Recent efforts by North American social scientists to devise systematic empirical tests for a series of propositions purportedly drawn from structural theories of dependency have focused largely on the consequences of foreign economic linkages for the economies of developing countries. Although the results of these tests have been received with considerable skepticism by dependentistas and neo-positivists alike, cross-national, quantitative studies of the dependence-development relationship are not without value: they have focused research on a central problem, namely the effects of various forms of economic linkages on rates and types of economic development. This concentration of research activities, in particular the current spate of replications, has yielded new empirical knowledge concerning these relationships, plus some intriguing conflicting evidence. This is now sufficient to support further inquiry in itself, independent of the confines of dependencia theories which gave rise to the research originally.

Sometime between now and 1991, the international community will have to consider creating a new legal regime for Antarctica. Until recently, the “cold continent” and its legal regime were the concerns of a few scientists, fishermen, and legal specialists. Now, with new information on the extent of Antarctic resources, concern that present supplies of raw materials, fuels, and food are limited, and improvement of cold weather extraction technology, a broader group of policymakers, entrepreneurs, scientists, and environ-mentalists are paying attention to Antarctica. Experts now believe that exploratory drilling for offshore oil and natural gas is only a decade away. Though commercial extraction is farther in the future, and commercial exploitation of land-based minerals is unlikely in the next thirty years, speculation about Antarctica's natural wealth has aroused wide interest. There remain formidible obstacles to all these activities, but recent work in the oceans suggests that these plans might materialize earlier than now expected, and that a legal regime capable of dealing with resource activities should be in place before they begin.

International institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility. Neorealists draw on the post–World War II era to advance sweeping general claims of institutional inefficacy. This study, by contrast, deploys the same hard-test method Grieco applied to the 1970s Tokyo Round negotiations to the crisis-rife 1870s to construct a unique methodological objective: a rigorous hard-test of nineteenth-century institutional autonomy. Three principal findings emerged. First, the maintenance of a liberal world economy in the turbulent 1870s is explained by an unlikely commercial instrument and the unprecedented regime design of an unexplored international institution—respectively the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) clause and the informal conventional tariff system (CTS) regime it underpinned—not British hegemony. Second, the international trade regime was not a public good unilaterally provisioned by “hegemonic” Britain via the 1846 Corn Laws Repeal. The regime was instead a private good that was collectively provisioned by all its constituent member states via the unprecedented interstate practices institutionalized in the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and then autonomously maintained by a negarchical and self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism. Finally, the informal CTS regime's enforcement mechanism autonomously altered the interests and behaviors of states in directions incongruent with executive preferences solely through the brute force of rational calculations imposed by decentralized international institutional constraints. Both the French and British executives in the 1870s believed the regime was normatively inappropriate and unsuccessfully attempted to exit amid eight system-threatening crises. Nonetheless, the MFN-based regime's self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism autonomously induced compliance: conceptualized as unitary states' behavior deviating from executives' first-order preference. The extraordinarily turbulent 1870s therefore provide an unexplored historical vantage point to make strong institutionalist claims in an era, issue area, and under conditions that they are least likely to be validated.

Much popular and scholarly writing abounds with references to blocs in the UN General Assembly, but there has been little systematic study of the actual patterns of group alignment in that body. This state of affairs may have resulted from the difficulties inherent in applying to international organization the methods used to analyze domestic legislative behavior. However, social scientists have recently developed some new techniques which may help to simplify this task and allow us to use quantitative procedures to study voting behavior in the General Assembly. This article will attempt to point out the difficulties encountered in analyzing bloc voting, and to indicate possible solutions, based on the use of quantitative techniques.

Many of the current theoretical debates in international relations focus on the connection between economics and security policies. Most traditional North American textbooks have considered the two policy areas as separate domains. Some scholars view the major economic trends and events of the 1970s as intertwined, whereas others argue that “state” interests properly should prevail when the two sets of values conflict. The traditional liberal, mercantilist, and neo-Marxist literatures shed some light on the nexus between politics and economics in foreign policy, but they offer very general statements that reflect only the conditions of the major powers. Two case studies of Japan and Finland in the postwar period suggest that generalizations must be applied cautiously, that some states are compelled to follow mercantilist policies to protect their political independence and autonomy, and that policies of welfare maximization often have to be subordinated to security concerns. The cases also reveal that the connection between economic and security concerns changes over time. A dynamic model of foreign policy will thus have to be sensitive both to the peculiar circumstances of a variety of states and to the sources of foreign-policy change.

A model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated. The model, based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization, is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the Middle East. The analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the Soviet Union, the United States, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Israel.

