Little research provides concrete evidence of relationships between socialization by the women's movement and support for feminism and equality. Support for these issues has increased in Canada since the early 1970s, and using cohort analysis this study demonstrates clear generational differences in this support. The greatest support appears among women's movement and post-women's-movement cohorts. Furthermore, this article identifies gender differences on feminism and equality not appearing in the aggregate data. These differences increase with added controls for education and employment, suggesting links between women's attitudes and the development of a gender consciousness.

Drawing on the proliferating literature on multiculturalism, this article provides a theoretical and critical argument in support of public funding for minority cultural schools, as well as a critique of the Ontario Conservative government's proposal in 2001 to extend tax credits to parents who enroll their children in private schools in Ontario. It argues that governments in Canada committed to the idea of multiculturalism have an obligation to promote the maintenance and flourishing of minority cultures through education and financial support. The article first outlines and refutes neutralist liberal arguments against public funding for minority religious and culturally education, and demonstrates what is meant by a right to culture and the attendant duties such rights impose on the state. It then raises and responds to concerns about such cultural pluralist policies and suggests ways to balance group demands for public funding with other values the state wishes to support. It argues that the Ontario government's proposal to provide tax credits for private education without regulation does not respond to concerns about balancing the right to culture and teaching liberal citizenship values, and offers alternative policy recommendations in the conclusion.

Gaetano Mosca, in his work which has been translated as The Ruling Class, engaged in an extensive criticism of the democratic theory that stems in particular from Rousseau. In the light of the historical evidence which he considered important he concluded:

Among the constant facts and tendencies which are to be found in all political organisms one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from societies that are meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class is directed and controlled by the first ….

Mosca, of course, is but one of a long line of writers who have tried to show that as an explanation of the power processes democratic theory is absurd. At the same time, however, most of these anti-democratic writers grant that there is, in all human beings, a compelling sentiment that justice and equality should temper power; that the masses should enforce some restraint on their leaders; and that government always involves some kind of consent of the governed. Those who bring an empirical method to the study of power are frequently condemned on the ethical grounds that they seek to justify some kind of tyranny, but what they do more than anything else is to show up the realities of power. Only after some examination of a power system has been made, can it be determined whether or not that system conforms to some ethical ideal. The ideals which are widespread in the Western democracies are, first, that there is popular participation in decision-making; and, second, that the class system is open, that is, that recruitment to positions of power is the result of personal achievement in a competitive society.

This article analyzes the legislative cohesion of political parties in Quebec between 1867 and 1989. The unveiling of frequent and widespread dissent within the two parties throughout the nineteenth century, and its gradual elimination thereafter, stand out as its major finding. Various explanatory factors are then reviewed: the confidence convention, the decrease of the number of divisions that did not involve confidence in the government or approval of its policies, the advent of universal suffrage, sanctions against dissenters and the role of party leaders. All these factors seem to have had some influence. The author argues that studies of this kind must distinguish between the various formal categories of divisions, a dimension often neglected in such studies.

Over a decade ago, the federal Liberal government announced one of the most controversial policy initiatives in Canadian history, the National Energy Program (NEP). The bargaining that followed the NEP's announcement on October 28, 1980 is easily recalled; intense disagreements focussed on economic, partisan and, ultimately, constitutional issues. While these events have stimulated a wide range of investigations, a prominent gap exists in the scholarship: very few studies adopt a game-theoretic perspective. In seeking to explain strategic interaction over energy policy, such an approach might increase understanding of the difficult political processes surrounding the NEP in a wider context.

These are five stages to the game-theoretic investigation that follows. First, a brief history of the phase of confrontation is provided. Second, the game-theoretic interpretation is presented in general terms, including participants, strategies and potential outcomes. Relevant measurements are derived in the third phase. In the fourth stage, the process of a sequential game is analyzed, in both abstract and operational terms. Fifth, and finally, policy-related implications of the analysis are discussed, along with possible directions for further research.

When might high ethnic mobilization co-exist with social pluralism? The article addresses this question by comparing four of India's major ethnic movements/parties. “Organizational pluralism” denotes flexibility and autonomy in party-society and intra-party transactions. Pluralism within influential political organizations aids social pluralism. High levels of organizational pluralism led Dravidianism to aid social pluralism; comparatively low levels led Hindu revivalist and Sikh organizations to ignore incentives to adopt more inclusive strategies. States willing and able to foster tolerance will emerge amidst high ethnic mobilization only if activists promote pluralism within major ethnic organizations.

The Quiet Revolution is commonly regarded as the single most important turning point in Quebec's recent history. This article questions the conventional paradigm that the institutional and structural changes in Quebec during the 1960s were merely symptoms of, and secondary to, the essence of the Quiet Revolution, that is, widespread changes of mentality, attitudes and values. The authors argue that the changes encompassed by the Quiet Revolution are not as complete as many have suggested and that the tension between the forces of tradition and the forces of modernity is still an important focus for understanding contemporary Quebec. More specifically, empirical data confirm that the push for secularization in Quebec, secularization being the cutting edge of the Quiet Revolution, has not run its course and that traditional religious values continue to play an important role in Quebec politics.

In a systemic and structural analysis of centralization and de-centralization, these phenomena appear as different means of regulating social systems. The types of controls which the Centre maintains or concedes identify centralization and de-centralization. Seven types of stakes can be involved in the struggle over controls: objectives, positions occupied by actors, the organization and internal functioning of these posts, personalities, goods, information and the controls themselves. The first two stakes are more important than the others. In the “game” of centralization and de-centralization, one structural law of politics seems at least in part to determine the behaviour of the protagonists. Whether an actor is in a superior, equal, or inferior position in a structure characterized by control relations, the actor will seek to establish a “political” environment which maintains or augments his or her position. The debates regarding The Decentralization of Local Centres of Community Services in Quebec (C.L.S.C.) illustrate these theoretical propositions. Events unfolded as if there were a logical order between the stakes of controls, and as if in the struggle for controls the actors sought to establish power structures which would maintain or augment their original position.

Abstract. Several Canadian provinces partially fund private education through statistical formulas. This article draws on various studies in the area of political economy in order to link provincial educational grants to factors not explicitly comprised in the formulas. More specifically, organizational and electoral variables are expected to have an impact on the amount of provincial grants received by private school authorities. Quantile regression analysis shows that Catholic and Protestant private schools are somewhat favoured by the existing system of grants. Likewise, membership in the main provincial interest group and electoral competition are beneficial to private school authorities.

Résumé. Plusieurs provinces canadiennes financent partiellement l'éducation privée. Le montant de ce financement est déterminé au moyen d'une formule statistique. Cet article se base sur divers travaux d'économie politique afin de relier les subventions publiques allouées à l'éducation privée à des facteurs non inclus dans les formules. Plus précisément, nous nous attendons à observer un impact significatif de variables organisationnelles et électorales. L'analyse de régression quantile montre que les écoles privées catholiques et protestantes de même que les écoles privées membres de l'association provinciale de représentation des intérêts sont avantagées du point de vue de la subvention et que la compétitivité électorale est positivement et significativement liée au montant de subventions reçues par les autorités scolaires privées.

Abstract. Until very recently, the “orthodox” liberal view had assumed that the right to the profession and practice of one's own religious values encompassed the right to instil particular religious values in one's children. This view has been challenged by sustained analysis of the role of children within liberal theory, given the basic tenet of the equal moral worth of persons. This strand of liberal thought questions the extent to which parental rights to direct children's upbringing can include a right to form children's basic value sets. With this challenge comes a stronger basis from which to also challenge the idea that parents may legitimately oppose certain aspects of the state-mandated curriculum on the basis that such education may impinge on the values they wish to instil in their children. This paper will examine the controversy surrounding Québec's “Ethics and Religious Culture” course within a framework that seeks to put the interest of children first, as well as how the religious rights of parents and children might be understood in this context.

Résumé. Naguère, l'opinion libérale voulait que le droit à la pratique et à la profession de sa propre religion et de ses valeurs comprît le droit d'inculquer ces valeurs religieuses à ses enfants. Depuis un certain temps, cette position est remise en question à la lumière d'une analyse soutenue des droits de l'enfant, vu la primauté du tenant de l'égalité morale de tous les individus dans la pensée libérale contemporaine. Selon cette analyse, il n'est pas acquis que le droit du parent de voir à la formation de l'enfant comprenne le droit de lui imposer des valeurs de base particulières. Cette remise en question donne lieu à une réévaluation plus concrète du droit des parents de s'opposer à certains aspects du programme d'études établi par le gouvernement sous prétexte que ceux-ci nuiraient à leur droit d'inculquer des valeurs particulières à leurs enfants. La controverse au sujet du cours d'éthique et de culture religieuse au Québec est revue dans un contexte qui place en priorité le droit de l'enfant. Il est question du rapport entre les droits des parents et ceux des enfants concernant la religion et l'éducation religieuse.

In this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.

Cet article porte sur le débat idéologique que suscite l'interculturalisme dans le champ intellectuel québécois depuis les années 2000. S'il a longtemps servi de point de convergence entre intellectuel.le.s néonationalistes, cherchant à allier pluralisme et nationalisme, l'interculturalisme n'a toutefois pas empêché la recrudescence des appels en faveur du resserrement du contrôle sur les personnes migrantes et les pratiques culturelles minoritaires. Notre thèse est que cette tendance confirme l’éclipse de la tentative de concilier nationalisme et pluralisme au sein de l'interculturalisme québécois. Pour soutenir cette thèse, notre article documente la faiblesse de l'interculturalisme québécois devant les blocs idéologiques formés par le multiculturalisme fédéral, le nationalisme conservateur et la montée des critiques antiracistes et décoloniales au Québec. Face à ces positions rivales, les contradictions de l'interculturalisme quant au privilège de la majorité sur les minorités ont été mises au jour au fil de controverses que l'article examine sur une période de vingt ans.

