The Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice Brandeis, recently handed down its decision in Tutun v. United States, and Neuberger v. United States. This is the latest of the important Supreme Court cases determining the law of naturalization, of citizenship, and of expatriation. During the past fifteen years they have comprised Johannessen v. United States, Mansour v. United States, Luria v. United States, Maibaum v. United States, Mackenzie v. Hare, United States v. Ginsberg, United States v. Ness, United States v. Morena, Ozawa v. United States, Yamashita v. Hinkle, United States v. Thind, Kaplan v. Tod, and Toyota v. United States.

The United States intervention in Haiti concludes another chapter in the development of the constitutional common law of presidential power. The Haiti experience further confirms the constitutional authority of the President to deploy armed forces into hostile foreign environments, and to initiate the use of force without prior, specific congressional authorization. The facts of the situation limit the “precedent” to small-scale interventions where the risk of major military engagements, either initially or upon escalation, is negligible. The cases of largescale hostilities, like Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, are quite different in fact and perhaps also in law. But the Haiti “precedent,” coupled with the recent interventions in Grenada and Panama and innumerable examples earlier in history, strongly supports an unqualified presidential power to carry out small-scale military operations in support of foreign policy goals.

In recent years federal courts have faced a growing number of challenges to United States actions abroad. Citizens living abroad have brought claims alleging that their property was unlawfully taken or that their lives were threatened by United States governmental action. Aliens living in foreign countries have also invoked constitutional protections—Nicaraguans have alleged torture and assassination attributed to CIA activities in Central America; a Mexican alleged that his home in Mexico was searched by Drug Enforcement Agency officials without a search warrant; a Lebanese citizen claimed that he was unlawfully arrested and interrogated in international waters by U.S. agents; a Polish refugee tried for hijacking in a special United States court convened in Berlin sought the right to a jury trial. These cases test the extent to which the Constitution limits U.S. conduct abroad.

As many readers are aware, Bond v. United States is a quirky case. The federal government prosecuted under the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a betrayed wife who used chemical agents to try to harm her husband’s lover. The wife argued that, as applied to her, the implementing legislation violated the Tenth Amendment. She thus raised difficult questions about the scope of the treaty power and of Congress’s authority to implement treaties through the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Bond Court avoided those questions with a clear statement rule: “we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.” This resolution betrays the Court’s ambivalence about the appropriate limits of the treaty power and about the Court’s own capacity to define those limits.

The task of codifying international law is so vast, the subject thus named so uncertain in nature and in limits, language so imperfect and misleading, and human reason so puny, that a person who addresses himself to the business with the intention of elaborating concrete expressions of the law finds himself with no solid foothold to start from, no certain direction to take, and no clear conviction as to how best to work. In the present attempt to study the problem of codification of international law in a few of its aspects, the writer has taken one topic only, the treaty, thinking that here we have phenomena in plenty and that discussion thereof may be a fruitful preliminary procedure. For even here, at the very outset, we are confronted with primary questions which throw us back to the very threshold as it were of the whole subject.

The following incident will explain the reason for the suggestions in this paper that treaties signed on behalf of the United States should be published, in some cases, before their ratification.