Is it legitimate to use discriminatory policies to achieve equality? As official support for reverse discrimination or affirmative action policies becomes more common among member states of the European Union, so does the potential for legal challenge. Yet no clear answer has yet been given by the European Court of Justice. The controversial European Court of Justice decision in Kalanke, striking down an affirmative action policy, was followed only two years later by that in Marschall, which signalled a significant change in approach to affirmative action policies. This change of attitude is likely to be tested in a variety of different ways in the near future. The next affirmative action case, Badeck, is now awaiting the opinion of the Advocate General, and a Swedish case is waiting in the wings. Both these cases are likely to take the Court into far stormier waters than those already traversed in Kalanke and Marschall.

This Article deals with selected issues of judicial protection that arise in the context of the sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia and Belarus after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As most cases challenging the sanctions are pending, this Article draws lessons from the previous case law on EU restrictive measures. It explores what aspects of the sanctions escape judicial review, then profiles of external (or formal) legality of the sanctions, of internal (or substantive) legality, and concludes by assessing the overall role of the Court in EU foreign affairs. The discussion shows that the case law in this area of EU administrative law converges to a great extent with other areas of EU competence, but tensions remain in how the Court may impose substantial constraints to executive discretion in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The question of exactly who benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of which range of persons and bodies should be recognised as legally competent to enforce any given provision of Union law before the national courts, is surprisingly murky. This lack of clarity is due partly to the inherent complexity of the question, as well as to the complication posed by the interdependent relationship between the Union and national legal orders. The confusing approach adopted by the Court of Justice compounds the matter. This chapter discusses some observations on why this is a question which poses particular policy challenges for the Union legal order, before going on to summarise the relevant tools employed by the Court of Justice when addressing issues about the decentralised enforcement of Union law by private and public actors. It is argued that, despite the apparent confusion, it is possible to construct a workable division of labour between the role of Union law in defining its own protective scope (on the one hand) and the discretion of each Member State over access to the courts for the enforcement of Union law (on the other hand). A detailed analysis of the case law is conducted in order to identity the weakest links in the system, or at least those which suffer from the greatest degree of doctrinal and conceptual neglect. The question of who exactly benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of enjoying rights of standing to enforce Union law before the national courts, presents both surprisingly difficult challenges and promising research issues for the future.

The choice of the word “flexibility” in the title of this paper rather than the term “closer co-operation” introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam is not accidental: since the general Amsterdam provisions on closer co-operation have not so far been used, a paper on the experience of those provisions since their entry into force would be very short—even if they have given rise to an extensive literature. It should nevertheless be remembered that under the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty itself there are situations where those provisions are deemed to have been used: under Article 1 of the Protocol Integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden, as signatories to the Schengen agreements, are “authorised to establish closer co-operation among themselves” within the scope of those agreements and related provisions; furthermore, under Article 5 of that Protocol, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have not notified the President of the Council in writing within a reasonable period that they wish to take part,

Both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights contain protections against invidious forms of discrimination. EU law has long been concerned to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex and nationality, and has more recently begun to tackle discrimination on the bases of race, sexual orientation, age, religion or belief and disability. Article 14 of the Convention is also concerned with these grounds—some explicitly, some through judicial interpretation—as well as others such as birth status. However, at a level of detail the two bodies of law differ in many ways: for example, in the contexts in which they apply, in their treatment of justifications for prima facie acts of discrimination, and in the extent to which direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. It is thus a matter for debate how far they in fact overlap, or have the potential to do so. Furthermore, given that it is a shared concern of EU law and the Convention to combat invidious forms of discrimination, their respective anti-discrimination protections might be felt to provide a particularly strong illustration of the extent to which there are similarities and divergences between the two bodies of law. In this sense, anti-discrimination law offers an illuminating case study of the intersections and differences between the two bodies of ‘European’ law, both at European level and within the domestic legal systems of EU Member States.

Government by the people presupposes that citizens are fully aware of public matters and properly informed. Nowadays, this is well understood and increasingly accepted. However, there is still disagreement as to how citizens are to check their government and what the limits of such control should be. In my view, it is essential that this scrutiny is generally available to all citizens and that it is provided in binding legal terms, the application of which is subject to legal appeal. However, a less stringent standard of scrutiny is often provided. Indeed, confusion between concepts is patent in this field and overshadows what is really at issue—the recognition of a fundamental right for citizens, which forms a basis for the exercise of several other rights. The right of citizens to review the exercise of public power is ultimately the foundation of both the principle of democracy and popular sovereignty.

In P v. S the Court of Justice sent out a strong message that it was keen to protect the rights of minorities. Ruling that the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 applies to the gender reassignment of the person concerned, the Court gave protection to P, a male to female transsexual. To justify its decision the Court said “[to] tolerate such discrimination [against transsexuals] would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard”. Its genuine commitment to safeguarding such rights was put to the test in Grant, when faced by the claim of a lesbian for concessionary rail travel for her partner under Article 141 (Article 119) EC on equal pay.

Ten years ago justice and home affairs (JHA) did not yet even exist as a EC/EU policy-making area. Yet—after modest beginnings in the context of the Maastricht Treaty’s “Third Pillar” in 1993—the development of EU policies in the JHA area was transformed into a fundamental treaty objective by the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, Article 2 TEU providing for the maintenance and the development of the European Union as an “area of freedom, security and justice” (AFSJ). This new integration objective was strengthened by the introduction of a range of new policy objectives, the communitarisation of asylum, immigration and other issues of the former “Third Pillar”, the incorporation of the Schengen acquis, new and more appropriate legal instruments and improved judicial control. This, and the results of the Tampere European Council of October 1999, led to a further expansion of the scope of policy-making in justice and home affairs, with dozens of new legislative acts being adopted, a considerable number of new legislative initiatives and even the establishment of new bodies—such as the prosecution agency Eurojust and the European Police College. There is no other example in the history of EC/EU integration process of an area of previously loose intergovernmental co-operation ever having made its way so quickly to the top of the Union’s political and legislative agenda.

