AS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT public policy issue facing both the country and its political leaders, the degree to which Britain can or should harmonize its welfare, employment and taxation policies with those of other EU members will receive progressively more attention. In this context and with the evident importance of opinion poll popularity for the main political parties’ pursuit of electoral success, public opinion on issues concerning welfare, taxation and redistribution is likely to have considerable bearing on the viability of Britain's incorporation of the legislation and practices endorsed in other EU member states. Nonetheless, even a cursory examination of evidence on the public's attitude on questions relating to these changes suggests integration is unlikely to follow a smoothly negotiated path. Responses to a recent British Social Attitudes survey, for example, show that, while holding mixed attitudes towards the idea of European integration and only mildly negative attitudes to EU inf hence over policies concerning pollution, immigration and defence, the British public are strongly opposed to EU influence over taxation and, to some degree, employment policy. Even among those people who endorsed the general aim of European integration, only a minority – in the case of taxation, a very small minority – found the idea of Europeanlevel decision-making acceptable.

How do rebel groups turned political parties adapt their ideological profiles after war? Do they continue to mobilize along the main conflict cleavage or do they adopt new issues that are conducive to peace? This article develops an analytical framework that captures the extent to which parties adapt along two dimensions: conflict cleavage issues and peacebuilding issues. It conducts a qualitative content analysis of party manifestos and related discourse of three former rebel parties with backgrounds as secessionist rebel groups: the Aceh Party, the Serb Democratic Party (Bosnia Herzegovina) and the Tamil National Alliance. It finds that while some parties adopt the language of peace settlements to legitimize themselves and actively downplay wartime divisions, others continue to seek support based on ethnic differentiation. It is argued that the programmatic message that former rebel groups mobilize around has implications for how they contribute to forging more peaceful inter-ethnic relations after war.

In mid-2011, it certainly looks as if England does not love coalitions, or at any rate the coalition that is governing it. The phrase was coined by Benjamin Disraeli in 1852. This article begins with the context in which Disraeli spoke, then gradually broadens its scope from England to the UK to the set of advanced democracies. Modern political economy has a great deal to say on the subject of coalitions. In conclusion we return to the prospects for future coalitions and minority governments in the UK.

Fundamental to democratic politics is the quality of representation of constituents' interests by elected officials. This article statistically examines a case of substantive policy advocacy in Great Britain: the issues of wait times and health rationing by the National Health Service (NHS), salient throughout the Blair years. An increase in constituent need for care implies an increase in demand for parliamentary representation, yet representation will not necessarily be supplied, because legislators juggle conflicting interests. We measure representative action using parliamentary questions from 1997–2005. Party and parliamentary status and a set of indicators of the health of British citizens provide measures of political supply and constituent demand. Employing count-regression techniques, we find increased parliamentary questions as the proportion of individuals with some high health risks rises, but opposite results for other health risks. Evidence of political supply is much more consistent, suggesting that political careerism goes a long way towards explaining whether MPs table any questions at all in this policy area.

This article has three aims. First, it aims to explain how media framing forms a central soft power tool utilized by states for the political control of social groups antagonistic to the states' dominant ideology. For that purpose it addresses Israeli state efforts to penetrate the native Arab community that remained within its borders after the 1948 war, seeking to create submissive ‘quiet Arab’ citizens. Second, it examines the role of Jewish-Arab (Mizrahi) professional opinion-makers in creating and maintaining this framing. Third, it demonstrates that efforts made by states to influence ‘captive audiences’ by media outlets in the global age can be successful only if they meet the needs of the target community.

ON 21 MAY 1998, INDONESIA'S AUTHORITARIAN PRESIDENT SUHARTO, in power since 1966, abruptly resigned from office and was succeeded by his vice-president, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie. Though retired for decades, Suharto was an army general and relied heavily on the support of the armed forces to rule this vast archipelago, the world's fourth largest country. Habibie is a civilian with long government service as minister of research and industry. President Suharto, Habibie often claimed, taught him everything he knew about politics.