By viewing multilateral negotiations in a rational choice context, it is possible to elucidate the contents of calculations that reflect decision makers' considerations if they are trying to do what they believe is in their best interest. By modeling the decision process and then using comparative statics simulations, it is also possible to discern when perceptions and reality are likely to deviate from each other and to gauge the hypothesized responses of all the actors to changed circumstances. In this way, the likely impact of Soviet moderation, Israeli intransigence, Jordanian vacillation, or U.S. intervention can be identified.

Does food aid enhance or diminish the nutritional status of recipient populations in less developed countries? In proposing that the long-term impact is negative, critics have argued that aid depresses local food production, is maldistributed and mismanaged such that it does not reach the needy in sufficient quantities, or, where effective, that aid merely reduces the death rate relative to the birth rate, permitting more people to survive at the margin of existence. This study explores the long-term impact of U.S. Public Law 480 food aid through a crossnational analysis of aggregate data on aid receipts and change in nutritional status over the period from 1962 through 1974. Alternative hypotheses are tested through least squares methods and.mean difference tests in the framework of a nonequivalent control group, quasi-experimental design. This study supports the following generalizations: food aid is significantly related with improved nutritional status; the greater the aid, the greater the improvement in nutrition; higher aid recipients do not have significantly lower rates of growth in domestic food production; higher aid recipients do not have higher rates of population growth; and food aid may lead to greater meat consumption among higher aid recipients. Negative effects, experienced in some countries at some times, are not systematically incurred by all food aid recipients over time. In general, food aid does improve nutrition.

Recent experience confirms an old truth: Switzerland offers a view of the past that works. In 1978 Switzerland was one of the richest countries in the world with a Gross National Product (GNP) of $13,853 per capita. Between 1975 and 1978 it raised the proportion of exports of goods and services in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 36 to 44 percent. In 1977 its current account surplus surpassed that of West Germany and was second only to Japan's. Between 1970 and the end of 1979 the Swiss Franc appreciated by about 90 percent on a trade-weighted basis; against the dollar the appreciation was about 120 percent. From a rate of more than 10 percent in 1974 its inflation rate dropped to 1 percent in 1978. Switzerland's official unemployment figures (which do not record the loss of more than 300,000 jobs among foreign workers and women since 1973) are lower than those of all other advanced industrial states. And even though since 1970 government expenditures have increased faster than in any other OECD country, Switzerland's budget deficit was cut by one-third in the midst of a general recession in 1976–1977. Real GDP dropped by more than 7 percent in 1975, which represented one of the largest declines in the OECD and was a much greater drop than had been recorded in any one year in the 1930s; yet, only two years later, in 1977 Switzerland's real GNP increased by 4.3 percent, which exceeded the growth rate of any other OECD member state.

An oft-claimed advantage of scientific studies of international politics is the intersubjectivity of such inquiries. Although the ultimate promise of scientific knowledge is the understanding it imparts to patterns of association among classes of events, much contemporary research falls considerably short of this goal. As a result, the principal, immediate value of such research lies in its adherence to scientific practices that ensure that findings are not wholly dependent on the methods of measurement and analysis adopted by a particular researcher. More than a decade ago James Caporaso demonstrated the utility of measurement validation as a specific application of the general scientific mandate that inquiry be intersubjective. 1 Yet despite widespread positive reaction to Caporaso's examination of alternative measures of the concept “integration,” his study stands out as a rare example of the type of systematic investigation of measurement validity that must be undertaken in order to fulfill this scientific mandate. 2

Although a substantial body of research argues that women provide terrorist organizations with important tactical benefits, few studies draw out the implications of this argument or examine whether female recruits affect the outcomes of terrorist operations. Using data on individual suicide attacks from 1985 to 2015, I show that an attacker's gender influences the lethality of an attack. However, this effect is conditional upon the gender norms of the state in which the attack occurs. The results demonstrate that a female advantage is more apparent only in societies where a woman's role in public life is limited; attacks by female suicide attackers are more deadly in countries where women are largely absent from the workforce, civil society, and protest organizations. I also assess whether counterterrorists eventually adapt to the use of female suicide terrorists. The results demonstrate that female attack lethality is declining with time, suggesting that security forces eventually adapt to women's participation in terrorism. These findings are consequential because they highlight the effect of persistent gender biases on counterterrorism efforts.

Socialists at the turn of the century explained modern imperialism as an attempt to escape the crisis of monopoly capitalism. “Super-profits” that could be secured in the periphery, according to Lenin, were necessary to offset declining rates of return in the advanced economies. Today, radical theorists stress the role of the multinational corporations in accounting for neocolonialism. If great national power does produce material benefits for foreign investors, this should be apparent in two cases: the experience of British capitalists in the “high age of imperialism,“ 1870–1913, and the operations of U.S. multinational corporations abroad after World War II. But rates of return on foreign investments have not been significantly different in the developed and less developed regions of the world—a finding that is relevant not only for theories of imperialism but also for understanding development and modernization, the operation of the multinational corporation, and international capital markets.

The dramatic upheaval in oil prices in the 1970s posed difficult policy dilemmas for the United States. Like other industrial importing nations, the United States was forced to make decisions concerning how to adjust its economy and society to the new and troubling international energy reality. From the Nixon to the Carter administrations, government officials attempted to implement policies of energy adjustment. These efforts began with ill-fated international schemes to form a “consumer cartel” of industrial nations, and ended with the decision in 1979 to decontrol oil prices.

The United Nations at its present stage of development is a political system of formally coordinate Members, each able to place before the Organization the demands that flow from its own environment. One can hypothesize that a stable environment will yield a stable pattern of demands on the United Nations political system. Similarly it can be hypothesized that a change in the environment—the major components of which are the Member States—will change the pattern of demands made on the political system of the Organization. It is on just such a change that this article proposes to focus. In the period between 1955 and the end of 1968, 37 African states, largely devoid of experience in the contemporary international arena and struggling with the multitudinous problems of fashioning coherent national entities in the face of both internal and external pressures, joined the United Nations. The admission of these states substantially altered the Organization's environment and the demands being made upon it. It is suggested here that these changes have been so substantial as to alter the nature of the political process of the Organization. Concern will be focused successively upon the nature of the entry of the African states into the United Nations, a determination of the areas in which the African states have made demands upon the system, the constitutional structure of the Organization as it has evolved under the impact of the African states, the impact of the African states on the handling of major issues, and finally on trends and implications of the role of African states in the United Nations.

Since mid-1982 the existence of a “debt crisis” has been almost universally acknowledged; many would argue that the crisis had existed unrecognized for much longer, despite alarms sounded regularly over the preceding decade. The definition of the crisis in the Northern industrial countries was remarkably uniform: the onset of widespread difficulties in servicing the mountain of developing country debt threatened the stability of the international financial system. The nightmare in the North was an episode of onrushing financial collapse in the mold of those described so vividly by Charles Kindleberger—a default by a major debtor country (or domino defaults by debtors large and small), followed by the failure of a major bank or banks, a collapse of confidence in the financial system, and ultimately a sharp contraction of economic activity and international trade. The model was that of a panic; the fear, that the financial system, which had appeared so robust in dealing with successive shocks in the 1970s, might prove less so in the harsher circumstances of the 1980s.

Under what conditions do officials in international organizations wield influence as informal political entrepreneurs? Two conditions, I argue in the article under discussion, must obtain: First, an asymmetry in the availability of information or ideas must impede national governments from negotiating Pareto-efficiently. High transaction costs, relative to gains, must induce a coordination failure. Actors able to provide the three essential entrepreneurial functions—initiatives, mediation, mobilization—must be scarce. Second, international officials must enjoy or be accorded privileged access to the information or ideas necessary to act as entrepreneurs and induce more efficient interstate bargains. Where either of these two conditions is absent, third-party entrepreneurial activities are likely to be redundant (because states, as stakeholders, would have greater means and incentives to act as entrepreneurs) or futile (because a consensual support among states would not be forthcoming anyway).

One goal of the law is to provide a means to return disputing parties to cooperation. The prevailing expectation is that international investment law largely does not do this; rather, an aggrieved foreign investor sues the host state as a last resort and divests. I use a new database of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) arbitrations and firm-level bilateral investment to show that, in fact, claimant investors reinvest in the host state at least 31 percent of the time (between 1990 and 2015). Among investors who file for arbitration, and controlling for sector, important correlates of reinvestment include the claimant's legal strategy; the extent of the claimant's grievance and success; and the incidence of post-arbitration litigation. Despite unique aspects of its institutional design, the de facto international investment regime can help solve host state time-inconsistency problems consistent with standard expectations of law. Whether the probability of reinvestment is high enough to reinforce host state commitments to this controversial regime is an open question.

The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco is supportive of peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. Lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas.

The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence—and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America.

In the 1970s the U.S. executive branch was forced to make a significant change in the procedure it uses to influence decisions by the multilateral development banks. This procedural change—from exclusive reliance on behind-the-scenes pressure to open voting in bank councils—reflects two more fundamental alterations: the relative diminution of U.S. power in bank councils and, especially, the development of increased congressional interest in formulating U.S. policy toward the banks. As a result of these two changes, the United States has identified publicly many of the policies it seeks to promote through the banks. Taken as a whole, the U.S. voting record indicates an abandonment of the verbal commitment to the liberal concept of maintaining the banks as apolitical financial institutions. Since the concept has never been a reliable guide to U.S. behavior in bank councils, its abandonment does not signify a major change in the relationship between the banks and the United States government. Rather, it signifies an opening of the U.S. political process, one that encourages public debate and multiple advocacy in the making of U.S. policy toward the banks.