The distribution of urban peoples and activities among cities of various sizes and characteristics has for a long time interested social critics, town planners, geographers, historians, journalists and some economists in western Europe and the United States. A common theme is that the distribution of urban peoples depends on the distribution of urban jobs. Thus to understand population changes, the analysis of cities usually becomes a study of trends in job location. A decentralized pattern of industrial jobs is thought conducive to a proliferation of small and medium-sized cities. Or to put it the other way, it is often suggested that the concentration of industrial jobs into large cities is a principal explanation of their size.

For more than half a century social critics and theorists have been predicting a coming era of decentralization in manufactures and, as a consequence, of urban peoples. The development of the automobile and of electricity, the use of mass production techniques in specialized single-storey buildings set on large tracts of land, improvements in telecommunications, a high income elasticity of demand for space—all of these have been suggested as forces tending to decentralize manufacturing employment. But what has in fact been the experience of the last half-century?

Reliable predictions of future employment are but one of many pieces of intelligence useful to governments in the formulation and implementation of policies of economic stabilization. With the adoption of a stabilization programme in 1945 an explicit need for these predictions was created in the Canadian government. In that year the “Employment Forecast Survey” was initiated by the federal Department of Labour in an attempt to secure the data from which these predictions could be derived. This survey is still conducted by the Department.

This article summarizes the results of an analysis of the predictions which were derived from data obtained by the Employment Forecast Survey from 1946 until 1957, when this method was abandoned, and a new technique of securing predictions from the data was adopted. Because these predictions were so little known outside Canadian government circles it may be useful to provide a brief description of the technique by which they were made, and an assessment of their reliability.

The original conception of the survey was comparatively simple. It seemed reasonable, a priori, that the individual decision-makers in an industrial establishment would be able to forecast the future employment of their own establishment with considerable reliability.

As indicated by the attribute “historical,” this essay is not concerned with evaluations on metaphysical grounds of life and the universe. Statements by philosophers to the effect that this is the best of all possible worlds, or that “life is a business the returns for which do not cover the costs by any means,” may indeed become objects of historical inquiry. After all, what has not become “historicized” these last hundred years! But investigations of that kind are not likely to yield any great results. Metaphysics, like mathematics, is all but timeless.

A good deal more closely related to historical and political categories are certain fundamental ideas regarding the nature of man. It has been observed that “the pessimistic view of human nature is, and has always been, the deepest sense of a conservative argument.” The inverse is true of a philosophy of progress, which is almost invariably based on an intrinsically optimistic evaluation of human nature. We shall have to touch occasionally upon that interdependence of metaphysical and politico-historical thought in the course of this inquiry. Our chief interest, however, centres on different problems.

Conservation is a word which occurs more and more frequently in politics. The “conservation of natural resources” appears both in the government accounts and in election speeches as a phrase which covers public spending on forests, waters, minerals, and fisheries, regardless of the ultimate purpose of that expenditure. Payments to American farmers, which enable them to achieve higher output and receive larger incomes, are blithely described as “conservation” without reference to whether or not the transaction has increased the nation's stock of natural resources.

Conservation is a field of study for many of the sciences. Originally, I think I may say, the child of the forestry profession (indeed in the United States the profession of forestry might almost be described as the child of the conservation movement), it has received increasing attention from many other fields. In the 1920's, conservation of oil resources became the slogan of the petroleum companies, swamped by new discoveries. They lost interest when demand increased relative to the newly controlled supply. In the 1930's, low demand for farm output, grave drought conditions, and allegedly increasing soil erosion made “conservation” a good cry for those who would give aid to agriculture. During the last war, farm specialists pushing soil conservation continued to hold the stage, but since then the public has heard increasingly from scientists and business men connected with fisheries, petroleum, water power, forestry, and even minerals. The current approach is to discuss the interrelation of the use of all the natural resources and to stress the necessity of conserving such resources simultaneously.

In a number of important aspects Canadian war-time price controls were a pioneering venture and for this reason have aroused considerable interest both at home and abroad. It is too soon to present a considered appraisal of these policies and procedures—indeed the operation has not yet been concluded—but it is perhaps not too soon to record in a broad way what was done and why.