Following scandals concerning extensive corruption, electoral fraud and manipulation by the security services, Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian regime collapsed in November 2000, throwing Peru into political turmoil. A fresh ballot organised in 2001 led to the election of Alejandro Toledo as president. Assessments of the Toledo administration's performance and the health of Peruvian democracy in the post-Fujimori period have been overwhelmingly pessimistic. Recent political developments are analysed to argue that such negativity is mistaken. Apart from recording strong economic growth, under Toledo civilian control over the military and intelligence services has increased markedly. Greater horizontal and vertical accountability has produced a more open polity. Citizen's rights are better secured. Despite ongoing problems, post-Fujimori a process of democratic ‘deepening’ has occurred.

This article observes a transformation in the largely essentializing, decontextualized form of identity politics that long defined political cosmology in Turkey, now in the process of negotiating accession to the European Union (EU). Accordingly, identity politics – not only the bread and butter of both Kurdish nationalism and Islamism, but also a justification for exhortations towards a limited, authoritarian democracy by Kemalists, the major power holders – is receding in favour of a civic, non-divisive political culture enabled by the EU anchorage. In danger of losing the longstanding centre–periphery configuration in an enhanced, participatory democracy and, concomitant with it, the periphery clientelism created by the waning identity politics, Kemalist nationalists, Islamists and Kurdish separatists appear to have stopped squabbling among themselves and joined forces against Turkey's EU bid.

The Transition Process in Hungary Produced Well-established parties and a developed party system. Parties came into existence along political and ideological lines. Parties had an organization, party programme, membership and party discipline similar to those of political parties in the Western European countries. The organization and structure of these parties resembled those of middle-class parties more than socialist or communis/fascist parties. Hungarian parties also had ‘direct structure’ with individual membership. All of them were closer to mass parties than to cadre parties, i.e. their primary aim was electoral success. But none of them became a mass party in terms of membership figures, which were rather low (the total membership of the six parliamentary parties was below 200,000 in 1990, so it was about 2.5 – 3 per cent of the electorate. There were ‘catch-all’ parties (HDF, AFD), parties with specific interest representation (SHP) and parties organized along some ideological principle (CDPP).

This article compares the use of people outside government to consider electoral reform in three countries using the single-member plurality electoral system. The composition of electoral reform bodies, ranging from commissions of experts (New Zealand) and ex-politicians (Britain) to assemblies of randomly selected citizens (British Columbia), appears to have influenced how well their recommendations were received by the public. Governments should be careful not to assume that they can retain control of the electoral reform process once they let it out of their hands, as the cases of New Zealand and British Columbia show, where majorities of the voters chose reform.

The articles in this special issue survey comparatively the shape of power and finance. The introduction sketches the history of the study of the political role of financial markets and examines the reasons for the comparative neglect of the subject by the discipline of political science.

While there is widespread agreement in the ministerial promotion and resignation literature that experience matters, experience has typically been defined as the length of time a legislator has worked in politics or served in a legislature. This approach fails to account for the different kinds of experience legislators accumulate as they progress through their political careers prior to appointment to cabinet. We demonstrate how researchers can use sequence and cluster analysis to obtain a more complete understanding of ministerial appointment. We identify four data-driven archetypes of political careers in Canada for the period 1968–2015. We find that MPs with diverse political careers are more likely to be appointed to cabinet, while MPs with opposition experience are more successful than MPs with government experience. We also find that parliamentary secretary is not necessarily a stepping stone to a full cabinet position, calling into question traditional conceptions of parliamentary politics as a ‘ladder’.

While previous research on cabinet reshuffles has offered valuable distinctions in terms of their timing, other defining features of reshuffles have largely escaped comparative inquiry. This article seeks to develop a more complete comparative assessment of cabinet reshuffles in parliamentary systems that reaches beyond the ‘classic’ samples of Westminster democracies. We seek to distinguish different ‘types’ of cabinet reshuffles that account for several key features, namely: the mode, the scope, the key principal and the party dimension of reshuffles. The usefulness and validity of this typology are demonstrated by a comparative assessment of cabinet reshuffles in four major West European parliamentary democracies. The conceptual distinctions and related empirical observations offered in this article should prove valuable, in particular when it comes to gauging the likely political and policy effects of different types of cabinet reshuffles, and should, ultimately, provide the foundations of a theory of comparative cabinet reshuffles.

