This article explores the relationship between cabinet instability and political performance in parliamentary democracies. I develop two theoretical arguments about how cabinet instability should affect government effectiveness, and I use these to define several measures of instability. The first argument suggests that instability in the partisan composition of cabinets should make it difficult for governments to adopt and implement new policy programs. The second argument suggests that instability in the partisan control of portfolios within the government (portfolio volatility) should make it difficult for cabinet ministers to obtain relevant information during policy formulation and implementation. I test both arguments by examining the short- and long-run effect of the instability variables on success at health care cost containment. The analysis indicates that short-run increases in portfolio volatility present problems for government decision makers, but in the long run, unstable systems are able to address the problem that instability poses.

We rely on data from India and the United States to show that political and economic centralization can influence the number of national parties in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. Historically, in both countries the number of parties in local electoral districts has been near two, but the number of national parties has fluctuated. Periods of a small number of national parties in both countries correspond to periods of centralization. We argue that, as national governments centralize power and make policies that affect local areas, candidates have greater incentives to associate with national organizations, and voters have greater incentives to abandon locally competitive but nationally noncompetitive parties.

This article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises. It combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two-party electoral choice. One state has two strategic actors—a government and an opposition party—both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo. The rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals. The parties' payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate. The model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state's preferences. This finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict, since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries, which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation.

We present a theory of European legal integration that relies on three causal factors: transnational exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and the production of legal norms. After stating the theory in abstract terms, we explain the construction of the legal system and test the relationship among our three variables over the life of the European Community. We then examine the effect of the EC legal system on policy outcomes at both the national and supranational levels in two policy domains: the free movement of goods and gender equality. Our theory outperforms its leading rival, intergovernmentalism. The evidence shows that European integration has generally been driven by transnational activity and the efforts of EC institutions to reduce transaction costs, behavior which governments react to but do not control.

This article presents a dynamic theory of parliamentary governments that incorporates attributes of the institutional system in a country, exogenous events that shape parliamentary and electoral opportunities, and the strategies of the government and the opposition as structured by institutions and preferences. The dynamics are investigated in an infinitely repeated game in which events in the form of shocks to income or government resources occur and the government responds with a legislative proposal that is subject to a confidence or censure procedure and may lead to government continuation, reorganization, or dissolution. With a majority confidence procedure, governments are stable, and if parties are politically patient, voting cohesion within the government is high. A censure motion initiated by the opposition can result in voluntary dissolution of government, and the approach of required elections increases the likelihood of dissolution. If the events represent fluctuations in aggregate income, governnment dissolution occurs in good times for the government leader and bad times for the other parties.

The purpose of this research is to examine theories of diffuse support and institutional legitimacy by testing hypotheses about the interrelationships among the salience of courts, satisfaction with court outputs, and diffuse support for national high courts. Like our predecessors, we are constrained by essentially cross-sectional data; unlike them, we analyze mass attitudes toward high courts in eighteen countries. Because our sample includes many countries with newly formed high courts, our cross-sectional data support several longitudinal inferences, using the age of the judicial institution as an independent variable. We discover that the U.S. Supreme Court is not unique in the esteem in which it is held and, like other courts, it profits from a tendency of people to credit it for pleasing decisions but not to penalize it for displeasing ones. Generally, older courts more successfully link specific and diffuse support, most likely due to satisfying successive, nonoverlapping constituencies.

My aim is to bring Marx's general theory of exploitation into line with contemporary theories of distributive justice advanced by liberal egalitarians, theories that stress the ideal of equal concern and respect for persons qua persons and require implementation of the ideal consistent with what historical circumstances permit. I begin by dismissing the labor theory of value as relevant to Marx's general theory, emphasizing instead a “property rights matching power” account. I conclude with some speculative comments about Kantian influences in Marx's sense of justice. Throughout, I assume that Marx believes that exploitation is unjust, and I pursue and sharpen this view in my analysis of Marx's criticism of the distributive principle of socialism.

Henry Thoreau's Walden is frequently read as the tale of a disaffected Romantic individualist escaping the rigors of community and modern society to seek refuge in a pondside idyll. I argue that this is a fundamental misreading which misses the political import of the book. Walden reveals itself to be a democratic advice-book focusing on the tensions between the political ideal of free self-direction and the unfavorable work conditions that laborers often face. Thoreau's goal is to set out a strategy by which economically vulnerable citizens may enact their liberty and autonomy in threatening employment conditions. To that end, Thoreau reformats themes and practices from various ancient philosophical traditions. Walden is one of the few texts in our tradition in which strategies are thought through for the individual laborer attempting to maintain freedom while at the same time making a living. It therefore merits our closest attention.

We present a framework to analyze the effects of constitutional features on legislative voting with respect to cohesion and the distribution of payoffs. We then apply this framework to parliamentary democracies and show how a prominent feature of decision making in parliaments, the vote of confidence procedure, creates an incentive for ruling coalitions to vote together on policy issues that might otherwise split them. The key feature that creates cohesive voting is the fact that votes on bills are treated as votes on who controls floor access in future periods. As a consequence, legislative majorities capture more of the legislative rents from the minority in parliamentary democracies than in nonparliamentary settings.