When war broke out in September, 1939 Canada, in common with most other countries, was emerging uncertainly from a decade of economic depression. Prices were low, unemployment was high, and the costs of relief were still a heavy charge on federal, provincial, and municipal budgets. The general index of wholesale prices was 28 per cent below 1926 and only 9 points above the low point of the depression in 1933. The iron and steel industry was operating at 20 per cent below 1928-9, and probably not in excess of 50 per cent of capacity. Recorded unemployed formed 12 per cent of the normal working force, and under-employment affected a further large percentage. Nearly a million persons were on direct relief and the fully employable persons on direct urban relief numbered nearly 200,000. In brief we entered the war with a high proportion of idle and underemployed resources.

We also entered the war with a sound and reasonably well thought out conception of overall war-time economic policy, but, excepting foreign exchange control which had been carefully prepared in detail well in advance, with very little organization for carrying it out and no very clear notion of what kind of a war it would be and along what lines our major contributions would, lie. The Defence Purchasing Board, predecessor of the Department of Munitions and Supply, began operations in July, 1939, but the organization of price and supply controls received detailed consideration only a few weeks before hostilities broke out. The Wartime Prices and Trade Board was created on September 3, 1939, and within a few weeks was actively involved in half a dozen commodity fields.

The 50 texts which make up Max Weber's “Early Writings” have been largely ignored by analysts of his works. Yet there are important differences between Weber's positions in those texts and the more familiar positions he exposed later. In the Early Writings, there is a nearly complete absence of epistemological preoccupations on themes which will later become central. One also notes the essential primacy of the political sphere over the scientific, in the form of the German Nation's transcendence as the condition for the protection of ethical ideals. This article argues that Weber's nationalist aggressiveness in his Early Writings is conditioned by the relative poverty of their theoretical basis.

In single-member constituency, simple plurality electoral systems, the disproportion between the popular vote polled by a party and the number of representatives it elects has stimulated much controversy. We review the mathematical and statistical models of two-party systems of this type which have been proposed by Kendall and Stuart, Theil, Lemieux, March, and the present authors. This leads to a detailed empirical study of series of elections in three systems: the provincial systems of Quebec and Ontario, and the Canadian federal system. In verifying a “sliding distribution” model more general than that of Kendall and Stuart, we construct the distribution of constituencies according their level of support for a given party, and hence provide an index of electoral regionalization. Less detailed seat-vote data, for longer series of elections in five systems, provide evidence for the persistence of electoral disproportions and the distinguishability of seat-vote characteristics between different systems. The extreme sensitivity of legislative proportions in Québec to small changes in popular vote proportions is shown to be a consequence not of peculiarities in the electoral map, but of the small standard deviation and large kurtosis (peakedness) of the distribution of constituencies.

This article challenges the conventional interpretation of the intellectual origins of Canadian federalism. The article argues that the debate over Confederation can be interpreted as a debate over the meaning of sovereignty. It argues centrally that certain of the most prominent supporters of Confederation were more powerfully attracted to the conception of classical federalism and co-ordinate sovereignty than is usually assumed, thus creating a striking parallel to United States federalism that is not typically recognized. It concludes by showing how this understanding of classical federalism was used with great success in opposing the post-Confederation centralism of John A. Macdonald.

Concepts do not travel; theories do. The distinction is an important one because the concept party identification and its measurement in different contexts provides students of voting with one of a class of problems in comparative analysis. Comparative analysis implies a search for and the development of general laws about human behaviour, laws which are valid across political systems. The way that this search is carried out is through the development, confirmation, and modification of theory. One such theoretical exchange has involved explanations of voting and a major concept in these theories has been “party identification.” The concept is controversial to the extent both that different theories describe it and its role differently and that variations have been observed in patterns of the relationship between some aspects of party identification and political behaviour. However, the role of theory and its status in analysis is problematical in David Elkins' “Party Identification: A Conceptual Analysis.” Comparative analysis requires, first and foremost, that the theory within which any concept is located be specified.

