Human rights due diligence (HRDD) is the main (voluntary) process through which companies can assess and address negative human rights impacts. In recent years, however, mandatory HRDD requirements are increasingly seen as a more effective way to persuade more companies to better address human rights risks in their global value chains (GVCs). This study investigates whether such mandatory legislative initiatives can positively impact workers’ rights in GVCs as an essential part of those human rights that should be addressed in HRDD. The study provides an in-depth analysis of the legal framework of workers’ rights in GVCs. It then uses the French vigilance law as a case study to empirically investigate the effects of a mandatory HRDD duty for companies using a simple difference-in-differences analysis with data from the Refinitiv database from 2014 to 2020. The study shows that there are indications that the French vigilance law positively impacts corporate human rights conduct. This finding particularly holds for the practices of companies that can be considered “laggards”, which can imply that legislators need to increase the mandatory requirements to further improve responsible corporate conduct.

Drones represent a rapidly developing industry. Devices initially designed for military purposes have evolved into a new area with a plethora of commercial applications. One of the biggest hindrances in the commercial developments of drones is legal uncertainty concerning the legal regimes applicable to the multitude of issues that arises with this new technology. This is especially prevalent in situations concerning autonomous drones (ie drones operating without a pilot). This article provides an overview of some of these uncertainties. A scenario based on the fictitious but plausible event of an autonomous drone falling from the sky and injuring people on the ground is analysed from the perspectives of both German and English private law. This working scenario is used to illustrate the problem of legal uncertainty facing developers, and the article provides valuable knowledge by mapping real uncertainties that impede the development of autonomous drone technology alongside providing multidisciplinary insights from law as well as software electronic and computer engineering.

Climate adaptation planning in pursuit of resilient and sustainable societies has become a focal point in urban policy. Climate adaptation planning is generally regarded as separate from traditional urban planning practices. Globally and in Europe, however, cities are increasingly integrating climate adaptation planning into their traditional urban planning instruments and processes. Recent research indicates that the scope of such integration is at varying stages. The City of Rotterdam (Netherlands) and the City of Antwerp (Belgium) have been identified as two European cities that face similar climate impacts and risks given their proximity to a large river delta. Both cities aim to integrate climate adaptation into their respective urban planning policies, but the scope of their integration differs. This paper critically analyses the urban planning policies of these two cities to distil key lessons learnt that cities with similar climate impacts and approaches to urban planning may potentially face in integrating climate adaptation planning into urban planning policies. The paper finds that identifying and evaluating the synergies, co-benefits or trade-offs of adaptation measures is a key challenge to integrating climate adaptation into urban planning policy. It is a potential stumbling block for long-term sustainable development and climate resilience.

The scaling of urban climate action and its governance is rapidly becoming a central focus in the urban climate governance literature and policy debates. Building on the broader scaling literature and inspired by related initiatives in other fields, this article calls for the development of a systematic “science of scaling” for urban climate governance. Such a science of scaling may help to give a better understanding of how well-performing urban climate action and its governance can be multiplied, accelerated and broadened (ie horizontal and vertical scaling and scaling out, up and down), and it may help to uncover scaling trajectories towards systemic change in cities (ie deep scaling).

This paper introduces the notion of legal tech solutionism and argues for how in an age where the development of legal tech is seen as a panacea for all ills it is important to evaluate the use and lifecycle of the technology before introducing it as a solution to the complex and structural problems that plague legal systems. It explores the framework of legal design and argues that legal design provides for a grounded and contextual approach to the development of legal products, content and services. To do this, the paper develops an approach that operates at three levels, including the value of building for usability, the importance of collaboration and community and the value of designing for many worlds to ensure an engagement with a plurality of contexts in the development of legal tech through evolving a grounded approach.

Consumers are increasingly interested in the sustainability of food products, but so far, no specific European Union (EU) legislation has been developed to harmonise sustainability claims. We analyse which efforts already undertaken within the EU dealing with sustainability claims on products apply to sustainable food claims. We show that whilst sustainability can address three different dimensions (environmental, social and economic), it is crucial to clearly define sustainability in order to allow for the development of concrete regulations and guidance documents. EU legislative initiatives so far seem to be focused on environmental aspects, whilst Member States approach sustainability more broadly. At the same time, substantiation methods can only be successful when sustainability is well defined. We conclude that whilst there is a large range of initiatives taken at different levels, the foundation of these initiatives remains weak when there is no clear scope of terminology nor clarification of substantiation requirements. Currently existing self-regulatory initiatives could support protecting consumers from misleading claims by providing specific provisions for (food) business operators on how to make sustainability claims. Only when claims can be trusted and understood by consumers will they be able to make more sustainable purchase decisions. This plays an important role in the overall policy objective of the EU of climate neutrality by 2050.