In exploring the conflicts between individual interests and the conditions that facilitate the disintegration of a political party, this article modifies the exit, voice, and loyalty framework developed by Hirschman. The utility of that framework is examined using the recent change in Japan, that is, the demise of the so-called 1955 system, in which the predominant conservatives confined the socialists to the status of a major but perennial opposition party. The quantitative analysis focuses on the split of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and the internal dispute in the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. These cases provide an interesting comparison of how individual characteristics and contextual conditions affect members' decisions to exercise exit and voice. At the same time, they illuminate how party-level changes have been influenced by intraparty factors.

Theorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinct from the apparatus of the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation. Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the anonymous “public conversation” of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited conception of the public sphere. For Rawls, public reason, which establishes norms for democratic discourse, applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres. I argue that Rawls's more limited “liberal” conception better guarantees the heterogeneity of associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his own principles by partially collapsing the public-nonpublic distinction with potentially illiberal consequences.

Since the debt crisis of 1982, Mexico has experienced more than a decade of market-oriented economic reform, but research on public opinion toward reform is limited. Drawing on general findings from opinion research in the United States, this study examines how policy preferences of Mexicans are shaped by social background, judgments about the economy, and political loyalties. The effect of these variables is examined across three national surveys, conducted in 1992, 1994, and 1995. We found that favorable orientations toward the president and the ruling party were consistently the strongest predictors of preferences about reform. Furthermore, as in the United States, sociotropic evaluations of the economy outweigh “pocketbook” concerns; despite many years of reform, both expectations and retrospective judgments are important in shaping preferences, particularly since the 1994 crisis; and social background variables have limited direct influence.

Why, given a strong presumption of success, do some presidential nominations fail? Of 1,464 important nominations from 1965 to 1994, less than 5% failed. Ninety-four percent of failures were rejected or withdrawn before reaching the floor, suggesting that opponents are most effective during prefloor stages. We propose a theoretical framework based on the notion that policy entrepreneurs pursue their goals within the context of a presumption of success. Logit analysis tends to support the theory that entrepreneurs can alter the presumption of success and defeat a nomination if they (1) identify negative information about a nominee to provide a rationale for changing the presumption and (2) expand the conflict through committee hearings and the media. Presidential resources—high public approval and efforts to signal that the nomination is a high priority—increase the chances of confirmation. Contrary to previous research, divided government has no independent effect on the fate of nominations.

Electoral research acknowledges the growing significance of the mass media in contemporary campaigns, but scholars are divided on the nature of this influence. Using a unique database that includes both media content and public opinion, we examine the flow of partisan information from newspapers to the voters and assess the press's role in electoral politics and citizen learning. We find that the American press does not present clear and singular messages about presidential elections but, rather, multiple messages about the candidates and the campaign. In addition, perception of the information is shaped as much by an individual's political views as by the objective content. Despite the mixed messages, we find that a newspaper's editorial content is significantly related to candidate preferences in 1992. These results challenge the minimal effects interpretation of the media, because local newspapers can play a significant role in providing cues that influence voters' electoral calculus.

Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic reelection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leaders' quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such “cheap talk” foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome.

How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability.

MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1992) argue that the aggregate distribution of party identification, or macropartisanship, shifts significantly over short periods in response to changes in presidential popularity and consumer sentiment. Their results are based on a subset of Gallup surveys available from 1953 to 1988 and only those CBS /New York Times surveys conducted during the Reagan administration. We replicate this analysis using a more extensive inventory of Gallup and CBS /New York Times data and find considerably less evidence of partisan fluctuation. The amount of partisan change caused by short-term movements in consumer sentiment and presidential popularity is found to be two to three times smaller than initially reported by MacKuen et al. (1989). Our results indicate that macropartisanship adjusts to short-term shocks in a limited and gradual fashion, consistent with traditional views of partisan realignment.

Given the recent court rulings against racial gerrymandering, the effect of multimember district elections on minority representation is an important issue. We present a model of voting in double-member district elections with two majority candidates and one minority candidate and consider the voting equilibria under straight and cumulative voting. In straight voting, while an equilibrium always exists in which the two majority candidates are expected to win the two seats, minority candidates may be elected. In cumulative voting, minority candidate wins are also possible in equilibrium but are less likely when minority voters prefer one majority candidate over another. We then present experimental evidence showing that minority candidates win significantly more seats in cumulative than in straight voting elections. When minority voters perceive a substantial difference between the majority candidates, however, they are more likely to split their votes between the minority and majority candidates, winning fewer seats.

Interest in the thought of Hugo Grotius on international law and ethics is justified inasmuch as he attempted to define a theoretical position between an idealism he thought counterproductive and an amoral realism he found unacceptable. Grotius constructed a system in which the moral authority of natural law was combined with the flexibility of human law. This required him to develop a special understanding of the nature and relation of these two types of law. In giving the law of nations, as a product of human will, the authority to suspend provisions of natural law, he provided for a code of international conduct that could permit injustice where necessary, without abandoning moral ideals altogether.

We maintain that the rise and fall in the number of states with divided Senate delegations can be explained primarily in terms of long-run forces of realignment/dealignment and staggered Senate elections. We test our model with election data from 1788–1996 rather than only the post–World War II period, which was common in previous research. We show that a large number of divided Senate delegations is not new; indeed, the highest percentage occurred in 1830. Exactly as predicted by our model, we find a cyclical pattern in divided Senate delegations that is tied to realigning epochs. Our analysis also calls attention to the recent decline in the number of such delegations, and we argue that this trend may well continue.