In 2001, the Irish carrier Ryanair and the Walloon regional government reached an agreement the terms of which appeared to be attractive for both sides. Ryanair would commit towards operating a number of its flights from Charleroi airport. In return it would receive a 50 per cent reduction in the amount of landing charges charged by the Walloon regional government, the owner of Charleroi airport. As a result, Ryanair would decrease its operating costs and gain an advantage vis-à-vis its competitors, while the airport and its owner would benefit directly and indirectly from the effects of an increase in passenger traffic. When the agreement was examined by the Commission, the Walloon Region sought to defend the measure by arguing that it had acted in its capacity as owner of the airport and that, viewed in this light, the agreement was not an infringement of the state aid rules, but an economically sound transaction. The Commission rejected this point, holding instead that, in entering into the agreement, the regional government had ‘placed itself in a situation of confusion of powers’, as the commercial need to attract Ryanair to its jurisdiction had caused it to derogate from the generally applicable regulatory framework. Given that the regional government had exercised a power of a regulatory nature, it could not invoke commercial rationality to justify its actions.

The European Community (EC) was established in 1957 on the basis of an international treaty. The Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, though the Court of Justice was soon eager to emphasise that the ‘Community constitutes a new legal order of international law’, and that:

Traditionally, EU state aid law has been attached to the goals of maintaining free competition and preventing the distortionary effects of Member States’ economic intervention, while social considerations have been considered immaterial to state aid control. However, in more recent years, EU state aid law has acquired a clearer ‘social dimension’, indirectly streamlining national subsidies towards social goals. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and particularly of Articles 3(3) TEU and 9 TFEU, has had an impact on the way in which social goals have been taken into account in the application of the state aid provisions. In the last decade, the European Commission has sought out a more appropriate balance between the main objective of preserving competition in the internal market on the one hand, and social objectives, also enshrined nowadays in the Treaties, on the other. This ‘social dimension’ is still underdeveloped, but emerges to varying degrees when looking respectively at the definition of state aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, at the scope of the derogations under Articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU and at the secondary legislation adopted for their implementation.

The Union’s constitutional regime for development policy has traditionally progressed alongside two parallel tracks. In addition to a general regime for all developing countries, there exists a special regime for African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP countries). The Union’s general development policy originated as a flanking policy within the Common Commercial Policy. This trade-centricity was only relativised by the insertion of an express development aid competence in 1992. The Union’s development cooperation competence can today be found in Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and allows the Union to adopt legislative acts or conclude international agreements to reduce poverty within developing countries. By contrast, the Union’s special development regime has had a very different constitutional source. It stemmed from the ‘colonial’ association to the Union (qua its Member States) of certain dependent ‘oversees countries and territories’ for which the 1957 Treaty of Rome had provided a limited development competence. Once these countries gained independence in the 1960s, however, the Union had to transfer this special regime to its contractual association competence under Article 217 TFEU. The association regime for ACP countries has itself undergone a number of significant changes with the transition from the Lomé Convention(s) to the Cotonou Agreement.

The movement towards common principles of European contract law has been described as inevitable. In the words of one of its foremost proponents, ‘it is a historic law that this unification is going to happen sooner or later’. It has been difficult to ignore in recent years the volume of work discussing developments in this area of law. One might note, in particular, the Private Law in European Context series published by Kluwer Law International and the Cambridge University Press Common Core of European Private Law project. Further, the publication of Communications by the EC Commission in 2001, 2003 and 2004 has served to promote an ongoing discussion on the nature and quality of the acquis communautaire and the ‘opportuneness’ of any form of non-sector-specific instrument in the area of European contract law. Such intervention, it has been said, forms ‘the riggings of a ship which is about to set sail’.

The Framework Directive for equal treatment in employment adopted in November 2000 by the Council of Ministers marks an important event for the millions of lesbians and gay men within the European Union. It follows hard on the heels of the successful lobbying to have “sexual orientation” included within an anti-discrimination article inserted into the Community treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam, as part of the development of European citizenship.

The admission, reception and treatment of asylum seekers in the European Union has been an issue of continuing political and legal concern throughout the 1990’s. The rising numbers of persons seeking protection at the beginning of the period coupled with a rapidly developing regional jurisprudence on the right to protection from the European Court of Human Rights in particular, changed the nature of the debate. The Member States began to search for common policies and practices as regards asylum through intergovernmental measures. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the most important aspects of asylum have been transferred to the EC Treaty: criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum; minimum standards on reception of asylum seekers; minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees; minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status amongst others.

A little more than four decades ago, the European Court of Justice declared that the law of the European Communities constitutes the supreme law of the Member States. The national institutions, most importantly the national courts, were to apply rules of Community law and, in so doing, were required to set aside conflicting provisions of national law, however framed. Since then, this judicially formulated constitutional principle has been developed and restated in later judgments by the ECJ. However, during the same period the absolute character of the principle has been continually challenged by the Member States.

Having briefly traced the history of EU criminal law, this chapter first examines the new rules governing the competency of the EU in criminal law matters deriving from the Lisbon Treaty. Europol and Eurojust, the EU institutions that have been created with a view to fighting trans-border crime are examined, and the pros and cons of a possible further institution, the European Public Prosecutor are discussed. A final section examines the impact of the EU Charter, and the need to establish in this area an order of precedence between the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights.