A broad literature on how oil wealth affects civil war onset argues that oil production engenders violent contests to capture a valuable prize from vulnerable governments. By contrast, research linking oil wealth to durable authoritarian regimes argues that oil-rich governments deter societal challenges by strategically allocating enormous revenues to enhance military capacity and to provide patronage. This article presents a unified formal model that evaluates how these competing mechanisms affect overall incentives for center-seeking civil wars. The model yields two key implications. First, large oil-generated revenues strengthen the government and exert an overall effect that decreases center-seeking civil war propensity. Second, oil revenues are less effective at preventing center-seeking civil war relative to other revenue sources, which distinguishes overall and relative effects. Revised statistical results test overall rather than relative effects by omitting the conventional but posttreatment covariate of income per capita, and demonstrate a consistent negative association between oil wealth and center-seeking civil war onset.

A common explanation for the increasing polarization in contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which threats could reduce polarization: by revealing information about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity mechanism). To evaluate the information mechanism, study 1 uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the identity mechanism, study 2 uses public opinion polls to assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among the public. Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or affective polarization among the American public. Instead, responses to external threats reflect the domestic political environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will inherently create partisan unity.

The results of deliberations in multilateral fora are often considered ineffective. Decision making in the European Union (EU) and in particular its key intergovernmental body, the European Council, poses no exception. Especially in the domain of EU foreign and security affairs, the unanimity requirement governing this institution allegedly allows nationalist governments to torpedo any attempt to build up a credible European defense force and a unified foreign policy stance. In this article, we take issue with the claim that multilateral summits merely result in “hot air” by looking at whether and how decisions made during EU summit meetings affect the European defense industry. We argue that investors react positively to a successful strengthening of Europe's military component—a vital part of the intensified cooperation within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)—since such decisions increase the demand for military products and raise the expected profits in the European defense industry. Our findings lend empirical support to the view that financial markets indeed evaluate the substance of European Council meetings and react positively to those summit decisions that consolidate EU military capabilities and the ESDP. Each of the substantial council decisions studied increased the value of the European defense sector by about 4 billion euros on average. This shows that multilateral decisions can have considerable economic and financial repercussions.

Drawing on Clausewitz's classical theory, we argue that the emergence of mass nationalism following the French Revolution profoundly altered the nature of the units constituting the interstate system, thereby transforming the conduct of interstate warfare. To validate these assertions—and thus to test Clausewitz—we rely on quantitative evidence at the macro level, with a particular focus on the global distribution of interstate war sizes, measured in terms of battle deaths, over the past five centuries. Drawing on extreme value theory, we demonstrate that temporal discontinuities in the shapes of the tails of such distributions can be used to draw inferences about the nature of the mechanisms underlying the bloodiest events in world history. This approach allows us to show that the interstate system experienced a fundamental shift in the mechanisms underlying the production of war sizes: a shift that can be dated to the years 1770–1810, and that resulted in a systematic increase in war severity. These same tools also allow us to rule out a number of alternative explanations for this shift (including changes in population sizes and changes in weapons technology), while providing evidence for a specific account of war severity rooted in the mobilizational capacities of states.

Although it is widely acknowledged that economic interests influence the politics of trade policy, most research on international relations treats security issues differently. Do conflicting economic interests shape political debate over foreign policy even when security issues are highly salient? To answer this question, I test a range of hypotheses about conflicting interests in the economic stakes of U.S. foreign policy during the early Cold War era. I present evidence that economic interests in their home states were closely related to senators' voting patterns on foreign policy issues. These patterns hold across economic and security issues. I also find that political parties play an important mediating role, making senators more or less receptive to various economic interests.

Contemporary trends toward protectionism seem not merely to represent a passing phase in the world political economy but reflect widespread resistance to deep-seated structural change. In three major sectors of the world economy characterized by surplus capacity—textiles, steel, and shipbuilding—state policies increasingly challenge liberal, market-oriented economic arrangements. The emergence of restrictive arrangements in these areas is still primarily organized nationally: multinational enterprises do not dominate economic activity. Conflict among firms over market shares is reflected, therefore, in conflict among governments. Such conflict may be temporarily resolved through market-sharing agreements, but these are inherently unstable. Increasing state involvement is likely in the long run to exacerbate the problems of capitalism and to increase conflict over international economic issues. These adverse developments will call further into question theories of international political economy that assume compatibility between a liberal, market-oriented international economic system and a state-oriented international political system.