‘Good losers’, legislators willing to play by parliamentary rules, even at the cost of defeat, are a microfoundation of democracy. Yet how they are created has not been adequately explained. Theories focusing on institutions, evolving norms, electoral incentives and ideology do not account for the case of post-war Japan, where deliberate disorder was common in the 1950s and 1960s, absent in the 1970s and 1980s, and returned in the 1990s. This paper highlights the importance of the legislative majority's behaviour in encouraging procedural compliance through the provision of informal mechanisms of consultation and compromise. The lack of such mechanisms also explains periods of parliamentary disorder in other countries.

A CURIOUS PHENOMENON MAY BE NOTED WITHIN THE EUROPEAN Community, and also in the negotiations on the entry of other European countries into it. This is the absence of any move towards European integration among the political parties in the member states. Rather surprisingly, an obstinate silence prevails in Europe and within the national political parties regarding this deficiency. One cannot help wondering what is the reason for this and what can be done to break this silence.

Outwardly the process of European integration presents in the main an economic aspect. The EEC Treaty is a classic example of this. The goal striven for is a customs union with a common policy in the economic sphere. Thus the first steps are being taken in the Community towards a common policy in a number of sectors (agriculture, transport, energy, external trade). Recently attempts have been made to link this sector-by-sector policy through the inauguration of a common economic and monetary policy.

Commissioning A Series On ‘Identity Politics’ Inevitably involves making contentious, if hopefully defensible, editorial choices about what each of these terms involves. Issues relating to ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ have figured ever more prominently on both the political and academic agendas over the past thirty years. These terms are often employed to describe a wide range of somewhat heterogeneous phenomena. For example, a recent UK Economic and Social Research Council Programme on ‘Identity and Choice’ lists under this rubric everything from ethnicity, nationality, gender and religion, to class, disability, shopping and musical preferences. However, such usage risks broadening the concept of identity to the point of vacuity. Therefore, the scope of this series is somewhat narrower: namely, political identity. Of course, the concept of the ‘political’ is itself contested and likewise seemingly infinitely expandable to all issues and areas of life. Consequently, a more restricted meaning applies here too, with politics limited to the making of collectively binding decisions amongst people holding divergent opinions and interests.

NO OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY COULD MATCH THE TURBULENT post-independence history that Syria has experienced. Gaining its independence from France in April 1946, Syria moved uncertainly through the bewildering web of inter-Arab politics until the first military coup in March 1949 propelled it towards the long period of instability that was to follow. Indeed, the coup of November 1970, popularly known as the ‘Corrective Movement’, which installed the Asad regime in power constituted the twenty-first change of government in the twenty-four years of the country's independence. This persistent political turmoil, particularly during the fifties and sixties, contrasts sharply with the stability that Syria enjoyed in the first eight years of this decade.

THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA REMAIN ONE OF THE MOST compelling questions both for scholarly analysis and in international politics. But in attempting to survey the prospects for a democratic future in post-communist Russia, all too often we are blinded by the dramas of the moment. Conflict between president and legislature, the success first of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and then of the communists in successive legislative elections, the Chechen war and the president's health – are all issues which have tended to crowd out analysis of more long-term structural considerations which will underpin the course of future Russian development. These major events in the day-today life of Russian politics can have a significant effect upon such development, but a focus upon them exclusively risks not only missing the importance of the deeper structural factors, but also misunderstanding the context within which these events occur. These events are shaped fundamentally by the structures which underpin the political system: broad structural changes within the society will give shape to the arena within which political activity takes place.

IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WE ARE CONCERNED WITH tolerance, not as a physical problem, but as a problem of human relations. In this context, ‘to tolerate’ generally means to endure, suffer or put up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approve. One can ‘put up with’ an item both when one can and cannot do anything about it. For example, one can ‘put up with’ the excesses of a ruler whose behaviour one has no power to amend. Equally, one can ‘put up with’ the excesses of a child even where one has no need to do so. In the second case, one has control; in the first, one does not. Both cases could be advanced as instances of ‘tolerance’. But cases of the first sort (powerlessness) I shall label as instances of ‘acquiescence’ or ‘sufferance’ or ‘endurance’, since it is obvious that acquiescence typically flows from powerlessness. I shall label cases of the second sort (powerfulness) as instances of tolerance. It is clear in any event that these two types of case are distinct, and, for the purposes of this discussion, at least, differential labelling is essential. In this context, an agent will be said to ‘tolerate’ an item where the item is disliked or disapproved and is yet voluntarily endured. On this definition it is plain that tolerance requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator.