The phenomenon of human shields challenges core tenets of international humanitarian law (IHL), including its careful dialectic between the imperatives of humanity and military necessity. Although the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality are well established in the abstract, consensus remains elusive when these concepts are applied to situations involving human shields, who blur the boundary between civilians and combatants. And while the prohibition against using human shields is absolute, it is too often honored in its breach in today's asymmetrical conflicts. Indeed, resort to human shields has become attractive precisely because it exploits protective legal rules to the detriment of those principled armed actors who value—and thus strive for—IHL compliance. These parties, in turn, are struggling to adapt their operations to a practice that has become “endemic” in the modern battlefield.

We have read with great interest the remarks “De Jure Naturae et Gentium” by Mr. Alfred P. Rubin of the U. S. Department of Defense. But as these remarks were obviously written with reference to this writer’s editorial, “Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law,”

Several important events have marked the seventh year in the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The court was in session at The Hague from February 6, 1928, to April 26, 1928 (thirteenth session); from June 15, 1928, to September 13, 1928 (fourteenth session); and from November 12, 1928, to November 21, 1928 (fifteenth session). It handed down two advisory opinions (Nos. 15 and 16) and two judgments (Nos. 12 and 13), and several important orders. It lost the services of two eminent judges through the resignation of Judge John Bassett Moore and the death of Judge André Weiss. A settlement was reached with the Netherlands Government of the long-standing question as to the privileges and immunities of the judges and registry officials; and, what is perhaps more important for the court’s future, the signatories of the court’s protocol of signature began the consideration of changes in the court’s statute in the light of seven years’ experience. The seventh year marks progress in the establishment of the court’s position as the chief agency in the world for the international administration of justice, as it marks also changes which will affect the future of the court.

In an era of propaganda warfare it is dangerous to condone the misuse of words. Words with a well-defined legal meaning, such as “intervention,” should not be loosely used in a non-technical sense outside the context in which they have been developed.

By a joint resolution passed on April 30 Congress reënacted, with modifications in some cases, and made permanent the essential provisions of the temporary resolution of August 31,1935 (as amended February 29,1936), which by its own terms expired on May 1, 1937. With the exception of the new Section 6 dealing with restrictions on the exportation and transportation of commodities other than arms, ammunition and implements of war, the duration of which by its own terms is limited to two years, the present resolution is therefore intended to lay down a permanent neutrality policy for the United States.

The Institute of International Law, Recalling its Resolutions of New York (1929) on the international rights of man, of Brussels (1936) on the juridical status of stateless persons and refugees, and of Lausanne (1947) on the fundamental rights of man, the basis of a restoration of international law.