Newcomb's paradox was first presented by Robert Nozick and has been discussed by a considerable number of writers. You are playing a game with a Being who seems to have extraordinary predictive powers. Before you are two boxes, in one of which you can see $1,000. The other is closed and you cannot see what it contains, but you know that the Being has put a million dollars into it if he has predicted that you will take it only, but nothing if he has predicted that you will take both boxes; you may take either both boxes or the closed one only. The Being has correctly predicted the choices of all who have so far played with him. What should you do?

Let us call the Being the seer, and his opponent the player. I should also like to reduce the amount that may, or may not, be in the closed box to $10,000. Nearly everyone could make good use of $1,000 and better use of $10,000 or $11,000, but it is hard to say whether a million dollars would be a blessing or a curse.

This paper is concerned with the question of the truth conditions of nomological statements. My fundamental thesis is that it is possible to set out an acceptable, non Circular account of the truth conditions of laws and nomological statements if and only if relations among universals — that is, among properties and relations, construed realistically — are taken as the truth-makers for such statements.

My discussion will be restricted to strictly universal, nonstatistical laws. The reason for this limitation is not that I feel there is anything dubious about the concept of a statistical law, nor that I feel that basic laws cannot be statistical. The reason is methodological. The case of strictly universal, nonstatistical laws would seem to be the simplest case. If the problem of the truth conditions of laws can be solved for this simple subcase, one can then investigate whether the solution can be extended to the more complex cases. I believe that the solution I propose here does have that property, though I shall not pursue that question here.

These words, from Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, ring unconvincingly in our ears. They affirm that the bonds of human society hold only those who believe in God. This affirmation breaks into two propositions:

• (i) the bonds of human society are promises, covenants, and oaths;

• (ii) promises, covenants, and oaths hold only those who believe in God.

Much might be said about the first proposition, but not here. Whether it rings unconvincingly in our ears, surely the second does, and it is this which I shall address. The suppos1t1on that moral conventions depend on religious belief has become alien to our way of thinking. Modern moral philosophers do not meet it with vigorous denials or refutations; usually they ignore it.

In his paper ‘Knowledge and Reasons’ B. A. O. Williams remarks: “That there should be radically impersonal knowledge seems, on the face of it, impossible: if p is known, then somebody must surely know it”. Williams points out, however, that this “apparent platitude” has strongly counter-intuitive consequences. let ‘Kp’ stand for ‘it is known that p', and’ Kap’ for’ a knows that p'.

Philosophy of religion has become in our days a considerable part of philosophy. Alain's books on religion, published in the early thirties, remain among the most valuable which have been ever written by philosophers on this subject, but unfortunately they are scarcely known to-day, at least in North America. The most important of them — Les Dieux — has recently been translated in English: The Gods, Richard Pevear, New York, New Direction, 1974. Although inspired by Hegel, Alain's method and ideas really are very original as well as profound, because Alain's style and doctrine deeply differ from Hegel's. They differ no less from analytical philosophers’ models, because Alain never argues with religion but reflect on it, in order to draw a true picture of man. The following essay tries to indicate both the contents and the main features of this philosophy.

The idea of creating a society guaranteeing equality between the sexes has never been considered by most political theorists. They have either endorsed, or simply accepted, the assumption that there is a natural inequality of the sexes which ought to be preserved in civil society. This same presupposition has excluded the family from the theorists’ framework of what are thought to be distinctively political institutions. Despite the centrality of the family to human life, it has been consigned to the domain of purely natural phenomena. The related belief that women and children must be relegated for theoretical purposes to the family, to be safely ignored in a realm of brute nature, suffices to allow such theorists to exclude women from the ontology of politics.

In looking at major theorists from this perspective, the task is not simply to show that they display sexist attitudes. The main purpose is to demonstrate that their theories rest on these assumptions and that they would be vastly different theories if these assumptions were not made.

Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics appears to defend a revised utilitarianism against both egoism and intuitionism, while conceding that the practical results of enlightened egoism largely coincide with those of utilitarianism, and that the utilitarian greatest happiness principle can be justified only as a fundamental intuition. It is true that Sidgwick was distressed by the description of his treatment of intuitional morality as ‘mere hostile criticism from the outside', and protested that that morality ‘is my own … as much as it is any man's; it is, as I say, the “Morality of Common Sense”, which I only attempt to represent so far as I share it’ (ME, x). However, he could not well have denied that, in The Methods of Ethics, the endorsement tentatively accorded to intuitional morality as a system is in the end withdrawn. Ultimately it is concluded that utilitarianism can define and correct what intuitional morality is vague or mistaken about, and can complete what common sense does not venture to treat at all.

