Technological innovations for online communication reduce the impact of signal transience on meaning standardization while boosting access to reliable patterning across multiple linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts – both asynchronous and synchronous. We classify emojis as ideographic symbols, examine their interdependence with surrounding words when reading/writing, and argue that emoji use validates the potential for meaning standardization in ideographs.

In his target article, Morin claims that ideographic codes are exceedingly difficult to use. In my commentary I will show that the use of Bliss symbols does not improve the communicative abilities of aphasic patients with severe language disorders. This failure to remediate communication disorders may result from disruption of inner language allowing to translate ideographic codes into spoken language.

The standardization account predicts short message service (SMS) interactions, allowed by current technology, will support the use and conventionalization of ideographs. Relying on psycholinguistic theories of dialogue, we argue that ideographs (such as emoji) can be used by interlocutors in SMS interactions, so that the main contributor can use them to accompany language and the addressee can use them as stand-alone feedback.

Writing systems display ubiquitous linguistic structure, from the recursive syntactic properties of their glyphs to the morphology/phonology of their combinatorics. This extends to Ancient Egyptian, Chinese, and Sumerian ideograms. Pure ideography requires switching this influence off. The pervasive linguistic tinge to the fabric of writing systems suggests that the chances of breaking what Morin terms language's lock-in effect are slim.

The learning account of the puzzle of ideography cannot be dismissed as readily as Morin maintains, and is compatible with the standardization account. The reading difficulties of deaf and dyslexic individuals, who cannot easily form connections between written letter strings and spoken words, suggest limits to our ability to bypass speech and reliably access meaning directly from graphic symbols.

There is an extensive literature on the usage of Blissymbolics in augmentative and alternative communication that contradicts Morin's contention that it fails as an ideography. Morin's notion of “standardization” (target article, sect. X, para. X) is at odds with the highly developed understanding of this notion in linguistics. What Morin seems to have in mind corresponds to the notion of emergence in iterative and multiagent models of language learning.

To the extent that we expect ideographs to be closer to the reality they depict than spoken or written words we are succumbing to the perennial allure of positivistic thinking. Morin powerfully argues that human communication, including ideography, cannot be understood apart from practice, thus removing the positivistic assumption that made the “puzzle of ideography” puzzling in the first place.

Can we explain the advantage natural languages enjoy over ideographies in a way that enables us to attempt the design of an ideography that “works”? I deploy an adapted version of Shannon's source- and channel-coding partitioning of a communication system to explain the communicative dynamics and shortfalls of ideographies, and reveal ways in which entrenchable, generalist ideographies could be designed.

One novel example and/or perspective in support of “Why the learning account fails” is the impressive ability of humans to recognize and memorize facial features and accurately and reliably connect those to related identities. Furthermore, neuroimaging analysis presents an example in support of the crucial role of standardization in the lack of adoption of ideography.

Notations are cognitive systems involving distinctive psychological functions, behaviors, and material forms. Seen through this lens, two main types – semasiography and visible language – are fundamentally differentiated by their material prehistories, emphasis on iconography, and the centrality of language's combinatorial faculty. These fundamental differences suggest that key qualities (iconicity, expressiveness, concision) are difficult to conjoin in a single system.

If, as it appears, failure of standardization blocks the rise of general-purpose ideography, then a more precise characterization of “standardization” should help illuminate aspects of the process. Comparison is made with several histories of standardization to outline relevant dimensions and thresholds. This line of inquiry is particularly important for the forward-looking question of whether such ideography can ever arise.

Morin has identified an intriguing puzzle about human communication systems, and one element of the solution: Inscriptional sign systems pose more coordination problems, making sender/receiver coadaptation more difficult. But I reject his view of written language, concluding that inscriptional sign systems can be generalist. The upshot is a cost-based proposal about why generalist ideographic systems are essentially unknown.

Morin envisions the adaptive landscape of graphic codes as an unfertile valley where writing rises as an isolated peak that humans managed to reach only on four occasions throughout all of history. By exploring the different paths to cultural convergence, we suggest an alternative landscape occupied by a mountain range of visual art systems. We conclude that graphic communication through visual art worked well enough to render writing contingent but not necessary in most cases.

Self-sufficient ideographies are rare because they are stifled by the issue of standardization. Similar issues arise with abstract art or drawings created by young children or great apes. We propose that mathematical indices and artificial intelligence can help us decode ideography, and if not to understand its meaning, at least to know that meaning exists.

Despite the once-common idea that a universal ideography would have numerous advantages, attempts to develop such ideographies have failed. Here, we make use of the biological idea of fitness landscapes to help us understand the nonevolution of such a universal ideographic code as well as how we might reach this potential global fitness peak in the design space.

Human language looms large in the emergence and evolution of graphic codes. Here, I argue that language not only acts as a strong constraint on graphic codes, but it is also a precondition for their emergence and their evolution as computational devices.

Despite obvious advantages, no generalised ideographic codes have evolved through cultural evolution to rely on iconicity. Morin suggests that this is because of missing means of standardisation, which glottographic codes get from natural languages. Although we agree, we also point to the important role of the available media, which might support some forms of reference more effectively than others.

The Chinese writing system is unique in its implementation of graphemic, phonological, morphological, and semantic features. We add nuances to its portrait in the target article and highlight research on radically different timelines of phonological and semantic activation during reading of Chinese and alphabetic script, paving the way for the identification of universal and culture-specific cognitive processing.

Morin suggested that one of the reasons for the difficulty in standardizing graphic codes is that the production of spoken language reduces the need for graphic codes. Here we try to extend their claims from a psychological perspective, which allows us to conclude that the puzzle of ideography is perhaps related to human psychological traits and psychological evolution.

This response takes advantage of the diverse and wide-ranging series of commentaries to clarify some aspects of the target article, and flesh out other aspects. My central point is a plea to take graphic codes seriously as codes, rather than as a kind of visual art or as a byproduct of spoken language; only in this way can the puzzle of ideography be identified and solved. In this perspective, I argue that graphic codes do not derive their expressive power from iconicity alone (unlike visual arts), and I clarify the peculiar relationship that ties writing to spoken language. I then discuss three possible solutions to the puzzle of ideography. I argue that a learning account still cannot explain why ideographies fail to evolve, even if we emancipate the learning account from the version that Liberman put forward; I develop my preferred solution, the “standardization account,” and contrast it with a third solution suggested by some commentaries, which says that ideographies do not evolve because they would make communication too costly. I consider, by way of conclusion, the consequences of these views for the future evolution of ideography.