Improvement of services is one of the principal objectives of reforms introduced into local governments, although this objective does not always guide the formulation of the contents of these reforms. A more rigorous analysis of the implications of service improvement should concentrate on local public goods, on their nature and, above all, on their supply and production—aspects hitherto only slightly developed. To start, one can try to infer certain local institutional characteristics which would be the most suitable for the purpose of service improvement. Certain authors who adopt this course anticipate a quasi-market model for local government services. A critical examination of this model shows that it is no longer suitable and that a preferable model is one which we can call “community co-responsibility.”

Ontario's two minority governments provide political scientists an opportunity to analyze how a government and legislature will function when executive control is curtailed by the electorate. It also affords an opportunity to observe the dynamics of legislative reform in a situation where backbenchers have unaccustomed clout. Relying on a survey of “insider” opinion, the article finds that MPPs showed little interest in reforms other than those which improved their services. Further, it finds that all the normal functions attributed to the legislature were performed better in a minority situation. However, while the majority of respondents had positive overall assessments of the minority experience, they had a variety of reservations about perpetuating it in some way. The article points up the dilemma that there appears to be no way to “capture” the widely recognized positive aspects of minority administrations within the norms of parliamentary government accepted by legislators and no willingness on their part to vary these norms.

In the past decade, patterns of variance in Canadian political culture have been documented in several studies of the attitudes and beliefs of the Canadian mass public. To date, however, the nature and significance of variations in political culture in Canada at the elite level remain largely unexplored. Given the importance generally attributed to elites in descriptions of the functioning of the Canadian political system, examination of the belief systems of Canadian political elites is a salient research priority. As a contribution to this field of inquiry the present research note presents the results of an investigation of the ideological self-perceptions of provincial legislators in all ten provinces.

Résumé. Notre contribution vise à analyser l'impact des instruments juridiques sur la fabrique des politiques publiques de la mémoire dans la France contemporaine. Il s'agit de montrer en quoi les instruments juridiques peuvent développer des effets propres sur les politiques de la mémoire qui n'étaient pas prévus initialement. C'est le cas lorsque la Cour de cassation décide, lors du procès Barbie en 1983, de donner une extension juridique à la notion de crime contre l'humanité, qui va au-delà de la reconnaissance des crimes perpétrés durant le judéocide. La reconnaissance originaire de la mémoire de la Shoah, adossée juridiquement à la notion d'imprescriptibilité du crime contre l'humanité, tient lieu de matrice cognitive pour la défense d'autres causes mémorielles (mémoire de l'esclavage et reconnaissance du génocide arménien, entre autres).

Abstract. Our contribution aims at analyzing the impact of legal instruments on public policy of memory in contemporary France. This is to show how legal instruments can develop specific effects on the politics of memory that were not originally foreseen. This is the case when “La Cour de Cassation” decided, at the Klaus Barbie trial in 1983, to give an extension to the legal concept of crimes against humanity that goes beyond the recognition of crimes perpetrated during the Holocaust. The recognition memory of the Holocaust, legally backed at the notion of crimes against humanity, acts as a cognitive matrix for the defense of other memories (memory of slavery, recognition of the Armenian Genocide …).

This article examines Hegel's view of love in his ''early theological writing,'' ''The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,'' where he saw love as a basis of autonomy in the modern self which could overcome the divisions between reason and emotion, self and other and finite and infinite. The article also examines Hegel's attempt in the essay to come to grips with why a community of love cannot be sustained by modern individuals. Consideration of this essay is seen to be valuable because of the insight it offers into the nature of the modern subjectivity. Even more importantly, it throws a different perspective on the mature Hegel. Contrary to the feminist view of Hegel as basing his political community on a reason that is exclusive of love and intuition, and the Marxist view of him as building the political community upon the abstract labouring will, this article argues for the ongoing importance of love in Hegel's mature political philosophy. Furthermore, it suggests that the need to protect and preserve the knowledge of love from the eclipsing effects of a narrow instrumental reasoning was an essential motive in the development of Hegel's mature philosophical system.

