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This article focuses on the jurisdictional conflicts that emerged at the juncture of the transplanted legalities that followed the Caucasian expulsion in the 1850s and 1860s, the proclamation of the proto-constitution known as the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, and the internationally enforced ban on trading in African slaves in 1857. Starting with the Caucasian expulsion, it traces how legal practices were carried over with Caucasian refugees to the Ottoman domains and how the judicial management of slavery-related conflicts determined not only the limits of slavery, but also how such liberal “fictions” as freedom or equality before the law were vernacularized by local agents in the Ottoman Empire. Navigating within a set of what were labeled as freedom suits (hürriyet davaları), I examine how enslaved refugees built their claims in relation to different legal terrains, problems, and concepts. I argue that while Caucasian-Ottoman slavery was economically marginal, it nonetheless posed serious challenges to the new political order the Ottomans aspired to establish, and the abolition that never came continued to bend categories of ethnicity, race, and gender in the decades after expulsion.
This essay partakes in the dialogue between history, anthropology, and social theory on the topic of debt as a social relation. Drawing on sources from nineteenth-century Switzerland, it examines everyday routines of debt collection in liberalism by taking the seized collateral object to the center of historical analysis. It is shown how the attached goods in a debtor's household became an object of knowledge for nineteenth-century framers of law as well as for ordinary debtors. I make use of anthropological theory in order to describe the legal techniques of delineating and extracting collateral, and show how these legal techniques implied specific knowledge practices. I then look at two borderline cases of collateralization: the pawning of mobile goods and the imprisonment of insolvent debtors. Further, I discuss how, by the 1880s, the limits of debt collection were debated, when certain goods were exempt for seizure in a projected federal law. Overall, on an epistemological level, debt collection appears as a double movement: it provided basic tools to untangle property relationships, yet all the while it created new, unpredictable complications. Thus debt collection was a distinctive arena in which the uneasy conceptual relationship between people and things in nineteenth-century liberalism unfolded. From this conceptual node I propose a historical epistemology of the collateral object.
This study examines the conception of nationhood developed by a political movement referred to as Ulusalcılık (nationalism), which emerged at the turn of the century. We focus on ways in which the Ulusalcı movement makes use of nation-building techniques to establish and propagate its own version of Turkish nationhood as one that is primordially secular and patriotic. This is expressed in its opposition to Islamism, Ottomanism, and what it sees as imperialist Western powers. We argue that the most significant technique Ulusalcı nationalists use to rebuild Turkish nationhood is a relocation of the nation's founding moment, from the official Kemalist one marked by the founding of the Republic in 1923 to the War of Independence fought against the European powers between 1919 and 1922. Our premise is that nationhood is ultimately the product of storytelling, and that the politics of nationhood involves the contentious production, dissemination, and negotiation of different stories and their corresponding founding moments. We analyze the story of Turkish nationhood told in the bestselling book Those Crazy Turks, which became the bible of the Ulusalcı movement. We argue that the Ulusalcı narration of Turkish nationhood interpellates a new national subject that is primordially secular, militaristically patriotic, and adamantly anti-Western. These are projected as essential qualities that must, at all cost, be upheld and defended against Islamist, Ottomanist, and Western powers that are conspiring to bring Turkey down.
This article uses the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to make a conceptual argument about sovereignty. Despite its aura of natural order, sovereignty is ultimately self-referential and thus somewhat arbitrary and potentially unstable. At the heart of this unsteadiness, we posit, lies the paradox between the systematic tenets of rational governance and the capricious potential of sublime violence. Both are highly relevant to the LTTE case: the movement created de facto state institutions to mimic governance, but simultaneously deployed an elaborate transcendental register of sacrifice, meaning, and intractable power wielded by a mythical leader. To capture this paradox, we connect the literature on rebel governance with anthropological debates about divine kingship. We conceptualize sovereignty as a citational practice that involves the adaptation, imitation, and mutation of different idioms of authority: political and religious, modern and traditional, rational and mythical. Understanding sovereignty in this way debunks the idea that insurgent movements are merely lagging behind established states. As sites of mimicry, bricolage, and innovation, they transform the way sovereignty is practiced and understood, thus affecting the frame that sovereignty is.
This essay provides an interpretation of parallel attempts to represent ruination in the cities of Warsaw and Berlin after the Holocaust—the architectural projects of Bohdan Lachert and Daniel Libeskind. Lachert strove to represent the ruination of Jewish life in Warsaw through a modernist housing project, whereas Libeskind sought to represent Jewish ruination in a museum. While these two projects might seem different, they come together around a shared aspiration: to represent absence and ruination. Both projects endeavored to create a new kind of memorial that moved away from the conventional form. Rather than turning away from ruination and suffering as the conventional monument has done, Libeskind and Lachert sought to develop a new, non-salvific kind of monument that would reflect on death, suffering, and emptiness. This essay emphasizes the novelty of their attempts to create a different relationship to the absence that is the past, while it also explores some of the central challenges—both historical and theoretical—that both architects faced in implementing their artistic visions.
The discipline called the “anthropology of Christianity” began to gain traction in the early to mid-2000s when interested scholars focused on Christianity as an object of collaborative and comparative cross-cultural analysis. Along with several landmark works of Joel Robbins, one foundational text is Fenella Cannell's edited volume The Anthropology of Christianity, published in 2006. In her introductory essay, Cannell poses a pointed question for the volume and the discipline itself: “What difference does Christianity make?” Bracketing the question of whether “difference” can or should be defined (Green 2014), several anthropologists have taken inspiration from Cannell, including Naomi Haynes (2014) in the concluding essay to a recent special issue of Current Anthropology, and myself and Debra McDougall (2013) in an edited volume on Christian politics in Oceania. Difference, as the criterion by which continuity and transformation are evaluated, is arguably the key concept for an effective anthropological engagement with Christianity.
This article links up the disastrous history of fossil fuels with the celebrated ecology of mangroves. Building on ethnographic and historical research in Puerto Rico and St. Croix, it outlines the often neglected but quite consequential place of crude oil in the Caribbean. Following the construction of what became the second largest refinery in the world, I describe how the imperial energy networks of the United States first came to the Caribbean. Troubling a popular origin story of the Caribbean, colonial and industry leaders voiced a robust critique of the plantation in order to justify the introduction of these enclave refineries. Imperial energy networks welcomed an unprecedented problem to the region: coastal oil spills. The scientific and legal response to these spills brought new attention to the vital relationality of mangroves. Rather perversely, the destruction of the mangroves in the Caribbean—in which crude oil played the leading role—opened mangroves up to new forms of knowledge and care. While many claim that fossil fuels helped cultivate a modern disregard for the natural world, I show how the negative ecologies of fossil fuels also instigated new scientific and political appreciations for the liveliness of the natural world. This story of oil in the Caribbean has implications for scholarly debates around the so-called Anthropocene. Against scholarship that looks at the coming disaster of crude oil as an epochal break in thought and politics, this paper instead describes the long history of acknowledging and managing the disastrous qualities of fossil fuels.
In 1957, the security force of Angola's colonial diamond mining company recruited African diviners to help them solve a case of diamond theft in Lunda. This event reveals a peculiar convergence of divinatory practices with techniques of corporate surveillance in Lunda's political economy of security. In their overlapping features of secrecy and control, divination and corporate security can be understood as historically aligned evidentiary practices, or what I call “corporate divination.” By examining divinatory rituals in tandem with the “occult” apparatus of corporate surveillance, and the figure of a colonial sorcerer-detective renowned for his “divinatory” prowess, I ask how such seemingly opposed modes of knowledge production eroded or shored up colonial rule. The cultural significance of divination within the context of a mining company, I suggest, exposes the conditions under which a colonial corporation appropriates the social world in which it intervenes, and conversely, the cultural resources that potentially shape or undermine corporate life in a colonial context.
From the late nineteenth century through the interwar period, the production and consumption of German things played critical roles in delineating and connecting a wide variety of German places in Latin America. Such places became ubiquitous in Chile and Argentina. They flourished because there was ample room in the German imagination for the multiplicity of German places and the cultural hybridity that accompanied them to extend beyond Imperial Germany's national boundaries and colonial possessions. They also flourished because host societies found virtue in having those German places in their states. This essay uses German schools in Argentina and Chile as a window into the emergence of such German places and the soft power that accompanied them. Scholars often overlook that power when they focus on colonial questions or formal and informal imperialism in Latin America. More than any other institution, German schools became sites where the production and consumption of German things were concentrated and multilayered, and where the consistencies and great varieties of Germanness that arrived and evolved in Latin America gained their clearest articulation. Because those schools were both centers of communities and nodes in a global pedagogical network that thrived during the interwar period, they provide us with great insight into a nexus of motivations that created German places in Latin America. Life around these schools also underscores the importance of studying immigrants and their things together.
