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Lord Cairns' Act in the County Court: a Supplementary Note
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
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InRedland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris Lord Upjohn, in a speech with which all the other Law Lords agreed, asserted that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to consider the applicability of Lord Cairns' Act. Much of the judgments, he observed, had been taken up with a consideration of the principles laid down in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., a case concerned exclusively with the proper principles upon which in practice Lord Cairns' Act should be applied. Neither Lord Cairns' Act nor Shelfer's case, he said in terms, had anything whatever to do with the principles of law appli-cable to the case then before the court. It is accordingly crystal clear that Lord Upjohn regarded Lord Cairns' Act as totally irrelevant: what is less clear is the reason for his opinion.
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References
1 [1970] A.C. 652; [1969] 2 All E.R. 576, H.L., in the Court of Appeal sub nom. Morris v. Redland Bricks Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 967Google Scholar; [1967] 3 All E.R. 1.
2 Chancery Amendment Act 1858.
3 [1895] 1 Ch. 287, C.A.
4 [1975] 34 C.L.J. 224.
5 [1970] A.C. at p. 665; [1969] 2 All E.R. at p. 579.
6 Subject to the separate point discussed below.
7 Supra.
8 At the time of Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris, supra, the statutory limit under the County Courts Act 1959, s. 39 was £500. It was increased to £750 by the Administration of Justice Act 1969 and to £1,000 by S.I. 1974 No. 1273.
9 [1975] Ch. 43; [1974] 3 All E.R. 417, C.A.
10 Supra.
11 See note 8 supra.
12 Supra.
13 See note 8 supra.
14 County Courts Act 1959, s. 74 as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 6. See R. v. Cheshire County Court Judge [1921] 2 K.B. 694Google Scholar; De Vries v. Smallridge [1928] 1 K.B. 482Google Scholar; Thompson v. White [1970] 3 All E.R. 678.Google Scholar Exceptionally it may grant an injunction under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, s. 1 whether or not any other relief is sought in the proceedings. There are other limited statutory exceptions.
15 Supra.
16 Supra.
17 [1925] 2 K.B. 144, D.C.
18 s. 69.
19 Box v. Green (1854) 2 Exch. 503; Brunsden v. Humphrey (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 141.
20 See C.C.R. Ord. 4.
21 Cf. Overstone Ltd. v. Shipway [1962] 1 All E.R. 52Google Scholar, C.A. This case was not, however, concerned with the question of jurisdiction but with the question whether there were two separate causes of action or one cause of action which was being improperly divided.
22 Supra. The leading judgment, given by Russell L.J. is somewhat ambiguous and might naturally lead to the inference that the plaintiff obtained £40 damages for damages actually suffered, plus £750 damages in lieu of an injunction. The headnote to the All England Reports in fact states that the plaintiff was awarded £750 damages in lieu of an injunction. The reports agree that what the Court of Appeal actually did was to dismiss the appeal, and it is thought that the fuller statement in the Law Reports of the county court decision must be correct, namely that the plaintiff, who claimed damages not exceeding £750, was awarded £750 in toto.
23 See the cases cited in note 14 supra.
24 [1963] 1 Q.B. 499; [1962] 3 All E.R. 814, C.A.
25 Supra.
26 Supra.
27 Supra.
28 Supra.
29 [1975] 34 C.L.J. 224.
30 Supra.
31 Supra.
32 Supra. Similar considerations apply to Hooper v. Rogers, Supra.
33 I am grateful to Mr. Keith M. Stanton, Lecturer in Law in the University of Bristol, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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