Résumé. Notre contribution vise à analyser l'impact des instruments juridiques sur la fabrique des politiques publiques de la mémoire dans la France contemporaine. Il s'agit de montrer en quoi les instruments juridiques peuvent développer des effets propres sur les politiques de la mémoire qui n'étaient pas prévus initialement. C'est le cas lorsque la Cour de cassation décide, lors du procès Barbie en 1983, de donner une extension juridique à la notion de crime contre l'humanité, qui va au-delà de la reconnaissance des crimes perpétrés durant le judéocide. La reconnaissance originaire de la mémoire de la Shoah, adossée juridiquement à la notion d'imprescriptibilité du crime contre l'humanité, tient lieu de matrice cognitive pour la défense d'autres causes mémorielles (mémoire de l'esclavage et reconnaissance du génocide arménien, entre autres).

Abstract. Our contribution aims at analyzing the impact of legal instruments on public policy of memory in contemporary France. This is to show how legal instruments can develop specific effects on the politics of memory that were not originally foreseen. This is the case when “La Cour de Cassation” decided, at the Klaus Barbie trial in 1983, to give an extension to the legal concept of crimes against humanity that goes beyond the recognition of crimes perpetrated during the Holocaust. The recognition memory of the Holocaust, legally backed at the notion of crimes against humanity, acts as a cognitive matrix for the defense of other memories (memory of slavery, recognition of the Armenian Genocide …).

Theorists of deliberation and deconstruction each claim commitments to a more open and legitimate democracy than existing liberal democracy. Eschewing traditional foundations such as natural law, historical inheritance, or the constitutive formation of the nation, they seek to develop a theory of democracy that is more inclusive in conditions of social diversity and complexity. This article investigates the meaning of the open political space that fosters the democratic experience under such conditions. First, a sociologically informed political theory, such as Jürgen Habermas' powerful if flawed attempt, is required to conceive participation in the democratic political sphere. Drawing on Jacques Derrida and others, the author then argues that deconstructive insights that introduce an openness to the non-identical contribute to a more complete democratic theory, offering a crucial mode of democratic inclusion of the other and an acknowledgment of difference that might assist in reforming current institutions. Thus a blend of Habermasian orientation toward deliberation and deconstruction's ethical sensibilities presents a promising development of democratic possibilities.

Measurement of changes of marriage frequency involves peculiar difficulties. To some extent the trend of crude birth and death rates reflects the trend of more refined indexes. A corresponding statement is not even approximately true of crude marriage rates. The crude rate may be either rising or falling, while the true rate remains constant, and vice versa. Though this fact emphasizes the need for accurate analysis, comparatively few computations of true marriage rates exist. One reason for this is probably that the marriage rate has fluctuated widely in the past from year to year in response to economic changes, without showing any very definite secular trend. So the relation between marriage frequency and reproduction rates has not seemed to be highly significant. However, the position is now changing. On the one hand, marriage is less inevitably followed by reproduction. On the other hand, most marriages are still followed by first births, and first births form an ever-increasing proportion of all births. Hence fluctuation in marriage rates is reflected to an increasing degree in fertility rates.

It is now a generally accepted view that the best method of obtaining true marriage rates is to draw up nuptiality tables in accordance with the principle on which life tables are constructed. The true marriage rate is then given by the proportion of women who marry at least once out of a thousand girls alive at 15 years of age (gross nuptiality), or out of a thousand new-born girls (net nuptiality). The present paper presents nuptiality tables for Canada and each of the nine provinces for 1930-2, and for Saskatchewan for 1926 and 1936. It is hoped that similar tables will be calculated for more recent years, when the data become available.

In a number of important aspects Canadian war-time price controls were a pioneering venture and for this reason have aroused considerable interest both at home and abroad. It is too soon to present a considered appraisal of these policies and procedures—indeed the operation has not yet been concluded—but it is perhaps not too soon to record in a broad way what was done and why.

When war broke out in September, 1939 Canada, in common with most other countries, was emerging uncertainly from a decade of economic depression. Prices were low, unemployment was high, and the costs of relief were still a heavy charge on federal, provincial, and municipal budgets. The general index of wholesale prices was 28 per cent below 1926 and only 9 points above the low point of the depression in 1933. The iron and steel industry was operating at 20 per cent below 1928-9, and probably not in excess of 50 per cent of capacity. Recorded unemployed formed 12 per cent of the normal working force, and under-employment affected a further large percentage. Nearly a million persons were on direct relief and the fully employable persons on direct urban relief numbered nearly 200,000. In brief we entered the war with a high proportion of idle and underemployed resources.

