and in favor of the Presidency and the national foreign ministers and officials, both reflected and encouraged these developments.

One of the lessons drawn by many scholars from the 1982 U.S. sanctions against the Soviet-European gas pipeline was that the decline of American hegemony and the global spread of American business placed the overseas networks of U.S. multinational corporations beyond the control of the U.S. government for the purposes of economic sanctions. Through systematically examining three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya, and South Africa), this study qualifies the generalizability of this “lesson.” In none of the cases was the United States willing to incur alliance costs through applying extraterritorial controls, nor was it able to persuade American firms to substitute public preferences for private ones. Nonetheless, in each case, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business stategies reinforced diplomatic preferences.

Colonialism, at least as it is generally defined in the United Nations as Western rule of non-metropolitan areas, is rapidly being brought to a close. As a consequence, within a few years some of the activities of the United Nations will be reduced to almost insignificant proportions. Seven of the eleven territories that were once included within the trusteeship system have already achieved self-government or independence, and another, Ruanda-Urundi, will soon attain that goal. Unless new territories are added, only Nauru, New Guinea, and the Pacific Islands will remain under trusteeship. The list of territories which according to the General Assembly are subject to the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter has not been cut as drastically, but in terms of the number of people involved, the reduction is equally impressive. Even with the high rate of population growth and the addition of the Spanish and Portuguese dependencies, the number of people living in such areas is about one-fifth of the 1946 figure of 215,000,000. With a few important exceptions such as Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, and Angola and Mozambique, the territories which in the UN's view “have not yet attained a full measure of self-government” are small and have populations of less than one million. It has already been recommended that the future of the Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and the possibility of allocating its duties to other departments be reviewed in the light of these developments.

The world today, Benjamin Barber points out, is “falling precipitantly apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same moment.” While states from Canada to India are threatened with breakup due to fractious nationalist impulses of their peoples, the power of technology and markets is forcing ever-tighter economic integration worldwide. From a common-sense perspective, these two impulses are among the most important processes in contemporary world politics. Yet, there has been remarkably little attention paid to developing a theory of the international system that examines the effects of both. Hegemonic stability theory considers economic integration but not nationalism; the few studies of nationalism as a systemic force play down the effects of economic integration; and neorealism, the most widely accepted theory of the international system, has no room to address either trend. The field is, partly as a result, a cacaphony of voices largely talking past one another.