In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion against some of the possible objections to it.

Recent materialists have not been overly impressed by the Cartesian claim that minds and bodies (mental states and physical states, etc.) can be imagined or conceived separately from each other. Their usual reply is that this is only to be expected, given the contingent nature of the identify involved. Kripke, however, has argued persuasively that such a reply is unacceptable because it overlooks a crucial fact about the terms in which the identity theory is couched.

Some philosophers, notably Professors Quine and Geach, have stressed the analogies they see between pronouns of the vernacular and the bound variables of quantification theory. Geach, indeed, once maintained that ‘for a philosophical theory of reference, then, it is all one whether we consider bound variables or pronouns of the vernacular'. This slightly overstates Geach's positition since he recognizes that some pronouns of ordinary language do function differently from bound variables; he calls such pronouns ‘pronouns of laziness'. Geach's characterisation of pronouns of laziness has varied from time to time, but the general idea should be clear from a paradigm example:

• (1) A man who sometimes beats his wife has more sense than one who always gives in to her.

The pronouns ‘one’ and ‘her’ go proxy for a noun or a noun phrase (here: ‘a man’ and ‘his wife’) in the sense that the pronoun is replaceable in paraphrase by simple repetition of its antecedent.

Husserl and others have spent a great deal of time writing introductions to phenomenology, and in trying to explain its nature. One thing that becomes clear from these efforts is that phenomenology claims to have a method for analyzing the essential structures of “mental events” (erlebnisse). This raises the possibility of phenomenology turning back on itself, for surely the analysis itself must consist of “mental events”. Hence, at some point in its investigations, phenomenology itself could become what phenomenologists seek to analyze. Husserl foresaw this when he suggested the possibility that:

What becomes apparent here is that phenomenology's self-reflection is necessary, not merely possible: without self-reflection phenomenology would lack final “genuineness” or the “ability to justify itself down to its roots”. Unfortunately while Husserl, here and in other places, signals the necessity of this sort of reflection, he nowhere seems actually to carry it out at length.

L'article de M. Theau offre peu de prises au commentaire. II est lui-même un commentaire très dense et structuré de Ia philosophie religieuse d’ Alain. Oui, pour Alain l'anthropormorphisme est le vrai de Ia religion; celle-ci ne nous révèle que notre vérité humaine; mais notre vérité humaine a précisément besoin de nous être révélée. Et M. Theau de poser une question fort pertinente: comment l'imagination — cette imagination qui pour Alain est purement passionnelle et nullement créatrice — peut-elle Créer les dieux et, plus encore, s'élever de Ia religion de Ia nature à Ia religion de l'esprit, au christianisme? Comment “Ia folie du logis” peut-elle nous révéler le vrai de l'homme?

Je voudrais revenir sur Ia réponse que l'auteur apporte à cette question, non pour Ia critiquer mais pour Ia préciser. Je terminerai sur Ia critique de fond que M. Theau adresse à ('auteur des Dieux.

The causal theory of human action that maintains that a person's wants cause his actions has recently gained considerable support in the philosophical community. The so-called logical connection argument, once a seemingly powerful obstacle to this theory, has fallen into disrepute. Roughly stated, this argument claims that since the relation between a want and the supposedly resultant action is logical in nature, whereas the relation between any cause and its effect must be contingent in nature, a want therefore cannot be the cause of an action.

In this paper I shall first of all consider four classical formulations of the logical connection argument (hereinafter the LCA), expounding them step-wise and reviewing various objections, some telling, that have been brought against them. Next I shall present my own formulation of the LCA, which is immune to such objections. Finally I shall propose a natural modification of the causal theory which would enable it to escape the brunt of the LCA. I shall then argue, however, that when the causal theory is modified in this way there are insuperable difficulties to the task of gathering evidence in support of it.

In 1966 Michel Foucault pointed out that the generation of thinkers who had taken as their model Sartre or Merleau-Ponty had suddenly become part of the intellectual museum. A new generation of thinkers had appeared whose passion was not for “meaning”, “man” and “commitment”, but for the “concept and the system”.

“Our task, Foucault went on, is to free ourselves from humanism and in that sense our work is political.” For some time Foucault and those who thought like him were classed as ‘academics”, that is as people whose thinking had little or no implications for the ongoing state of the society. Then came the May movement of 1968 and in February of 1969 a major gathering was held and the main speakers were Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault.

The primary objective of this paper is to improve the defense of the thesis that

This is to be done by establishing (in Parts Ill and IV) that there is a unique sense in which

A secondary objective of the paper is to illustrate (in Part I) the way in which the value and validity of (2) has been obscured in recent defenses and criticisms of (1), which inappropriately interpret it in terms of the claim that

Since the truth of (3) will be denied, the defense of (1) will also involve arguing (in Part II) that the traditional alternative to the bodily criterion, namely the criterion of memory and psychological characteristics, not only is not a necessary condition of personal identity but also is not a sufficient condition.

On an act utilitarian view it is morally permissible if not obligatory to choose to perform an action which contributes as much as any other action to the total happiness (utility) of all those capable of enjoying happiness. As the view has just been stated, however, there is some question of how we are to understand the phrase “all those capable of enjoying happiness”. For even leaving aside the possibility that animals or spirits might be included, there is still the matter of the size of the population of humans “capable of enjoying happiness”. Furthermore, among our ethical decisions themselves are decisions which would cause a decrease or increase in population and which in perhaps even more specific ways determine the applicability of this phrase “all those capable of enjoying happiness”. According to the socalled classical or total utilitarian principle, the phrase in question is understood as describing some population whose existence will enable one to maximize the net amount of happiness. For on the classical principle what one is obligated to do is simply to maximize net happiness.

I wish to defend a functionalist approach to the mind-body problem. I use the word ‘functionalist’ with some reluctance, however; for although it has become the conventional label for the sort of approach taken by such philosophers as H. Putnam and D. C. Dennett, I believe it is somewhat misleading. The functionalist, as I understand him, tries to show how there can be machine analogues of mental states and then argues that just as we are not inclined to postulate an ontological dualism between simulated mental states and the machine's physical states, we need not postulate a dualism between mind and body. The functionalist also argues, however, that it is wrong to identify the mental states or simulated mental states with the physical states.

Recently functionalism has come under attack, first for not being a coherent alternative, and secondly for not being able to provide an adequate account of sensations. I believe that the first objection is misguided and shall deal with it in section I. However, I agree that functionalists have not provided an adequate account of sensations, but I shall try to help remedy this in section II.

As the title of this paper suggests, these remarks on Foucault should be understood as an attempt to complete the picture that McDonell has provided of Michel Foucault's work, rather than as a critique of that picture. I find myself in agreement with much that McDonell has said, but would nevertheless like to comment on a few points. There are two main features of McDonell's introduction to Foucault. First, the overall bearing of Foucault's work is held to have to do with the history of ideas, with a special concern with the methodology that such a type of history should follow. Second, the work of Michel Foucault possesses a rather strong unity that can be stressed in taking L'archéologie du savoir as, so to speak, the sun of a small theoretical system around which revolve such planets of written words as Histoire de Ia folie à l'âge classique, Naissance de Ia clinique, Les mots et les chases and, eventually, Surveiller et punir.

While there is agreement among many (but not all) theologians and philosophers that a miraculous event should be conceived in opposition to the natural order, there is disagreement about why this opposition must be present. In this paper I propose to examine Antony Flew's explanation of how and why miracles and nature are opposed, suggesting that his account is, as it stands, problematical and in need of revision. In evaluating Flew's position I shall focus on comments he makes when discussing Hume's account of miracles, and while I shall not attempt to argue the correctness or incorrectness of Flew's interpretation of Hume, I think that what I say, if correct, bears importantly on that issue.

It is generally believed—see, for example, Lakatos, Dorling, Koertge, Gellner, and Finnocchiaro—that Feyerabend is committed to the view that science is an essentially irrational enterprise. In this paper, I argue initially that this is so only if Feyerabend is saddled with an unreasonable notion of rationality. Next, I point out, first, that there is a reasonable notion of rationality which is compatible with Feyerabend's non-method ‘anything goes’; and, second, that unless coupled with some form of rationalism this non-method is obviously and trivially false.

By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people.