We also entered the war with a sound and reasonably well thought out conception of overall war-time economic policy, but, excepting foreign exchange control which had been carefully prepared in detail well in advance, with very little organization for carrying it out and no very clear notion of what kind of a war it would be and along what lines our major contributions would, lie. The Defence Purchasing Board, predecessor of the Department of Munitions and Supply, began operations in July, 1939, but the organization of price and supply controls received detailed consideration only a few weeks before hostilities broke out. The Wartime Prices and Trade Board was created on September 3, 1939, and within a few weeks was actively involved in half a dozen commodity fields.

Conservation is a word which occurs more and more frequently in politics. The “conservation of natural resources” appears both in the government accounts and in election speeches as a phrase which covers public spending on forests, waters, minerals, and fisheries, regardless of the ultimate purpose of that expenditure. Payments to American farmers, which enable them to achieve higher output and receive larger incomes, are blithely described as “conservation” without reference to whether or not the transaction has increased the nation's stock of natural resources.

Conservation is a field of study for many of the sciences. Originally, I think I may say, the child of the forestry profession (indeed in the United States the profession of forestry might almost be described as the child of the conservation movement), it has received increasing attention from many other fields. In the 1920's, conservation of oil resources became the slogan of the petroleum companies, swamped by new discoveries. They lost interest when demand increased relative to the newly controlled supply. In the 1930's, low demand for farm output, grave drought conditions, and allegedly increasing soil erosion made “conservation” a good cry for those who would give aid to agriculture. During the last war, farm specialists pushing soil conservation continued to hold the stage, but since then the public has heard increasingly from scientists and business men connected with fisheries, petroleum, water power, forestry, and even minerals. The current approach is to discuss the interrelation of the use of all the natural resources and to stress the necessity of conserving such resources simultaneously.

As indicated by the attribute “historical,” this essay is not concerned with evaluations on metaphysical grounds of life and the universe. Statements by philosophers to the effect that this is the best of all possible worlds, or that “life is a business the returns for which do not cover the costs by any means,” may indeed become objects of historical inquiry. After all, what has not become “historicized” these last hundred years! But investigations of that kind are not likely to yield any great results. Metaphysics, like mathematics, is all but timeless.

A good deal more closely related to historical and political categories are certain fundamental ideas regarding the nature of man. It has been observed that “the pessimistic view of human nature is, and has always been, the deepest sense of a conservative argument.” The inverse is true of a philosophy of progress, which is almost invariably based on an intrinsically optimistic evaluation of human nature. We shall have to touch occasionally upon that interdependence of metaphysical and politico-historical thought in the course of this inquiry. Our chief interest, however, centres on different problems.

Reliable predictions of future employment are but one of many pieces of intelligence useful to governments in the formulation and implementation of policies of economic stabilization. With the adoption of a stabilization programme in 1945 an explicit need for these predictions was created in the Canadian government. In that year the “Employment Forecast Survey” was initiated by the federal Department of Labour in an attempt to secure the data from which these predictions could be derived. This survey is still conducted by the Department.

This article summarizes the results of an analysis of the predictions which were derived from data obtained by the Employment Forecast Survey from 1946 until 1957, when this method was abandoned, and a new technique of securing predictions from the data was adopted. Because these predictions were so little known outside Canadian government circles it may be useful to provide a brief description of the technique by which they were made, and an assessment of their reliability.

The original conception of the survey was comparatively simple. It seemed reasonable, a priori, that the individual decision-makers in an industrial establishment would be able to forecast the future employment of their own establishment with considerable reliability.

The distribution of urban peoples and activities among cities of various sizes and characteristics has for a long time interested social critics, town planners, geographers, historians, journalists and some economists in western Europe and the United States. A common theme is that the distribution of urban peoples depends on the distribution of urban jobs. Thus to understand population changes, the analysis of cities usually becomes a study of trends in job location. A decentralized pattern of industrial jobs is thought conducive to a proliferation of small and medium-sized cities. Or to put it the other way, it is often suggested that the concentration of industrial jobs into large cities is a principal explanation of their size.

For more than half a century social critics and theorists have been predicting a coming era of decentralization in manufactures and, as a consequence, of urban peoples. The development of the automobile and of electricity, the use of mass production techniques in specialized single-storey buildings set on large tracts of land, improvements in telecommunications, a high income elasticity of demand for space—all of these have been suggested as forces tending to decentralize manufacturing employment. But what has in fact been the experience of the last half-century?