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for the Digital Services Act, which is expected to be adopted before summer 2022. It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the twenty-one-year-old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the e-Commerce Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services. Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this article, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap, as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the Digital Services Act will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by Article 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where Article 17 leaves a margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the Digital Services Act relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where Article 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter. From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the Digital Services Act aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might help us to achieve that goal.

What type of enforcement is the most effective to punish violations of food law or to prevent them from occurring in the first place? This article examines the question of which mix of private and public enforcement exists in European Union (EU) food law and whether this mix corresponds to the recommendations of existing social science research. Based on this research, we contend that EU-determined enforcement mechanisms differ in effectiveness across Member States. New technologies have the potential to stimulate a novel mix of public and private enforcement tools at the EU and national levels.

Under what conditions can artificial intelligence contribute to political processes without undermining their legitimacy? Thanks to the ever-growing availability of data and the increasing power of decision-making algorithms, the future of political institutions is unlikely to be anything similar to what we have known throughout the last century, possibly with parliaments deprived of their traditional authority and public decision-making processes largely unaccountable. This paper discusses and challenges these concerns by suggesting a theoretical framework under which algorithmic decision-making is compatible with democracy and, most relevantly, can offer a viable solution to counter the rise of populist rhetoric in the governance arena. Such a framework is based on three pillars: (1) understanding the civic issues that are subjected to automated decision-making; (2) controlling the issues that are assigned to AI; and (3) evaluating and challenging the outputs of algorithmic decision-making.

In this article, we argue that the design and timing of regulatory responses, as well as the adherence of the population to the relevant rules, have a critical impact on the progression and public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. This hypothesis is empirically tested using the example of Poland, a country that experienced, compared to its Western European neighbours, a relatively mild first phase of the pandemic. In this context, we compare Poland with selected countries, including France, Germany, Spain and the UK, and we supplement them with examples from other Visegrad Four (V4) countries – Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. On that basis, we conclude that while the observed differences between the countries in the progression of the COVID-19 pandemic are the result of a multitude of complex and interrelated reasons (such as demographic structure, population density and connectivity or cultural factors), well-designed public health measures, which are implemented early as a part of the proactive strategy that anticipates and reacts quickly to changing circumstances, can effectively decrease the number of COVID-19 infections and related deaths, provided that the adherence of the relevant population is high.

This paper argues for a sandbox approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI) to complement a strict liability regime. The authors argue that sandbox regulation is an appropriate complement to a strict liability approach, given the need to maintain a balance between a regulatory approach that aims to protect people and society on the one hand and to foster innovation due to the constant and rapid developments in the AI field on the other. The authors analyse the benefits of sandbox regulation when used as a supplement to a strict liability regime, which by itself creates a chilling effect on AI innovation, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. The authors propose a regulatory safe space in the AI sector through sandbox regulation, an idea already embraced by European Union regulators and where AI products and services can be tested within safeguards.

While nudging has garnered plenty of interdisciplinary attention, the ethics of applying it to climate policy has been little discussed. However, not all ethical considerations surrounding nudging are straightforward to apply to climate nudges. In this article, we overview the state of the debate on the ethics of nudging and highlight themes that are either specific to or particularly important for climate nudges. These include: the justification of nudges that are not self-regarding; how to account for climate change denialists; transparency; knowing the right or best behaviours; justice concerns; and whether the efficacy of nudges is sufficient for nudges to be justified as a response to the climate crisis. We conclude that climate nudges raise distinct ethical questions that ought to be considered in developing climate nudges.

The role of software in society has changed drastically since the start of the twenty-first century. Software can now partially or fully facilitate diagnosis and treatment of a disease, regardless of whether it is psychological or pathological. Consequently, software plays a role comparable to medical equipment with a physical footprint. Understanding when software as a medical device must comply with applicable rules is vital for both manufacturers and regulators. We therefore examine the Medical Device Regulation to expand on the notion of intention, as this is the key basis for the classification of medical devices. Finally, we develop objective criteria that software must fulfil to be considered a medical device under European Union law.

This article contributes to the discussion about managing the risks and uncertainties of emerging technologies through increased stakeholder participation. Authorities have increasingly invited stakeholders from high-technology sectors to participate in assessing the risks of, and designing responses to, new technologies. Yet authorities often struggle to attract stakeholders from such sectors to participate; a critical challenge identified but still undertheorised in the literature. Responding to this gap, this article presents a case study of the UK’s regulatory sandbox for financial technologies, applying a document study, questionnaire and interviews to explore fintech firm motivations and apprehensions about participation. Drawing on the bureaucratic reputation literature, the study finds that fintech firms have a range of practical, reputational and normative motivations to participate, and these motivations are inextricably tied to the regulator’s strong reputation with the sector as procedurally correct, high-performing and morally committed to facilitating innovation. On this basis, recommendations for practitioners and hypotheses for future research into the drivers of stakeholder participation in regulatory decision-making surrounding emerging technologies are proposed.

Under the notion of human rights due diligence (HRDD), firms are under a responsibility to account for the social and environmental impact connected to their operations across global value chains. This responsibility intersects with the sphere of operation of voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), which certify production against certain social and environmental criteria. With mandatory European rules on HRDD in the making, the question arises regarding the extent of alignment of VSS with HRDD notions and, consequently, the possibility for this form of transnational private regulation to complement European Union (EU) HRDD legislation. After presenting the regulatory effects of HRDD in global value chains and its current transposition in EU instruments, this contribution examines the relationship between private standards and HRDD. By delving into the substantive requirements and policies of several schemes certifying agricultural commodities, this paper studies the extent to which they manage social and environmental risks in global value chains and the possible support they provide to firms subject to the upcoming HRDD obligations.

Digital vaccination certification involves making many promises, few of which can realistically be kept. In this paper, we demonstrate how this phenomenon constitutes various forms of theatre – immunity theatre, border theatre, behavioural theatre and equality theatre – doing so by drawing on perspectives from technology regulation, migration studies and critical geopolitics. Technological theatre and political theatre often serve valid functions, but these forms are problematic for several reasons. First, they involve real-world infrastructures that, while unlikely to accomplish the task at hand, will nevertheless last a long time and be repurposed. They therefore constitute governance by data infrastructure, diverting action and control away from elected legislators to for-profit contractors. Second, vaccine certification effectively legitimises inequalities between countries and people by formalising ways to distinguish between the vaccinated and non-vaccinated and to exclude the latter, thus reinforcing both mobility and connectivity divides. It serves as a way to (further) close borders and to regulate, through code and infrastructure, access to public goods such as employment and public space. Finally, the project of certification displaces a more important action, namely addressing the radical inequality in countries’ ability to combat the pandemic.

This article further develops the concept of algorithmic vulnerability. The analysis is built on empirical evidence of the Chinese Health Code System (HCS), compared to similar plans for the “COVID-19 Certificate” in the European Union (EU). Implementing the HCS has shown two-sided regulatory implications: improving social protection (a national strategy, a common mutual-recognition standard, scaled-up public–private cooperation) and increasing risks of social exclusion (non-digital and digital forms of vulnerability). This article argues that algorithmic vulnerability is caused by mismatches between biased databases, unfairly pre-designed algorithms and dynamically changed risk groups in reality in the context of COVID-19 vaccination. It contributes a framework for deploying plans for digital certificates in the EU concerning minimising the social risks associated with algorithmic vulnerability. The framework consists of (1) reinforcing existing vulnerability inherited from non-digital society (eg caused by intersectional factors of race/ethnicity, gender, age and health) and (2) introducing new forms of vulnerability generated by algorithm design and implementation (eg excluding the risk groups of individuals who are un/mis/overrepresented in the databases, such as those defined by nationality plus COVID-19 status).

In the World Trade Organization (WTO), the US approach to science-based risks and trade restrictions prevailed over that of the European Union (EU). The EU, dissatisfied with the margin of action available when “relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”, largely kept intact its internal practice on marketing and importing genetically modified (GM) crops and GM-containing products. The goal of this article is to ascertain whether these regulatory preferences of the US and the EU translate into their post-Biotech external trade efforts. US and EU preferential trade agreements are scanned for rules on trade in biotechnology goods or the use of precautionary elements in regulation. It transpires that neither bloc systematically tries (or manages) to bend trade agreements to accommodate its defensive or offensive trade interests in this field. Among the possible reasons for this apparent inertia are the US confidence in the WTO baseline and the EU preference for a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to its trade-restrictive policy in this area.