THE IDEAS of Global South and Global North today seem to have substituted the previous geopolitical notion of an East–West divide as well as the concepts of the First, Second and Third Worlds. It is probably too obvious that this new divide is as biased and as loaded with ideological constructs and unavoidable contradictions as both previous ones. If we pay closer attention to the details, we find the difficulties, which blur the picture. How, for example, did Australia turn out to be in the Global North or Russia, the former leader of the ‘Eastern’ or ‘Second’ World, drift towards the Global South together with its polar regions and Arctic ambitions? It is not really clear how one can unite culturally, geographically, economically and politically different countries into a single unit as wide as a Global North or Global South. If North is neatly defined as European and North American societies (with the possible inclusion of Australia and New Zealand), one can only wonder whether we do not face here the good old Eurocentric world-outlook in just slightly changed clothes. This really becomes obvious when a relatively homogenous ‘North’ is opposed to a ‘South’ containing countries as different as India, Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. Political will and overlapping interests can probably bring these countries closer within the frameworks of the BRICS countries club; but they cannot change the background of very different histories, the background from the depths of which they ask and answer questions concerning their being in the modern world.
The interesting question, thus, is not why this or that country is included in (or excluded from) the putative or real Global South, but how a particular culture positions itself in a world understood in terms of various geographical, geopolitical and geocultural divides. Essentially the same question is about the ways in which a particular culture maps the globe. Of course, this mapping or positioning is a historical phenomenon and does change with the passing of time. Like large tectonic plates, cultures can also drift to the West or East, float to the South or North and cause violent eruptions when they collide. Thus, countries, which several decades ago were defined as Eastern, now seem to belong to the West or North.
IN RECENT TIMES we have witnessed what appears to be the return of a certain expectation in terms of the emancipatory and transformative potential of the South, at an economic level, but also politically and socially (Gray and Gills 2016). The awakening of this interest is due to the trustworthiness demonstrated by cooperation amongst so-called Southern countries, and stems from the new visibility that this has attained within representational frameworks. The re-emergence of a Southern layout based on the controversial Global South category, the SSC acronym (South-South Cooperation) and especially that of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), have built upon a historic promise. This promise was made in the second half of last century, specifically from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, drawing on novel economic and cultural theories. It was aimed at creating innovations that could rearrange the world and was formulated for the first time in the African and Asian Non-Aligned Countries’ Conference in Bandung in 1955, whose principles were the SSC's foundational motto (equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, non-interference and non-aggression).
In the following decade the history of colonialism that had its origin in the distant sixteenth century was about to end: the process of anti-colonial struggles had – almost entirely – been accomplished in the form of national liberation or by means of the decolonisation process that was achieving its final goals in Africa. ‘Recognising that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations’ was stated – at last – in the United Nations’ Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly 1960).
Along with the apparent heterogeneity of liberated Southern countries, the factors that were common amongst them were their past of subjugation, an economically dependent present and a future already marked in advance by the challenges of reducing their own developmental differences, as well as those of countries without a colonial past and that had experienced significant economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s. Only thereafter could the geographical contrast start to evolve into something patently geopolitical: thus, the debate about economic development entered the global political agenda and was laid out as the North–South divide (for a complete account of the meaning of this binary opposition, see Pinheiro in this volume).
THE TERMS ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ are the latest in a long series of conceptual distinctions that serve as attempts at world-interpretation and world-ordering. By now they are widely used without further explanation, in particular the term ‘Global South’, showing that they have entered common language in global public debate. A recent bibliometric study showed that the use of the term ‘Global South’ in the social sciences and humanities has been steadily increasing from 19 in 2004 to 248 in 2013 (Pagel et al. 2014; for general reflections on this rise, see Hylland Eriksen 2015). There are now scholarly journals that carry the term in their title, such as The Global South, published by Indiana University Press and already in its tenth year, or the open access online journal Bandung: Journal of the Global South. Higher education institutions have started to honour the concept by institutionalising it, such as through the Global South Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science or the Global South Studies Center at the University of Cologne. If rapid diffusion is a measure, the apparently geographical distinction between South and North is a great success.