Existing explanations of European monetary integration, emphasizing economic interdependence, issue linkage, institutions, and domestic politics, take a predominantly regional approach. In the international monetary thesis developed here, I argue that U.S. policy disturbances, transmitted through the international monetary system, created compelling incentives for European states to cooperate on exchange-rate and monetary policy. I develop a general theory of macroeconomic power, based on open economy macroeconomics, and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration. This article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the European Union by examining four periods in which the United States acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system. European governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the United States supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption. The evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal.

How does publicizing states' illicit activities affect the stability of international order? What does this relationship tell us about how governments react to violations of international rules? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that transparent monitoring strengthens the normative legal order, we argue that these activities often undermine it. We develop two mechanisms through which this occurs: by raising the known rate of noncompliance, and by sharpening the threat that deviance poses to other states. We argue that when enforcers understand the dangers of publicizing transgressions, they do so selectively. Focusing on the nuclear nonproliferation domain, we demonstrate that these concerns shaped American decisions to reveal or obfuscate other states' efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. We formalize this argument and then empirically test the model's predictions using in-depth case study analyses. We find that the US failed to disclose infractions when this publicity would have undermined the rules through the two mechanisms we identify. However, while concealing violations can prevent proliferation in response to specific nuclear programs, it can also create potential dangers to a regime's overall health and stability. In addition to reassessing a widely shared assumption about the value of transparent monitoring, this article's broad theoretical framework can shed light on enforcement and compliance dynamics in a variety of international settings.

The recent civil war literature suggests that negative economic shocks in low-income countries increase the risk of civil war. Foreign aid can be an effective conflict-prevention tool in times of severe economic conditions. Aid cushions government spending from the downward pressures of economic shocks, providing recipient governments with resources they can use to make rebellion a less attractive option for aggrieved domestic groups. Using Official Development Assistance (ODA) data covering 1990 through 2004, we find that foreign aid appears to be a useful tool for preventing civil wars in the wake of negative economic shocks, and as such aid should be assessed by donors with these conflict-suppressing aspects in mind.

Policymaking power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare-mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This article investigates quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries.

This article develops a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education. I argue that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education spending, lower private education spending, and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education spending. Furthermore, I argue that integration with the international economy should lead to higher public education spending, conditioned on regime type and income, and should push the balance between tertiary and primary education toward states' particular comparative advantages. These propositions are tested on a data set of more than one hundred states from 1960 to 2000, using a variety of panel data techniques, including instruments for democracy. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is also tested on a number of case histories, including the Philippines, which shows great variation in democracy and openness, and India and Malaysia, which constitute unusual cases that lie “off the diagonal” of open democracies and autarkic autocracies.The author would like to thank Beth Simmons, Torben Iversen, Michael Hiscox, Jeffry Frieden, Jim Alt, Teri Caraway, John Freeman, Jane Gingrich, David Samuels, W. Phillips Shively, Mark Kayser, John Ahlquist, and Michael Kellerman for highly useful comments and criticisms. In addition, I thank the current and past editors, Lou Pauly, Emanuel Adler, David Stasavage, and Lisa Martin, and three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

Bureaucracies with field operations that cannot be easily supervised and monitored by managers are caught between two sources of dysfunction that may harm performance. The first source of dysfunction is straightforward: field workers can use operating slack and asymmetric information to their own advantage, thwarting an organization's objectives. The second source of dysfunction is often overlooked: attempts to limit workers’ autonomy may have deleterious effects, curbing agents’ ability to respond efficaciously to the environment. I find that the parliaments and executive boards to whom International Development Organizations (IDOs) are accountable differentially constrain IDO organizational autonomy, which in turn affects management's control of field agents. Tight management control of field agents has negative effects, particularly in more unpredictable environments. Attempts by politicians to constrain organizations in an effort to improve performance can sometimes be self-undermining, having net effects opposite those intended.

The claim is advanced for recognizing evolutionary learning as the generative principle of world politics. Immanuel Kant was the first to specify a “natural” process leading toward “perpetual peace.” The long cycle, seen as the process of structural change. is explained with the help of a Parsonian learning model and a social evolutionary model and is argued to be coupled with the Kantian process. The long cycle defines the agenda for change in the major institutional complexes of world politics and deepens our understanding of the conditions for the control of global war.

Recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions. Using a new data set that consists of about 35,000 observations on the trade of fifty-four nations between 1919 and 1938, we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs. Traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in World War II. In this study, we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers. However, our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express. We argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great-power hubs. The political-military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories, and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade. As a result, measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added.

We undertake an individual-level analysis of mass political behavior toward sovereign debt resettlement by leveraging the unique circumstances of a 2011 referendum on debt repayment in Iceland. This allows us to engage broader questions about mass international political economy. Against the recent thrust of a growing literature, we find evidence of material economic “pocketbook” effects—self-interest—on voting behavior, operating alongside symbolic/sociotropic and partisan/political logics. Contrary to expectations, these self-interest effects are not conditional on voter sophistication. We conclude that conventional sampling frames may be inappropriate for understanding contemporary democratic contestation over international economic policy.

This study examines the determinants of intra-alliance cooperation by focusing on a single case study: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to deal with Persian Gulf security since 1979. It chronicles the evolution of NATO policy towards Southwest Asia, identifying examples of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. The essay then develops four hypotheses about intra-alliance behavior and uses them to examine the case study. The External Threat hypothesis suggests that alliance cohesion rises and falls with external threats to collective security. The Alliance Security Dilemma hypothesis proposes that cohesion is a function of the coercive potential of the alliance leader and its ability to exact cooperative behavior from its weaker partners. The Collective Action hypothesis suggests that alliance behavior is fundamentally a public goods problem. The Domestic Politics hypothesis asserts that alliance behavior is determined primarily by political and economic factors at the domestic level.

The essay points to the overriding importance of American coercion in producing political cooperation within NATO on the out-of-area problem. It shows, however, that the economic components of alliance behavior are relatively insensitive to bargaining pressure and threat perceptions, and that European defense expenditures are determined largely by domestic factors. The article therefore illuminates the need to distinguish carefully between the political and economic components of alliance management. It suggests, however, that the different dynamics driving cooperation and discord are not a function of the issue-area per se, but of the scope and locus of its decision-making arena. While some issue-areas are largely the domain of foreign policy elites and lend themselves to oligarchic forms of decision making, others have a far more immediate impact on domestic politics and are therefore more influenced by pluralist factors.

Policies to mitigate global climate change entail significant economic costs. Yet a growing number of firms lobby in favor of regulation to mitigate carbon emissions. Why do firms support environmental regulations that directly increase production costs? This question is all the more puzzling in a globalized economy where regulation may undermine the competitiveness of domestic firms at home and abroad. By imposing differential costs on participants in the domestic market, policies designed to mitigate carbon emissions shift market share toward firms with low anticipated adjustment costs. I develop and test a model of climate change policymaking in the presence of market competition and open borders. Heterogeneity in adjustment costs induces a preference for regulation among low-cost firms. Firms facing import pressure—or export competition—may prefer stringent regulation if costs are sufficiently asymmetric. Firms embedded in global value chains also benefit if regulation raises the costs of domestically produced intermediate goods.

Third World debt grew very rapidly in the 1970s. Many states, faced with sharply higher costs for energy and manufactured imports, borrowed aggressively in unregulated offshore capital markets. But what constrains sovereign states to repay this debt to commercial banks? Creditors do not turn to their home states to enforce payment; rather, the supervision of sovereign debt is largely a function of commercial banking arrangements, especially lenders' syndicates, and the International Monetary Fund's conditional lending. This political structure, which involves unified private sanctions, has ensured that no state defaults unless it is insolvent or is willing to accept a radical rupture in its international commercial relationships. When the problem is insolvency, creditors routinely convene ad hoc conferences. In conjunction with an IMFapproved stabilization program, creditors can renegotiate debt-service schedules and provide new financing if necessary. These arrangements are distinctive among international economic regimes because they rely on nonstate actors as the primary source of rules, norms, and procedures.

Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.

India's experience with the international computer industry serves as a key test of the “bargaining school” and the “Marxist-dependencia school” on relations between developing countries and multinational enterprises. India changed (and improved) its performance over time in reformulating its ties with the international computer industry. How did changes in international computer technology and industrial structure combine with Indian domestic institutional and political developments to yield an improved position for India in international computing? The case study illustrates the overall analytical superiority of the bargaining school over the Marxist-dependencia school. It also suggests a modest revision of the bargaining school's understanding of the speed at which certain developing countries are attaining the capability to negotiate successfully with multinationals in high-technology industries.