This article discusses the data embassy, a new international legal concept created in response to a pressing problem. In 2007, Estonia fell victim to ‘distributed denial-of-service attacks’ and consequently, made Estonia's entire public sector data communications network inoperable. Their response was to strengthen their protection against and penalization for cybercrime, and to develop the concept of a ‘data embassy’. On 20 June 2017 the Republic of Estonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg signed an ‘Agreement on the hosting of data and information systems’, to host Estonian data in Luxembourg. Such data embassies perform a unique function and benefit from many privileges and immunities, but their legal status has been unclear. This article addresses the question concerning the legal status of the premises of the data embassy.

As a consequence of the state unity theory, the conduct of all state organs is attributed to the state in an undifferentiated manner. It follows that, in both international and European Union law, state liability can be based on the substance of judicial decisions despite the independence of the judicial branch. However, beyond the matter of attribution, there is a significant divergence between the two legal systems. In international law, the judicial origin of challenged decisions does not influence the application of liability criteria, whereas, in EU law, the liability criteria can be applied to judicial decisions in a tightened manner. This article has the twofold aim of establishing and explaining this difference.

Once the ‘popular plaything of Realpolitiker’ the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus post the 1969 VCLT is often described as an objective rule by which, on grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination of a treaty. Yet recent practice from some States suggests that it is returning with a new livery. They point to an understanding that is premised on vital State interests––a view popular among scholars such as Erich Kaufmann at the beginning of the last century.

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

In an economic climate plagued by the risk of insolvency, sellers will not wish to sell unless they can be sure of getting paid. At the same time most sellers would go out of business if they asked for cash on delivery and did not sell on credit. In Europe one way to combine these conflicting business realities is by selling goods subject to a reservation of title clause or a clause de réserve de propriété or an Eigentumsvorbehalt (hereafter RTC). An RTC may be defined as “merely an agreement between the parties as to the time when ownership is to pass”. By reserving title in the goods sold until they are paid for, it ensures that goods revert to the seller in case of the buyer's insolvency, and hence escape from the hands of the liquidator. The sale fails but the seller's losses are minimised. This is particularly important in the current context of insolvency practice where the legal order for the distribution of assets is very unfavourable to the supplier of goods who does not use an RTC. As an unsecured creditor he will receive any money owed only after the costs of the insolvency procedure and the shares of preferential and secured creditors are subtracted from the assets. He will, in the blunt words of Templemann LJ, ‘receive a raw deal’.

The Lords were not lost in admiration of section 20 of the State Immunity Act 1978. Lord Browne-Wilkinson described it as “strange” and “baffling”. It is certainly true that (as Lord Browne-Wilkinson continued) “Parliament cannot have intended to give heads of state and former heads of state greater rights than they already enjoyed under international law”.1 Nor was it intended that their rights should be inadvertently curtailed. The State Immunity Bill originally introduced into the House of Lords in 1977 would, by reflecting in UK statute law the European Convention on State Immunity2 make huge inroads into absolute sovereign immunity—tottering but not yet demolished through the repeated onslaughts of Lord Denning. The European Convention was however “essentially concerned with ‘private law’ disputes between individuals and States”.3 It was not intended to have any application to criminal proceedings—in so far as lawyers in 1977 even contemplated criminal proceedings in domestic courts against foreign States in their public capacity. It did not deal with the personal privileges or immunities of heads of state. There were no ready-made treaty rules on heads of state and no clear customary rules either.4

In the negotiations for the Treaty on European Union,1 “subsidiarity” assumed central importance. This was the first time that the term was expressly incorporated with general effect into the Treaty.2 The principal provision3 is Article 3b, which reads:

The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only4 if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.

Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.