Concerned by the proliferation of idiosyncratic prescriptive case studies in the nascent subfield of policy studies, Richard Simeon, in his seminal 1976 article, asked scholars to produce more comparative policy research that aimed at explaining general events and contributing to theory building. The extent to which Simeon's vision materialized remains debated. With a view to informing this debate, we conducted a systematic content analysis of the articles published in five major generalist public policy journals from 1980 to 2015. The analysis reveals that Canadian policy scholars took a comparative turn, publishing more territorial, sector and time comparisons than in the past. We also found evidence that theoretical knowledge accumulation is more important today for Canadian authors than it was when Simeon wrote his article.

For three weeks in early 2022, the streets of downtown Ottawa were occupied by protestors associated with the so-called Freedom Convoy. The inability of Ottawa's municipal police to end the protest was not only a spectacular failure of local policing but also a failure of national security policy. This article brings together literatures on Canadian federalism, multilevel politics and federal capitals to argue that the occupation of Ottawa demonstrates a misalignment between the political and jurisdictional responsibility for Ottawa's public and national security. Potential reforms range from the expansion of federal authority over the Parliamentary Precinct to the restructuring of the National Capital Region as a federal district or territory.

Buildings produce a large proportion of Canada's greenhouse gas emissions and municipalities control a number of policy levers that can help to reduce those emissions. This article explains variation among Canadian cities regarding policies adopted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a particular focus on green building standards. By applying insights from the study of the politics of public policy to urban politics, this article finds that while electoral disincentives prevent most cities from enacting high impact green building policies, the success of some cities can be attributed to the influence of independent municipal environment departments. These departments facilitate policy learning by providing information and resources. The findings suggest that policy makers could improve the effectiveness of local climate change policy by creating municipal environment departments that have organizational capacity—funding, staff, and a cross-cutting mandate—and are insulated from interference from politicians and line departments.

Measurement of changes of marriage frequency involves peculiar difficulties. To some extent the trend of crude birth and death rates reflects the trend of more refined indexes. A corresponding statement is not even approximately true of crude marriage rates. The crude rate may be either rising or falling, while the true rate remains constant, and vice versa. Though this fact emphasizes the need for accurate analysis, comparatively few computations of true marriage rates exist. One reason for this is probably that the marriage rate has fluctuated widely in the past from year to year in response to economic changes, without showing any very definite secular trend. So the relation between marriage frequency and reproduction rates has not seemed to be highly significant. However, the position is now changing. On the one hand, marriage is less inevitably followed by reproduction. On the other hand, most marriages are still followed by first births, and first births form an ever-increasing proportion of all births. Hence fluctuation in marriage rates is reflected to an increasing degree in fertility rates.

It is now a generally accepted view that the best method of obtaining true marriage rates is to draw up nuptiality tables in accordance with the principle on which life tables are constructed. The true marriage rate is then given by the proportion of women who marry at least once out of a thousand girls alive at 15 years of age (gross nuptiality), or out of a thousand new-born girls (net nuptiality). The present paper presents nuptiality tables for Canada and each of the nine provinces for 1930-2, and for Saskatchewan for 1926 and 1936. It is hoped that similar tables will be calculated for more recent years, when the data become available.

This article presents a test of the argument that vulnerability to economic dislocation, primarily as it is represented by economic homogeneity in communities, exercises a constraint on levels of support for Quebec nationalism. The guiding hypothesis is that residents of economically vulnerable ridings will be reluctant to accept the risks attached with political moves toward independence. The authors employ data on the level of support for the Bloc Québécois in the federal elections of 1993 and 1997, and the proportion voting "Yes" in the 1995 sovereignty referendum in Quebec, in the province's 75 federal electoral districts as their measures of support for sovereignty. Results suggest that there is a relationship between the geographies of potential economic vulnerability and the level of nationalist support, particularly evident in the 1995 referendum voting and the 1997 election. Calculations involving perceived economic vulnerability and risk remain as powerful defenders of the political status quo in Quebec.