At the same time, this distinction is problematic in numerous respects. Indeed, the stream of publications in which the term ‘South’ is used as a concept – or, some might prefer to say: in place of a concept – as if it had an evident and generally accepted referent keeps being accompanied by a debate about the very meaning and usefulness of the term, in which numerous and not at all consonant voices can be heard. To give just a few illustrations: conceptually, the distinction between North and South has multiple – overlapping, but not identical – meanings. North/South may be taken to be a distinction between the rich and the poor, the dominant and the dominated, the centre and the periphery, the ‘advanced industrial societies’ and the ‘developing’ ones, among others. Empirically, the Global South is not identical with the southern hemisphere, in which societies of the Global North, such as Australia, are located, and vice versa.
THE TENDENCY to spatially displace imaginaries of societies and their specific historical development is not new. The interpretation of a space based on geographical orientation has indeed seldom been based on any natural idea of what the space is (Gregory 1994; Garfield 2013). Recently, though, much attention has been devoted to the discussion of space as a political and historical entity. It has been rediscovered as a privileged object for the analysis of different historical processes largely crystallised in different parts of the globe.
As part of this volume, in which the reader will find a variety of issues related to how spatial categories can be taken as ‘useful’ concepts for the inquiry into problems of the social world, this chapter addresses a relatively unexplored aspect of modern experience with space. This aspect concerns the relation between displacements of people in different spaces and the production of knowledge/interpretation. It argues that the South, understood for now simply as a specific localisation of historical relations, has always been a space where general trans-regional theories and concepts have emerged. As with so-called ‘Northern theory’, ‘Southern theory’ shares similar pretensions of universality and also proceeds by exercising similar gestures of historical erasure. Hence, from this point of view, there is not a strong purely intellectual distinction that could split Northern and Southern thought. However, an important aspect constituting what could be regarded as something that does split a Northern from a Southern intellectual tradition is that the former has departed from the idea of spatial neutrality as a condition for the production of theories, as Mignolo (2011) has shown; and the latter, on the contrary, has interpreted itself and its place in the world through what is called here a critical localisation of argument. This critical localisation of discourse is done without any prejudice against the production of universal claims. Henceforth, this chapter highlights what could be an important difference detected between the ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ intellectual traditions, but argues in favour of the existence of similar claims of universality despite the location of knowledge/interpretation.
IN FEBRUARY 1930, Leo Frobenius, the German archaeologist and ethnologist, announced to the world that he had identified the ‘source of the civilization which created Zimbabwe and many hundreds of ruins’ (‘The Zimbabwe Riddley’, Cape Times, 1 February 1930) scattered around southern Africa. Zimbabwe, a ruined stone city, is a Late Iron Age archaeological site in the south of the country that today also goes by the name Zimbabwe. The city was once the capital of a pre-colonial kingdom that existed between the tenth century and the fifteenth century. The kingdom thrived on a gold and ivory trade that linked it to a commercial network that involved the east African coast, parts of the Middle East, India and China. The Indian Ocean was the centre of this network and the heart of one of the world's most dominant trade systems at least until the fifteenth century. The city had first come to the knowledge of Europeans through Portuguese explorers in the sixteenth century but controversy over its origins had raged among Europeans almost from their first contact with its ruins. Many Europeans believed that Zimbabwe, with its sophisticated architecture, including curved and five-metre-high walls built without mortar, could not have been the work of Africans. The site was believed to be too complex to have been produced by Africans. Enter Frobenius to settle the matter.
When he made his announcement, Frobenius was in Cape Town, en route back to Germany after a research trip to India. Speaking to the Cape Times, a top English-medium newspaper in the Union of South Africa, Frobenius said the archaeological sites that dotted southern Africa were more than just ruins. Ruined cities such as Zimbabwe, local rock paintings and decayed mines were all related to a ‘culture of the highest order’. And this culture was not African – Frobenius said. How had he arrived at his conclusion? ‘Logically, he had piled one deduction upon the other’, the Cape Times reported.